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Abstract
Amidst the worst disaster to impact a major U.S. city in one hundred years, New Orleans’ main
trauma and safety net medical center, the Reverend Avery C. Alexander Charity Hospital, was
permanently closed. Charity’s administrative operator, Louisiana State University (LSU),
ordered an end to its attempted reopening by its workers and U.S. military personnel in the
weeks following the August 29, 2005 storm. Drawing upon rigorous review of literature and an
exhaustive analysis of primary and secondary data, this case study found that Charity Hospital
was closed as a result of disaster capitalism. LSU, backed by Louisiana state officials, took
advantage of the mass internal displacement of New Orleans’ populace in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina in an attempt to abandon Charity Hospital’s iconic but neglected facility and
to supplant its original safety net mission serving the poor and uninsured for its neoliberal
transformation to favor LSU’s academic medical enterprise.

Keywords
Charity Hospital; New Orleans; public hospitals; safety net; Hurricane Katrina; Naomi Klein;
disaster capitalism; medical neoliberalism; LSU Health Care Services Division; Huey Long
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Introduction
Amidst the worst disaster to impact a major city in the United States in one hundred
years, New Orleans’ Reverend Avery C. Alexander Charity Hospital was permanently closed.
The twenty story Art Deco public health landmark commonly referred to as “Charity” served as
southeast Louisiana’s main trauma center, the teaching hospital for several colleges and
universities, and the healthcare provider of last resort for the poor and uninsured.
Within one day of Hurricane Katrina’s August 29, 2005 landfall, conditions at Charity
rapidly deteriorated from its operation as a modern urban safety net hospital. It quickly became a
Third World facility hobbled without electricity, air conditioning and running water. As in much
of New Orleans, Charity’s patients, staff and their families were literally marooned for days
awaiting rescue. Some died awaiting that rescue. Everyone endured great hardship and
discomfort as the languid summer heat inundated the hospital as floodwaters swelled outside.
Evacuation of Charity’s patients, staff and their families, finally completed five days later – left
behind a shuttered building representing nearly three centuries of healthcare tradition.
Charity Hospital’s closure in the wake of Hurricane Katrina forced the layoff of nearly
all of its 3,600 workers. Graduate training programs were destabilized, leading to the disruption
of the education of students and medical residents. The finances of the area’s remaining private
and non-state hospitals hemorrhaged due to overnight inundation with impoverished patients that
Charity would have normally seen. Many primary care practices and outpatient health centers
citywide, already decimated by flood damage and the dislocation of their patient base, also lost
the only hospital which would accept their referrals. Charity’s closure also compromised
emergency trauma services and psychiatric crisis intervention – leaving a fractured response to
cope with New Orleans’ staggeringly high levels of depression, mental illness, and suicide.
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The doctors, staff and residents of Charity’s emergency department nevertheless
attempted to reopen the hospital following the storm evacuation of its patients. They almost
succeeded. Joined by several U.S. military units and international response teams, key
operational services of Charity were readied for interim use within one month of Hurricane
Katrina. In spite of this heroic effort, Charity Hospital’s administrative operator, the Louisiana
State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD or LSU), deemed the facility unfit
for medical use to reopen. Instead of expeditiously repairing and reopening New Orleans’ main
trauma center in the wake of the storm, hospital administrators, backed by state officials
including Governor Kathleen Blanco halted – then cancelled – a disaster recovery operation.
Ordered under the threat of arrest to end their attempted hospital resurrection, Charity
workers were forced instead to practice medicine in hastily-erected MASH-style tents located
five blocks away from the campus they had restored just days before. Thus began an odyssey of
makeshift disaster trauma medicine – resulting in a still-fractured New Orleans healthcare system
unable to fully restore its acute care capabilities back to even pre-storm levels.
This thesis considers the closure of Charity Hospital as well as the future vitality of the
state hospital system it spawned. Developing over almost three centuries out of the European
almshouse tradition to yield modern medicine, Charity’s now-shuttered downtown New Orleans
hospital became the emblematic flagship of iconic populist Huey P. Long’s Share Our Wealth
commitment to the poor and dispossessed. Charity and its inspired network of Louisiana public
hospitals – a holdover remnant of Keynesian New Deal-era policies – have also endured through
decades of institutional neglect and cannibalization of its assets for private medical interests. Yet
only now has Charity Hospital been seriously challenged – by authorities taking advantage of the
epic catastrophe sparked by Hurricane Katrina – to permanently supplant its historic mission.
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Theoretical Foundation
Consideration of the closure of Charity Hospital following Hurricane Katrina
sociologically demands a deeper explanatory investigation rooted within a theoretical
foundation. Yin (2009, p. 36) suggests that, far from having to develop a “grand theory” of
immense scope and proportion, “the simple goal is to have a sufficient blueprint” for a study.
Yin, citing Sutton and Staw (1995, p. 378), states “this requires theoretical propositions [to
convey] a story about why acts, events, structure, and thoughts occur.”
Creswell (2009, p.51) defines theory as “an interrelated set of constructs (or variables)
formed into propositions, or hypotheses, that specify the relationship among variables (typically
in terms of magnitude or direction).” In this study, the proposition is “New Orleans’ Charity
Hospital was closed as a result of disaster capitalism, to supplant its original mission, for its
neoliberal transformation to favor LSU’s academic medical enterprise.” The stated proposition is
examined through the review and analysis of literature, data and participant observation.
The theoretical parameter for this study starts from its subject of investigation – namely
the conflict between efforts of New Orleans’ Charity Hospital’s doctors, medical residents and
the U.S. military to reopen Charity after Hurricane Katrina as the city was virtually emptied of its
population; and direct actions of Louisiana State University (LSU) and the State of Louisiana to
forbid the hospital’s reopening. Reallocation of Charity’s capital assets away from its historic
mission to treat the medically indigent to favor LSU’s graduate medical education for a private
healthcare marketplace completes the theoretical limit of this case study’s research proposition.
Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1994, p. 80) roots conflict theory in free market
competition for “resources or advantages desired by others.” This is expressed through the
mobilization of economic “power resources” out of which social conflict arises.
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Conflict theory is also the leading theoretical construct for the discipline of medical
sociology. Characterized as the sociology of healthcare access and delivery, this thesis draws
from this scholarship to explore research questions arising out of Charity Hospital’s closure.
Matcha (2000) observed the confluence of medical sociology and conflict theory:
Medicine is more than a biological interpretation of symptoms. For
instance, medicine involves the values of the health-care provider and
the patient, as well as the resultant consequences associated with the
similarities or differences of these values (p. 17).
Weitz (2001) notes medical sociology frames “problems as public issues rather than
merely personal troubles.” She cited C. Wright Mills’ critique of the division between “troubles”
and “issues” through comparison of an individual patient’s experience where issues transcend the
personal into the larger structural realm, whether in a hospital or in society (p. 5). Referencing
conflict theory, Weitz also said that the sociology of medicine “often challenges both medical
views of the world and existing power relationships within healthcare” (p. 9). Weitz writes that
hospitals once “functioned as total institutions, in which patients traded individual rights for
health care,” (p. 291) but “the bureaucratic nature and large size of modern hospitals, coupled
with the highly technological nature of hospital care, often means the patient as individual person
and not just diseased body gets lost” (p. 296).
Brown (1989) addresses the polarity of health, illness, politics, economics and culture:
Health and illness cannot be understood by simply looking at
biological phenomena and medical knowledge. Rather, it is necessary
to situate health and illness in the framework of larger political,
economic, and cultural forces (p. v).
Considering deeper these dimensions in the context of the conflict over Charity
Hospital’s closure following Hurricane Katrina, this thesis extends its social conflict theoretical
foundation to include the related paradigms of neoliberalism and disaster capitalism.
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Harvey (2005) contextualizes neoliberalism within its economic basis:
Neoliberalism in the first instance (is) a theory of political economic
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced
by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an
institutional framework characterized by strong private property
rights, free markets, and free trade (p. 2).
Horton (2007, p.1) etymologically links “neo” to neo-classical free market economics
emerging in the late nineteenth century; “Liberal” signifies freedom from governmental
intervention. Harvey (p. 19) noted that neoliberal conceptions of freedom have served only as the
theoretical legitimating of a merger of the public sphere into the private sphere, reducing daily
life into quantified financial transactions to advance capital accumulation above all life pursuits,
“in short, the financialization of everything” (p. 33).
Coining the term medical neoliberalism, Jill Fisher (2007, pp. 64-65) said this variant
also emphasizes “a cultural sensibility toward the commodification of health and wellness.” No
longer seen as a necessity, healthcare under medical neoliberalism “transforms individuals from
patients to consumers.” Rather than holistically considering one’s actual health needs within the
healthcare system, the emphasis is placed upon individualizing the health experience “in terms of
opportunities for [consumer] choice” – the choice to purchase health services like commodities –
leading “to a prioritization of choice over equity and access” – as well as an altered landscape for
doctors and hospitals to favor privatization. Fisher noted this impact:
The changing structure of payment for medical services had profound
effects on the culture of medicine. For example, it can be said to have
undermined the authority of physicians, who under managed care
must adhere to the rules of medical diagnostics and treatments set by
insurance providers … Ultimately, managed care played a key role in
the commodification of health care. By assigning values and
standards to clinical practice, medicine became less a social good and
more a set of commodities to which individual patients have
differential degrees of access (pp. 65-66).
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Focusing on the “internal disagreement” liberals themselves have apart from
conservatives over healthcare delivery and access, Bodenheimer (2005) argued that the
neoliberal paradigm simultaneously judges healthcare as a human necessity; yet one that also
affords it to be most efficiently delivered through private capital, by marshalling public resources
in order to achieve the fullest and most productive economic and social results. Bodenheimer
suggests that under this rationality, government health assistance programs like traditional
Medicare and Louisiana’s Charity hospitals are expected to incorporate private mechanisms to
manage and distribute otherwise intrinsic public benefits, because market competition is
expected to produce the strongest program for the best price.
Klein (2007, pp. 14-15) said “the ideology [of neoliberalism] is a shape-shifter, forever
changing its name and switching identities.” U.S. adherents “who associated liberals with high
taxes and hippies,” identify themselves as “conservatives,” “classical economists” and
“neoconservatives.” Fathered by Nobel Prize-winning economist and self-identified classical
liberal Milton Friedman, Klein (pp. 17-19) suggests neoliberalism is a return to classic preKeynesian liberalism fused with “corporatism” through forced economic and political “shocks.”
Extending neoliberalism into the post-modern global capitalism realm, Naomi Klein’s
2007 book THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, popularized the second
variant of conflict theory considered within this thesis. Klein defines disaster capitalism as the
use of a disaster or major event for the deliberate re-engineering of economic, political and
community spheres to create capital investment opportunities while affected populations are
internally displaced. Klein suggests that disaster capitalism transforms crisis relief and social
reconstruction to reflect neoliberal values, defying any attempt to return to simply restoring what
was before the calamity. Instead, this “reconstruction” paradigm deconstructs what was.
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This thesis documents the calamitous healthcare and social impacts of the disaster
capitalist paradigm on Charity Hospital and New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
Occurring with greater frequency beyond the United States over the past forty years, Bello
(2006) has described this kind of disaster response, “influenced by neoliberal market economics,
as promoted by the World Bank and influenced by the U.S.” as the Relief and Reconstruction
Complex. Bello argues that the once dominant role played by the United Nations and the Red
Cross in post-war and natural disaster relief and reconstruction has been overtaken by a “brand
of ‘humanitarianism’ (that) has put strategic considerations before people’s needs.” Bello, citing
Klein (2005), recalls another attempt to “fast track” privatization of public services following the
1998 disastrous Hurricane Mitch in the Central American nation of Honduras, “while the country
was still knee deep in rubble, corpses and mud.” This ‘reconstruction’ has now come to define a
First World disaster response, with the closure of Charity Hospital amongst its first acts.
The attempt to reopen Charity Hospital by its doctors, medical residents and U.S.
military personnel in the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, in defiance of LSU and the State of
Louisiana signals just the most dominant theoretical conflict explored in this case study. Indeed,
from discussions of how to finance construction before this ‘Big Charity’ facility was built in
1939, through previous attempts to close this iconic but worn hospital just a month before the
2005 storm, this thesis explores its theoretical proposition through a social historical narrative
and data analysis of the case of Charity’s permanent closure. It is showcased in part by this
history; in what RMJM Hillier (2008, p. 23) termed as having national architectural, cultural,
technological and historical significance, with its “unique model of publicly funded care for the
poor and uninsured,” as being one of the oldest and largest safety net / teaching hospitals of its
kind, and being emblematic of public healthcare facing restructuring by free market competition.
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Narrative Structure of this Case Study
Yin (2009, pp. 175-179) explores the various ways a case story report can be structured
as predicated by its purpose. Compositional structures include linear-analytic, comparative,
chronological, theory-building, “suspense” and unsequenced. Synthesizing data pertaining to its
theoretical proposition, this case study is set chronologically in a social historical narrative
format to represent time periods in Charity Hospital’s almost 300 years of history:
Chapter One – From Charity Hospital’s founding through Medicare and Medicaid
This chapter reviews the social history of Charity Hospital from its 1736 founding
through creation of the 1965 federal Medicare and Medicaid programs. Founded as a
French colonial almshouse, Charity was the home of one of America’s first and most
enduring medical schools, and became one of the nation’s largest safety net hospitals.
Chapter One’s first theoretical flashpoint details Huey P. Long’s use of Charity as the
catalyst for his challenge to the Louisiana bourbon and petrol elites (in expanding public
health services, his creation of the LSU Medical School, and laying the groundwork for a
statewide Charity Hospital system). Another conflict that led to the delay in construction
of the iconic Art Deco ‘Big Charity’ building was Long’s audacious challenge to U.S.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal with Long’s Share Our Wealth program
towards the development of a deeper Keynesian liberal social welfare state. Chapter One
also explores the major post-World War II federal healthcare initiatives that brought
Charity Hospital’s raison d’être into question because of their substantial competitive
challenge for patients as well as for federal government financial and healthcare
resources: the 1946 Hospital Survey and Construction Act (better known as the HillBurton Act), and the 1965 advent of the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
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Chapter Two – From Medicare and Medicaid until Hurricane Katrina
Chapter Two reviews the status of Charity and its inspired public hospital system two
decades out from Medicare and Medicaid’s late 1960s programmatic realization.
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) funds, enacted by Congress to support safety net
hospitals that took care of a disproportionate share of the poor and uninsured, initially
promised Charity Hospital’s renewal after years of institutional neglect. But the
siphoning of over $2 billion of these funds by Louisiana’s Medicaid program to favor
private medicine exacerbated Charity’s crisis – even as a seemingly more focused state,
and later, a LSU administration sought to modernize Charity’s inspired but beleaguered
public hospital network. Spotlighted are conflicts between the Edwards’ administration
and the Louisiana State Legislature, LSU and the Foster administration, and respective
Louisiana Health Care Authority (LHCA) / LSU Health Care Services Division (LSUHCSD) plans to close New Orleans’ Charity Hospital before Hurricane Katrina.
Chapter Three – Hurricane Katrina and Charity’s Hospital’s forced closure
Chapter Three recounts how New Orleans’ Charity Hospital’s patients, staff and their
families endured Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, left to fend for themselves until their
evacuation a week after the storm. The conflict between LSU and Louisiana Governor
Blanco and Charity’s doctors, workers, medical residents, U.S. military personnel and
others seeking to resurrect hospital operations following Hurricane Katrina is detailed.
Also explored are the medical consequences of keeping Charity Hospital closed in the
months and years following the storm; as well as the dispute between the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) against the State of Louisiana’s claim that
Charity was more than 50% damaged and thus eligible for full FEMA replacement funds.

9

Discussion – Was the closure of Charity Hospital a case of disaster capitalism?
The Discussion Chapter considers in depth whether Charity Hospital’s closure was a case
of disaster capitalism. Its occurrence during the height of the internal displacement of
New Orleans’ population following Hurricane Katrina, who was disproportionately
impacted by Charity’s closure, and its demographic and human rights implications are
detailed. With regards to disaster capitalism’s definition as an opportunity for the
creation of investment opportunities, this chapter highlights the Bring New Orleans Back
Commission (BNOB) and the Louisiana Health Care Redesign Collaborative efforts to
take advantage of Charity Hospital’s closure. Also explored in depth are LSU’s often
contradictory motivations, in defense of Charity’s inspired statewide public hospital
system (against critics seeking to end LSU administration) and LSU’s own calls for its
dissolution, to supplant its historic Charity heritage for a medical neoliberal enterprise.
Findings – Confirmation of the theoretical proposition for this case study
The Findings Chapter summarizes the key theoretical foundational results in considering
this case study’s conflict supposition that New Orleans’ Charity Hospital was closed as
the result of disaster capitalism in order to supplant Charity’s original safety net mission
in favor of LSU’s neoliberal University Medical Center academic medical enterprise.
Epilogue – Conflict between LSU and the Jindal administration over the LSU-HCSD state
budget appropriations recalls how broken our healthcare system is without Charity Hospital
Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal and his Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH’s)
mid-year raid of the LSU Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD) Fiscal Year 20112012 budget to cover DHH’s own budget shortfall portends grim consequences for LSU’s
current and future public hospital system administration; and recalls how broken our
healthcare system is without Charity Hospital – completing the theoretical parameter.
10

Methods
The research strategy for this thesis is a case study. Creswell (2009, p. 13), citing Stake
(1995), defines a case study as a rich and exhaustive description of an issue, detailed through one
or more cases within a setting or context. Yin (2009, p. 130) suggests “the first and most
preferred strategy is to follow the theoretical propositions that led to your case study.”
In Yin’s case study strategies (pp. 130-131), theoretical propositions drive the
development of research questions; shaping the literature review and guiding the collection of
data, “(focusing) attention on certain data and (ignoring) other data.” The theoretical proposition,
said Yin, “also helps to organize the entire case study and to define alternative explanations to be
examined.” Yin suggested research questions rooted in theoretical propositions emphasizing
‘how’ and ‘why’ “can be extremely useful in guiding case study analysis.”
This case study is qualitative. Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1994, p. 341) said:
This refers to analysis which is not based on precise measurement and
quantitative claims. Sociological analysis is frequently qualitative,
because research aims may involve the understanding of phenomena
in ways (requiring neither quantification nor precise measurement).
Creswell (2007, pp. 129-130) grouped qualitative data into “four basic types:”
observations, interviews, documents and audio-visual materials. Research for this case study
involved the collection of primary and secondary data, consisting of documents and audio-visual
materials. 1 Free of interpretation or evaluation, primary source material document original ‘realtime’ occurrences on which evaluative literature is later based. Secondary source material
usually consists of “accounts written after the fact with the benefit of hindsight.” Depending on
the context, literature and data can serve as both primary and secondary sources (University of
Maryland Libraries 2011).
1

The list of 73 literature and 519 data items utilized for this case study is available in the reference section.
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Collection and processing of archival data occurred in tandem and as the result of the
literature review to explore theoretical and historical propositions of the study and to develop
new lines of inquiry. Coding and content analysis classified data into manageable categories that
formed the basis for development of the thesis outline, discernment of findings and drafting of
the narrative in relation to the research questions.
The collection of primary and secondary data for this thesis began conscientiously in
January 2006. During New Orleans’ first Martin Luther King, Jr. parade following Hurricane
Katrina, a group of Tulane Medical School residents, who said they had helped clean out Charity
Hospital, proclaimed the facility had been repaired from flood damage it received during the late
August 2005 storm. To substantiate the claims, they passed out copies of a December 17, 2005
article by Adam Nossiter in The New York Times entitled: “Dispute Over Historic Hospital for
the Poor Pits Doctors against the State.” Their claims elicited my interest, as I was an outpatient
of Charity Hospital at the time of the storm. I engaged in extensive library research and review of
electronic databases at the University of New Orleans (UNO) Earl K. Long Library. I attended
numerous public meetings of post-Katrina recovery and healthcare reform efforts, collecting
publicly distributed materials. I also filed Louisiana Public Records Act requests of LSU and
Louisiana state officials.
Under direction of my thesis advisor Dr. Vern Baxter, a theoretical foundation built on
open-ended questions began to take shape. It was under Dr. Baxter’s direction that I explored
broader areas of healthcare policy; and was introduced to the paradigm of neoliberalism –
especially in conjunction with Klein’s exploration of disaster capitalism. This latter line of study
was also greatly enhanced thanks to my tenure as a Student Research Assistant at the UNO
Center for Hazards Assessment, Response and Technology (UNO-CHART) from 2006 to 2010.
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Study Validity and Reliability
Concerning study validity and reliability, Yin (2009) notes “because a research design
is supposed to represent a logical set of statements, you also can judge the quality of any given
design according to certain logical tests.” Yin identifies case study “tactics” for validity and
reliability testing as they apply to descriptive case studies (pp. 40-45):
• Construct validity: Identification of correct operational measures for the concepts studied
•
•
•

Use multiple sources of evidence / in data collection
Establish chain of evidence / in data collection
Have key informants review draft case study report / in composition

• External validity: defining domain of generalization of study findings
•

Use theory in single-case studies / in research design

• Reliability: demonstrate study operations can be repeated for same results
•
•

Use case study protocol / in data collection
Develop case study data base / in data collection (p. 41)

This thesis uses multiple sources of evidence and establishes a chain of evidence drawn
from historical literature and data – reflected primarily through a conflict theoretical lens to
maintain construct validity. Ongoing discussion over specific subject areas regarding Charity
Hospital’s closure and parallel ‘how’ and ‘why’ reasons serve as key informant review
indicators. Generalization of study findings tests external validity. Reliability of study findings is
assured with the advance statement of data collection protocol and attaching a detailed
bibliography of all cited literature and data.
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Standpoint of the Researcher

K. Brad Ott’s 2003-2004 Winter Holiday Greeting. December 2003 self-portrait produced by Blaine Dunlap.

My personal standpoint of this thesis began as a patient. Just shy of two years before
Hurricane Katrina, I suffered a deep vein thrombosis – a leg clot following an extended period of
sitting during vacation travel. Within a week of my return from the trip, I experienced partial
paralysis on the right side of my body. Upon admittance to the Emergency Department of
Charity Hospital, I was injected with blood thinners to break the clot. I had already suffered a
stroke – but the paralysis was substantially reversed thanks to Charity’s emergency intervention.
Out of concern for a potential stroke reoccurrence, Charity’s medical staff kept me in
the hospital six days – in time to determine that I also had an undiagnosed congenital heart defect
– which would require heart surgery. I received this corrective surgery at LSU Interim Hospital
in 2008. Awaiting this, I became a regular Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans
(MCLNO) outpatient – receiving regular blood clotting monitoring and medicine calibration
under coordination of the Robert Hamilton Coumadin Clinic and other LSU medical units. 2
2

The Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO) comprises Charity and University hospital campuses.
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Due to suffering a stroke, heart and brain injury, I was evaluated by Louisiana
Rehabilitation Services (LRS). My job retraining program was to return to the University of New
Orleans to complete my undergraduate degree in sociology and seek an advanced degree for
enhanced employment potential. I completed my undergraduate studies in 2007.
Within a few months of my stroke, I joined Advocates for Louisiana Public Healthcare
(ALPH), a community advocacy group supporting Charity Hospital operations. Serving as its
legislative director in 2004 and 2005, I was also the appointed representative for health care
consumer interests on the Region 1 Health Care Consortium (R1HCC – comprised of Jefferson,
Orleans, St. Bernard and Plaquemines parishes) and served as co-chair of its “Care for the
Uninsured Committee.” This latter advisory council was one of nine inaugurated during the
Louisiana Governor’s Health Reform program under Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco.
Operating under the Participatory Action Research paradigm (PAR), 3 I am combining
both my standing as a former Charity Hospital patient and an advocate for its reopening with my
role as a researcher. Participant observations expressed herein are solely my own. Through
rigorous review of the literature backed by recognized theoretical standpoints and the expansive
consideration of multiple sources of data, these research procedures intend to afford replication
and validation of my findings, as well as address any perceptions of researcher bias. In addition
to disclosing my standing as a researcher, the ethical dimensions of this case study which I
adhere to are to honestly represent all findings, interpret clearly applicable literature and theory
and properly attribute all material sources utilized. Concerns that would otherwise arise with the
subject of healthcare and its provision which might involve research directly upon human
subjects are greatly minimized with reliance upon public documents and audio visual materials.

3

See West, Alcina, Peterson and Laska (2008). Also known as Advocacy/Participatory: Creswell (2007, pp. 21-22)
and Action Research: Brydon-Miller, Greenwood and Maguire (2003) and Hilsen (2006).
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In this harbor weary sea-worn ships drop anchor and new launched
vessels start their outward trips. Within these walls, life begins and
ends.
Seal of Charity Hospital, embossed on its entrance floor 4

But perhaps Huey’s most tangible legacy comes with the essential
things he made: the government programs that eventually
transformed Louisiana from one of the most ruthlessly irresponsible
caretakers of its people in the nation to one of the most beneficent …
[like] the Charity Hospital system, with its anchor and architecturally
handsome New Orleans base, providing the necessity of health care…
Garry Boulard, Huey Long Invades New Orleans (1998, p. 211)

Perhaps not surprisingly, the public hospital has suffered much loss
of support since passage of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in
the mid 1960s…
Andrew J. Brown, Community Health (1981, p. 100)

Chapter One
Charity Hospital’s founding
through Medicare and Medicaid
Charity Hospital’s First 200 Years: Yielding Modern Medicine.......................................17
Huey Long launches LSU Medical School,
‘Big Charity’ and a statewide hospital armada ..................................................................20
Table 1: New Orleans’ Charity Hospital and its inspired public hospital system .............27
Charity Hospital and its inspired safety net system face competitive pressure
because of the 1946 Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) Act .......................28
Medicare and Medicaid undermined “special categories” like Charity Hospital ..............31
4

Viewed via participant observation; See also Tulane University School of Medicine (1990, p.3)
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Charity Hospital’s First 200 Years: Yielding Modern Medicine
The etymology of charity, with twelfth century origins, denotes “benevolence for the
poor” (Online Etymology Dictionary 2011). Hospitals, as social institutions, are also said to be
rooted with “the concept of charity care” (Missouri Foundation for Health 2005). Founded as a
colonial infirmary, Charity Hospital is also amongst the oldest teaching hospitals in America.
Mechanic (1978) noted the practice of medicine is a relatively recent development:
Medicine has really developed primarily in the past 100 years. Before
that time medical practice consisted for the most part of trial-anderror attempts by self-appointed practitioners to deal with the ills of
people. Although hospitals can be traced back as far as the preChristian era, it was not until late in the nineteenth century (that)
hospitals cared for any large number of patients (p. 316).
Stoeckle (1995), citing Vogel (1980) said hospitals “were founded in the 1600s to
attend to the ‘sick poor’ with ‘medical relief,’ not simply to house ‘the poor’ as ‘poor relief’ …
removed from the community and hospitalized because of infectious disease…” (p. 4).
Starr (1982) observed hospitals were places most people avoided:
Almost no one who had a choice sought hospital care. Hospitals were
regarded with dread, and rightly so. They were dangerous places;
when sick, people were safer at home. The few who became patients
went into hospitals because of special circumstances … (as) seamen
in a strange port, travelers, homeless paupers, or the solitary aged –
those who, traveling or destitute, were unlucky enough to fall sick
without family, friends, or servants to care for them (p. 72).
Salvaggio (1992, p.11) recalled New Orleans’ Charity Hospital’s 1736 founding. The
first infirmary of the French colonial port, the Royal Hospital, was restricted to military
personnel and colonial administrators. Capuchin religious fathers were left to care for the rest of
the populace: “Horrified by the plight of indigent patients being turned away from the Royal
Hospital,” French sailor and master ship builder Jean Louis forged a provision in his 1735 will to
establish the Hospital of St. John, or L'Hopital des Pauvres de la Charité (Hospital for the Poor).
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Salvaggio (1992) said a second hospital was built in 1743 (p. 12). Later, under Spanish
colonial rule, hurricane destruction in 1778 and 1779 led to construction of a third Saint Charles
/ San Carlos Hospital in 1785 through the generosity of prominent Spanish businessman Don
Andrés Almonester y Roxas (pp. 20-22). Destroyed by a fire in 1809, a fourth Charity Hospital
would be built by the Louisiana state government in 1815 (pp. 26-37).
Underscoring Charity Hospital’s almshouse status, Salvaggio said African slaves and
Ursulines nuns were Charity’s permanent medical staff in its earliest years (pp. 13-14).
Conditions were overcrowded, necessitating the placement of two patients per bed (p. 16). Most
of Charity’s doctors performed without payment as volunteer physicians (pp. 27-28).
Within a year of the inauguration of the fifth Charity Hospital in 1833, Salvaggio
(1992, pp. 67-68) observed that new milestones would be set. Charity’s governing board “took
an important step in an effort to eliminate political problems and placed hospital management
entirely in the hands of the Daughters of Charity” – the famed French order of Catholic religious
women who gave distinguished nursing care during the 1832 yellow fever-cholera epidemic.
Salvaggio also said The Medical College of Louisiana, forerunner of the present-day Tulane
University School of Medicine – was established at Charity as the first one in the city and state.
Salvaggio (p. 68) noted that initially, the French-trained physicians of Charity Hospital
scoffed at the medical college’s establishment – “who undoubtedly considered American
medical schools inferior to those of Europe.” Starr (1982, pp. 40, 146) underscored this
skepticism, saying many of the first American medical schools actually operated just as
apprenticeships, without the benefit of hospital experience or training. Salvaggio (pp. 86-87) said
that the Medical College of Louisiana’s proprietary nature did not inspire confidence in its
medical education – until 1884, when Paul Tulane gave $1.25 million to form Tulane University.
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Matcha (2000) said “a 1906 survey (of 162 medical schools) by the American Medical
Association (AMA) brought about not only fundamental change in medical education, but also
provided the basis for the professionalization of medicine.” In an act of peer review, Matcha
noted the AMA “turned to the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching” which
enlisted Abraham Flexner to perform a similar study in 1910. He found “only 31 of the medical
schools should remain open” (p. 230). Salvaggio (1992) said Flexner declared Tulane made the
cut: “It is unthinkable that Tulane could have received such a good rating had it not been for the
wide variety of patients and the hands-on teaching provided by Charity Hospital” (p. 98).
New Orleans’ Charity Hospital’s evolution into a major teaching center portended the
late nineteenth century transformation of American medicine. Starr (1982, p. 169) noted the
record rise in the number of American hospitals to over 4,000 by 1910 from under 200 in just
forty years. Roberts and Durant (2010, p. 13) recorded that this dramatic rise “was influenced by
a number of social and demographic changes, including immigration and rapid urbanization,
which resulted in densely populated cities with increased demand for healthcare.”
Starr (1982, p. 145) now described hospitals “developing from places of dreaded
impurity and exiled human wreckage into awesome citadels of science and bureaucratic order.”
Charity Hospital pioneered much of this development in its first 200 years. Salvaggio
spotlights an editorial lauding Charity by the Cameron Parish Courier, May 26, 1923:
New Orleans wears proudly the honor of being the home of Charity
Hospital. It is an institution that confers distinction upon the city. New
Orleans, because of the magnificent work done by Charity Hospital, is
rated among the first in medical science.
But Charity Hospital serves the whole state of Louisiana. Its mantle of
mercy shields the sick and the injured of the city street, country road,
pine hills, and cypress swamp. From wheresoever he comes, so it be
within the borders of this state, his wound will be bound up, his
ailment ministered to (pp. 102-103).
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Huey Long launches LSU Medical School, ‘Big Charity’ and a statewide hospital armada
Murray (2006, p. 468) said “sickness” insurance based on half of a worker’s pay was
available in the U.S. by the late nineteenth century. Starr (1982, pp. 206, 240-241) noted that
while fraternal societies provided insurance to just over a quarter of American families, most
remained uninsured. Starr elaborated that while the federal government enacted “a system of
compulsory hospital insurance for merchant seamen as far back as 1798 (following European
precedents),” this was the exception. Starr said “although general hospitals in Europe became
primarily governmental and tax supported, in America they remained mainly private.”
Louisiana, descendent from French and Spanish colonial rule, became a noteworthy
U.S. exception. McDonald (1984) noted that “Louisiana was the first state in this country to
maintain and operate a general hospital from state funds…” (p. 3).
Campaigning for governor in 1927 for a second time after suffering a narrow loss in
1924, Huey P. Long, an attorney who had successfully challenged Standard Oil’s unmitigated
profits while a Public Service Commission regulator, proclaimed a new course for Louisiana –
one in which Charity Hospital would ultimately play a pivotal role. Long’s vision of social and
economic change was encapsulated in a campaign speech he gave under the tree which inspired
the poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow in St. Martinville, Louisiana – the Evangeline Oak:
And it is here under this oak where Evangeline waited for her lover,
Gabriel, who never came. This oak is an immortal spot, made so by
Longfellow’s poem, but Evangeline is not the only one who has
waited here in disappointment. Where are the schools that you have
waited for your children to have, that have never came? Where are the
roads and the highways that you send your money to build, that are no
nearer now than ever before? Where are the institutions to care for the
sick and disabled? Evangeline wept bitter tears in her disappointment,
but it lasted through only one lifetime. Your tears in this country,
around this oak, have lasted for generations. Give me the chance to
dry the eyes of those who still weep here! (Long 1933, p. 99).
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Long was resoundingly elected governor in 1928. Enacting sweeping social and
economic reforms, he consolidated power to push through his ambitious agenda. Surviving
unrelenting impeachment attempts by his political and corporate enemies, Long practiced the
craft of previous governors by freely dispensing state jobs and contracts to his supporters. Yet
loyalists were drawn however – not from the ossified Bourbon plantation elite that ruled the state
virtually uninterrupted since its colonial French founding – but from the common hard-scrabble
men and women of north Louisiana Long had come of age with; first as a traveling salesman,
then as a tenacious trial lawyer representing the dispossessed (Williams 1969, pp. 9-106).
Seeing that Charity Hospital was a rich center of patronage, Long:
…moved to take over the board of administrators of one of the largest
institutions operated by the state – Charity Hospital in New Orleans,
which was maintained for indigent patients and which was the most
extensive hospital of its kind in the South. It was governed by a nineman board, of which the governor was an ex-officio member
(Williams, p. 292).
Long chose Tulane University-trained doctor and Rhodes Scholar Arthur Vidrine to
replace Charity's previous superintendent Dr. William Leake – who was the son of a Standard
Oil attorney Long had fought in a number of cases when he served on the state Public Service
Commission. With Vidrine at the helm, Long proceeded to study whether Charity could
clinically support another medical school (Williams, p. 293). Salvaggio (1992, p. 110) noted that
few Louisianans could afford to attend the private Tulane -- then the only one in the state.
Williams (pp. 512-513) cited Tulane overcrowding that “it had to refuse many qualified
applicants.” Long said “creation of a second institution would enable these and other young men
to secure a medical education and would provide Louisiana with more doctors.” Both Salvaggio
and Williams observed however that the creation of LSU’s Medical School next to Charity
Hospital would likely be seen – not as a healthy addition – but as a direct assault upon Tulane.
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Long’s relationship with Tulane had been complicated. In one of his most catalytic life
events, Long compressed a three-year Tulane University Law program into one, passing the bar
to become “a full-fledged lawyer at the age of twenty-one” (Williams 1969, p. 79). Salvaggio
(1992, p. 106) said Governor Long in 1929 also reserved “500 beds in Charity Hospital
specifically for Tulane” – cementing the school’s medical training program within Charity and
resolving a major bureaucratic impasse that had bedeviled Tulane for decades.
Yet Long (1933) certainly also knew that Tulane’s chair was a ringleader against him:
Impeachment would have been over anywhere except in Louisiana,
and over in Louisiana with anybody except the kind of opposition
which I had aroused. … The controlling political factor of The TimesPicayune newspaper was a railroad, telegraph and power company
lawyer by the name of Esmond Phelps. He was also the head of the
Board of Supervisors of Tulane University, on which sat others
affiliated with such interests. The institution was largely supported by
the Rockefeller Foundation (Long, pp. 180-181).
Salvaggio (pp. 108-110) detailed the “colossal mess” of Vidrine being denied a coveted
Tulane professorial appointment, reportedly at the hands of Dr. Alton Ochsner, then head of
Tulane surgery. Ochsner later would lose his Charity medical privileges because of a confidential
communication with another colleague Vidrine may have intercepted – which warned that
Tulane’s dependency on a politicized Charity and its house staff would doom Tulane’s program.
Long’s desire to create a LSU Medical School wasn’t out of any antipathy against
Tulane or its leadership. Long responded to The Times-Picayune:
Huey snapped back: “Raise all the hell you want to, print what you
want to. But we’re going to have that medical school and every
qualified poor boy can go” (Williams, p. 514).
Long’s confrontation with Tulane’s defenders paid off handsomely. LSU’s medical
building was constructed next to Charity in record time for its October 1931 opening. Medical
school enrollments, despite the economic depression of the 1930s, swelled at both schools.
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Louisiana in the early 1930s became a national leader in healthcare. Care of the
mentally ill improved dramatically through the most modern therapeutic interventions of the day.
Arbitrary restraints of psychiatric patients and prison inmates had ceased. Psychiatric patients
and prison inmates alike received for the first time “a system of regular medical care” (Williams
1969, pp. 546-547). Rural healthcare in particular saw unprecedented improvement:
Through the Board of Health Long tripled funding for public
healthcare. The state’s free health clinics grew from 10 in 1926 to 31
in 1933, providing free immunizations to 67 percent of the rural
population. By expanding the state’s network of roads and bridges,
Long made it possible for citizens – especially the rural poor – to seek
professional healthcare and hospitalization (Long Legacy Project,
2010).
Williams noted that Long’s “critics could not deny his claim that the hospitals had been
enlarged and bettered” even as they lambasted his authority over them. New Orleans’ daily
newspaper, The Times-Picayune, charged that Long’s health reforms were a guise for patronage:
[The Times-Picayune charged] Long associates who were not poor
received free Charity Hospital treatment … The charge was
substantially accurate. But it did not cite the fact that the practice was
not new: persons with political influence had always been able to get
into the hospital. What was new, and hence very apparent, was now
that more of them got in – because there were more beds (Williams
1969, p. 547).
Starr (1982, p. 173) noted medical patronage was also prevalent in private hospitals
throughout the United States – favoring upper-class rather than working class groups with free
medical care and that “staff appointments went to physicians from established families…”
Referencing the aging 100-year old fifth Charity building, Salvaggio (1992, pp. 125126) said Huey Long made substantial improvements in the downtown New Orleans facility. Yet
by 1936 daily hospital admissions at Charity were higher than counterparts in Chicago, New
York and Los Angeles – because of Long’s promise of free care for all poor Louisianans.
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Salvaggio (1992, p. 126) said a federal grant was sought in 1933 to pay 30 percent of
costs of a new Charity building. The balance was proposed be paid over 30 years “from revenues
generated by a few private, paying wards...” Admitting private physicians of Southern Baptist
Hospital and Touro Infirmary however charged that the plan “would put them out of business…”
Leighninger (2007, pp. 139-141) said in June 1934, Huey Long “announced that he had
a new plan to finance a new sixth Charity Hospital: The pay beds would be withdrawn, and in
their place the state’s corporation tax would be raised.” Long’s plan seemed to initially gain
federal confidence. A volatile political situation in New Orleans at the time however, between
pro-Long and anti-Long forces, coupled with Long administrative moves to “keep federal
projects out of the hands of his enemies” – ultimately halted the process of constructing the sixth
Charity Hospital until after Huey Long’s death.
Wall, Cummins, Schafer, Haas and Kurtz (2002) said while Long “worked hard to elect
Franklin D. Roosevelt to the White House, the harmonious relationship between the two men
soon collapsed, largely for the same reason that Long had fallen out with Governor Parker in the
early 1920s: Huey wanted FDR’s job.” (p. 283) Wall, et al on Long’s “Share Our Wealth”:
In 1934 while a U.S. Senator, (Long) proposed a national plan of
income redistribution called “Share Our Wealth” as a superior
alternative to the existing “New Deal” of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt. To many of the unemployed or marginally employed
during those Depression years, “Share Our Wealth” sounded
attractive indeed, with its assurances of guaranteed family incomes,
free college educations, homestead exemptions, veterans’ bonuses,
shorter work weeks and similar benefits – supposedly all to be funded
by taxes levied on the incomes of the very wealthy… (p. 268).
Klein (2007, p. 251) said President Roosevelt strengthened his own New Deal program
to stem calls for even more radical economic proposals – such as Huey Long’s call for stricter
regulation of finance capital and sweeping social welfare – “to steal Long’s thunder.”

24

Klein (2007, p. 251) proposed that Long represented the popularization of much more
direct calls for a centralized economic restructuring of the American economy in the face of a
deepening Great Depression – and that in response to this popular threat, America’s industrial
and financial titans saw that Roosevelt’s “New Deal” was the preferable route.
Dethloff (1976, pp. 31-32) explored Long’s challenge to Roosevelt, quoting from his
1935 Share Our Wealth circular that free market failures demanded government intervention:
We looked upon the year 1929 as the year when too much was
produced for the people to consume. We were told, and we believed,
that the farmers raised too much cotton and wool for the people to
wear, and too much food for the people to eat. Therefore, much of it
went to waste. ... But, when we picked up the bulletin of the
Department of Agriculture for that year 1929, we found that,
according to the diet which they said everyone should eat in order to
be healthy, multiplying it by 120 million, the number of people had
the things which the government said they should eat in order to live
well, we did not have enough even in 1929 to feed the people. … But
why … did it appear we had too much? Because the people could not
buy the things they wanted to eat, and needed to eat. That showed the
need for and the duty of the Government then and there, to have
forced a sharing of our wealth, and a redistribution, and Roosevelt
was elected on the pledge to do that very thing.
Leighninger (2007, pp. 52-53), focusing on Louisiana’s Public Works Administration
projects, first noted that the fiscal architecture of the New Deal had to be hashed out – as
President Roosevelt’s initial economic stimulus began to falter amidst worries about deficit
spending. Leighninger mused whether Roosevelt really did consider deeply the merits of Huey
Long’s cogent argument to equalize wealth with consumption as its basis through direct
government intervention. Long’s economic theory ran parallel to the ideas of John Maynard
Keynes, the influential British economist. Keynes called for investment to stimulate “community
consumption.” This, said Klein (2007, p. 20), represented the “mixed, regulated economy”
mitigating capitalism’s excesses through wage hikes, social welfare and public works programs.
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The controversy between Long and Roosevelt which blocked construction of the new
Charity Hospital was eclipsed in dramatic fashion. On the evening of September 8, 1935, Huey
Long was assassinated in the Louisiana State Capitol. His New Deal legacy was momentous:
In the space of seven years he gave (Louisiana) a highway system
second to none in the nation, an outstanding state university, vastly
improved public schools, and the beginnings of a comprehensive
system of state aid to the sick and the elderly, far in advance of the
national Medicare program (Wall, et al, 2002, p. 284).
Leighninger (2007) said Louisiana’s reconciliation with the Roosevelt administration
after Long’s death, along with his corporation franchise tax – restarted the Big Charity project:
Laws Long had passed to keep federal agencies at bay were repealed.
The way was cleared for a third Charity Hospital proposal. This time
only a grant was requested, which freed the (Public Works
Administration) from concerns about hospital bond issues. Matters
were further helped by the new regulations increasing the size of the
grant from 30 to 45 percent. For the state’s share of the project, the
Charity administrators could rely on funds from (Long’s) corporation
franchise tax that had been dedicated to it and which, a newspaper
noted as early as March 1935, had been “piling up in the banks and …
not doing anybody any good” (p. 141).
Five months of patient relocation and demolition of Charity’s nineteenth century fifth
hospital building cleared the way for construction on the sixth ‘Big Charity’ in July 1937. It was
completed in July 1939. Charity became the second largest hospital complex in the U.S. with
2,680 beds in its main building and 850 additional beds in “four memorial buildings.” Also built
were a power house, ambulance, laundry and warehouse buildings, and a new school of nursing.
Detailing building subsidence of about 18 inches following Charity’s construction,
Leighninger recalled “investigators found various corners cut by contractors,” necessitating
reimbursement (p. 147). But Salvaggio (1992) observed:
Charity again became one of the world’s great hospitals – a model of
health care for indigents years before modern federal health-care
programs were put into effect (p. 137).
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Table 1: New Orleans’ Charity Hospital and its inspired public hospital system
Hospital, Original name

Year opened

Location

1736

New Orleans

1876

Shreveport

1938

Pineville

1938

Lafayette

1938

Independence

1941

Monroe

1943

Bogalusa

1958

Lake Charles

1968

Baton Rouge

1978

Houma

1992

New Orleans

Charity Hospital
Shreveport Charity Hospital

5

Huey P. Long Memorial
Lafayette Charity Hospital

6

Florida Parishes Charity Hospital

7

Northeast Louisiana Charity Hospital 8
Washington-St. Tammany Charity
Lake Charles Charity Hospital
Earl K. Long Memorial

10

11

South Louisiana Medical Center
University Hospital

9

12

13

Source: Roberts and Durant. 2010. A History of the Charity Hospitals of Louisiana. Table by K. Brad Ott

Popularly attributed by many to Huey Long, it was his younger brother Earl K. Long
who “built more charity hospitals than any other governor.” Kurtz and Peoples (1990, p. 267)
noted then Lieutenant Governor Earl Long in 1936 enacted the old-age pension “(expanding) it
into the nation’s largest program for senior citizens” to pay out considerably more monthly
benefits than Social Security at the time. A free “welfare prescriptions” program, “free
ambulance service and dental care (via) mobile medical clinics, were particularly helpful for
those in … rural areas.” Louisiana became a national model for social welfare innovation.
5

Second location built in 1889. (p. 67) Replaced in 1953 as Confederate Memorial Hospital. Became LSU
Shreveport in 1976 with medical school. Now known as LSU Health Sciences Center-Shreveport (p. 74).
6
Replaced and renamed University Medical Center in 1980 (p. 113).
7
Renamed Lallie Kemp Charity Hospital in 1954 (pp. 122-124).
8
Replaced and renamed E. A. Conway Medical Center in 1987 (p. 134).
9
Expanded in 1951, (p. 148) it merged to become Bogalusa Medical Center in 2002 (p. 153).
10
Renamed W. O. Moss Medical Center (p. 159).
11
Renamed Earl K. Long Medical Center (p. 169).
12
Renamed Leonard J. Chabert Medical Center (p. 191).
13
Formerly Hotel Dieu Hospital; with Charity: The Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO) (p. 48).
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Charity Hospital and its inspired safety net system faced competitive pressure
because of the 1946 Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) Act
Anderson, Boumbulian and Pickens (2004, p. 1163) cite Dowling’s (1982) City
Hospitals to outline four stages of urban public hospitals. Charity led most in all the stages:
•

Stage one was the ‘poor house’ or almshouse. “During this period hospitals were
components of almshouses and medical care was considered subordinate to the
almshouses’ social and welfare functions.”

•

Stage two was “the practitioner period” … “when medical and nursing care became the
focus of the urban public hospital. Physicians took time away from their private practices
to see patients in an inpatient hospital setting.”

•

Stage three was known as “the academic period,” when “urban public hospitals installed
full-time medical staffs controlled by medical schools largely in response to the Flexner
Report. …”

•

Stage four was the “large investment of federal funds to build academic infrastructure for
research, education and patient care.”
Salvaggio (1992, p. 97) said while New Orleans hospitals such as Hotel Dieu, Touro

Infirmary and Southern Baptist Hospital grew, “as late as 1950, Charity probably contained twothirds of all occupied hospital beds in New Orleans.” Indeed, ‘Big Charity’ and its armada of
Louisiana safety-net public hospitals expanded to lay the groundwork toward an integrated
healthcare system decades before most American hospitals or states. Especially for low-income
people, Charity’s multiple facilities revolutionized access to the latest advances of modern
medicine unbounded by geography or one’s ability to pay. 14
Advancing a comprehensive European social health insurance model, Louisiana’s
nascent Charity Hospital system served its public well. 15 Yet its ability to keep doing so now
faced new challenges from federal programs that favored patient access to proprietary medicine
with private insurance. In time, this would have a profoundly detrimental impact on Charity.
14

e.g., Charity had the first blood bank in the South (Salvaggio 1992, pp. 150, 190); pioneered in anesthesiology (p.
139); infectious disease research (pp. 158-159); and sickle cell anemia research (pp. 178-179).
15
e.g., “The state’s charity hospitals are as close as America gets to a European-style public health system” (Swann
2005); “In the United States, the political conditions and preexisting institutions were altogether different … where
classical liberalism had most thoroughly shaped the relations between state and society” (Starr 1982, pp. 240-241).
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President Harry S. Truman in 1946 proposed a national program to expand veterans’
and community hospital capacity, support for medical research and graduate medical education,
and comprehensive health insurance coverage for all Americans (Starr 1982, pp. 281-286). After
encountering fierce resistance to the national health insurance part of the proposal, Truman
succeeded only in passing into law a national program of veterans’ and community hospital
construction known as The Hospital Survey and Construction Act. Better known as the HillBurton Act, after its U.S. Senate sponsors Lister Hill and Harold H. Burton, this massive postwar construction program was conceived out of a 1942 American Hospital Association (AHA)sponsored national commission. Between 1947 and 1971, Hill-Burton put up one-third of the
cost of hospitals, nursing homes and outpatient facilities; with two-thirds of costs locally-raised
to receive federal match funding (pp. 348-351). Starr said Hill-Burton’s programmatic
requirements for obtaining the loans necessarily favored projects that could prove financial
viability – meaning that the new hospitals funded often served wealthier communities.
This mass expansion of community hospitals nationwide following World War II
would pose a new competitive challenge to Louisiana’s Charity system and other similarlysituated public hospitals. Two facets of the Hill-Burton Act that outwardly sought to address
inequities within the legislation would in time have profound impacts upon Charity and its
inspired safety net system. Starr observed the first involved the provision of charity care:
Hospitals receiving assistance had to make available “a reasonable
volume of hospital services to persons unable to pay.” But for the next
twenty years, no regulations were issued specifying what a reasonable
volume might be, and the provision went unenforced (p. 350).
The lack of enforcement of charity care provisions under Hill-Burton saddled the
Charity Hospital system to bear a disproportionate burden of providing indigent healthcare in
Louisiana – freeing newly-constructed private hospitals to attract patients with insurance.
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Starr (1982) noted that the second facet involved addressing racial discrimination in
public accommodations. Community hospitals would be barred from receiving Hill-Burton funds
if they discriminated on the basis of race – yet the law contained a crucial loophole:
The law itself prohibited discrimination by any assisted hospital, but
said its conditions were met if separate but equal facilities were
available in an area. The Supreme Court did not rule these provisions
of Hill-Burton unconstitutional until 1963 (p. 350).
Roberts and Durant (2010, pp. 172, 196, 221-225) recorded that while three Charity
units or hospitals received Hill-Burton planning and design funds – racial segregation was
unabated until passage by the U.S. Congress of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Effectively, this meant
that in most cases Charity Hospital system facilities were the only hospitals available for African
Americans in Louisiana until the close of 1965, when the threatened loss of federal funds within
one year of the Civil Rights Act’s enactment forced integration of all medical facilities.
Matcha (2000, p. 317) observed that Hill-Burton’s hospital expansion “(exacerbated)
structural problems associated with the health-care system by creating an over-supply of
facilities that are underutilized.” In Louisiana, seven Charity facilities were already in operation
with Hill-Burton’s 1946 enactment. Charity now found itself in a new competitive environment
competing against newly-constructed private facilities serving a healthier population of
individuals having health insurance. Lax enforcement of Hill-Burton’s charity care and racial
discrimination provisions only magnified Charity’s under-financed operations – which would
face additional competitive pressure with the 1965 enactment of the federal Medicare program:
For elderly people, Medicare alleviated the very great evil of
uncertainty about medical treatment; it gave them security they had
never known before. For many, the greatest worry had been whether
they could afford physicians and hospitalization. Before Medicare,
when workers retired – typically, in those days, at 65 – many of them
were on their own with regard to medical coverage… (Pence 2004, p.
453).
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Medicare and Medicaid undermined “special categories” like Charity Hospital
Brown (1981) illustrated the impact Medicare (and its counterpart for the poor,
Medicaid) had on patients whose previous source of healthcare was in hospitals like Charity:
Perhaps not surprisingly, the public hospital has suffered much loss of
support since passage of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in the
mid-1960s. Many of the poor and elderly who were previously
dependent on this facility for curative care are now able to use private
practitioners and hospitals. The image of the public hospital as the
“poor people’s” hospital spurred movement of Medicare- and
Medicaid-eligible patients to the private sector… (p. 100).
Salvaggio (1992, p. 193-196) suggested that Charity’s raison d’être was now in
question unless it enacted major structural changes. Salvaggio cited a 1965 Times-Picayune
editorial warning that state legislative appropriations for Charity could even be in jeopardy.
Rebutting the widespread view that Medicare reflected expansion of the socialized
welfare state, Oberlander (1997, p. 597) said “Medicare was modeled after the indemnity
insurance plans that predominated in 1965.” Matcha (2000) also addressed that federal spending
under Medicare and Medicaid would actually enhance private medicine practice:
The passage of Medicare and Medicaid represented an economic boon
for the medical community. Although reimbursement levels were not
consistent with the private sector, these programs offered a new and
growing pool of medically needy persons… (p. 349).
Freund and McGuire (1995, pp.305-306) said that the politics of Medicare’s passage
compromised the possibility of an actuarially-sound public health insurance program – resulting
instead in an unprecedentedly expensive public-private hybrid with few cost-controls, lacking
restraints on hospital utilization and reimbursement of medical procedures reflecting retail costs:
The financing of Medicare had been problematic from the outset. To
overcome the objections to the program by doctors, insurance
companies, hospitals … Medicare legislation created less of a public
healthcare program and more of an infusion of public money into
private channels (Freund and McGuire, p. 305).
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Initially, the American Medical Association (AMA) vigorously opposed Medicare’s
creation. Freund and McGuire (1995) said however that the AMA came to support the program:
To secure the cooperation of physicians, the initial Medicare
legislation allowed reimbursement of doctor’s “usual and customary
fees,” so long as those fees were “reasonable.” Such vague language,
especially in the context of a seldom competitive fee-setting process,
led to rapid inflation. Fees increased disproportionate to other rates of
inflation; the number of elderly treated increased, and the number of
medical services ordered by doctors for their Medicare patients rose
markedly… (p. 306)
Starr (1982, pp. 379-388) said fissures between medical advances of the period,
expanded access to care and unsustainable costs – were brought on not only by Medicare and
Medicaid, but also, by unresolved contradictions of a largely private health system. Under these
conditions, the public welfare state can only expand if it first provides a guaranteed windfall for
private capital interests – leading to the vast growth of a corporate healthcare complex.
Medicare and Medicaid outlays now fueled widespread fear of unrestrained inflation in
the U.S. economy growing throughout the 1970s:
The adoption of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 made the federal
government the dominant force in U.S. health care finance. Almost
immediately thereafter, Medicare outlays skyrocketed. After the
expected initial ramping up during program implementation in 196768, the program unexpectedly continued to grow in inflation-adjusted
terms, accelerating to real rates of increase in the 10-20 percent range
for the balance of the 1970s. This growth came at an awkward time,
during a period in which the U.S. was experiencing simultaneous
increases in both inflation and unemployment (Moran 2005, p. 1417).
This growth in Medicare costs was not sustainable. The inflation they were fueling was
negatively impacting the U.S. economy. Starr (pp. 379-388) posed that there could either be a
more regulated, nationalized governmental solution – or the nation could opt for free market
forces to discipline Medicare inflation. President Richard Nixon launched in February 1971 a
free market “national health strategy” of managed care organizational expansion.
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The term managed care implies healthcare system controls through close monitoring of
healthcare providers to tightly scrutinize “where and when patients receive their healthcare”
(Weitz 2001, pp. 425-427). Widely recognized by their administrative units as “HMOs” or
“Health Maintenance Organizations,” these are pre-paid insurance provider groups, paid through
“a fixed yearly fee in exchange for a full range of healthcare services.”
Starr (1982, pp. 396-397) said that Nixon conferred with industrialist Henry J. Kaiser
(who had refined earlier models of health purchasing cooperatives during World War II) and
reviewed plans adopted by Governors Reagan (California) and Rockefeller (New York) before
urging Congress to incentivize the mass expansion of HMOs to become by 1980 the dominate
form of health insurance. According to Moran (2005, p. 1419), managed care plans came to
define health insurance, despite a “backlash against the most restrictive (HMO) forms.”
While both Medicare and Medicaid were enacted in 1965, Starr (p. 370) noted they
“reflected sharply different traditions.” Medicare’s connection with Social Security and its
“uniform national standards for eligibility and benefits” contrasted it with Medicaid’s “stigma of
public assistance.” Medicaid rules vary widely in all 50 states, as well as in what kind of
coverage is provided and how much reimbursement physicians would receive – leaving
Medicaid often underfunded and poorly resourced by the medical community.
Despite documenting chronic underfunding, a precipitous decline in medical
residencies, labor strife amongst Charity’s house staff and nurses, and the near-total breakdown
of the hospital’s physical plant as the result of deferred maintenance, Salvaggio (1992, pp. 193248) said that Charity Hospital improbably ascended from its possible closure after the passage
of Medicare through a series of events, mishaps and interventions that likely would have
otherwise felled a less venerable institution.

33

Freund and McGuire (1995, p. 283) documented the practice of patient dumping –
when "for-profit hospitals frequently refuse to serve patients who cannot pay or transfer them –
often in medically unstable conditions” to public or non-profit hospitals. The practice was
outlawed by Congress in 1987. Salvaggio (1992, p. 251) also found that Charity also endured the
custom of patient skimming. This routine involved the acceptance – indeed, the active
recruitment by neighboring private hospitals of patients away from Charity – by admitting them
for costly, but financially reimbursable trauma care to nearby Tulane and Hotel Dieu hospitals.
Salvaggio (p. 203) said that even with Medicaid reimbursement, most area private
hospitals actively discouraged admittance of the indigent patients Charity regularly treated –
prompting a successful class action lawsuit demanding free care at private hospitals (under their
Hill-Burton charity care responsibilities). As part of the settlement, Charity also received
additional Medicare and Medicaid funding to reopen closed beds and recruit nursing staff, as
well as to ensure maintenance of its overburdened emergency department. Charity’s substandard
obstetrics, gynecology and pediatrics care; latent segregation and uneven treatment of poor
patients, especially women of the period, demanded more corrective action (Ward 1986, p 10).
Louisiana Governor John McKeithen increased substantially Charity’s budget during
the 1968 to 1972 period – reversing the fiscal bleeding enough to keep the hospital from
completely closing its inpatient units. Salvaggio (pp. 200-202) noted a significant capital outlay
of the period was the 1969 installation of new electrical transformers to stem persistent power
problems. A major water main break in 1970 that flooded Charity’s basement for one day
prompted the replacement of inundated switchgear components. McKeithen also unsuccessfully
attempted state legislative passage of a statewide “vice tax” from coin-operated amusements, as
well as an excise tax on the sale of whiskey with the proceeds dedicated to Charity hospitals.
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Its woes notwithstanding, Charity Hospital still garnered notable acclaim amidst its
substantial complexity and inherent shortcomings. Observed Ward (1986):
Charity Hospital was widely believed to provide the best services for
gunshot wounds or emergency care. It also offered excellent treatment
for such challenges as premature infants, contagious diseases, and
trauma care (the medical inheritance of the indigent) (p. 10).
Lovell (2011b) noted that “under Louisiana’s populist legacy, Charity hospitals
continued to expand … at a time when other states were dismantling their public hospitals.”
Charity could not however ignore Medicare and Medicaid’s soaring costs.
Starr wrote (p. 377) even as the federal commitment to funding Medicare and Medicaid
substantially deepened; its direct delivery became increasingly privatized. Aside from Veterans
healthcare “and various other special categories” – the advent of Medicare and Medicaid
“undermined the rationale for municipal, veterans’ and other government hospital services.”
Stolzenberg (2000) reviews the “special category” of “safety net” hospitals:
Public hospitals have demonstrated their value to the nation’s
healthcare system by filling service gaps and caring for vulnerable
populations, thereby earning the title “America’s Safety Net System.”
This title clearly implies that the public hospital will always be there
when other institutions cannot, are not, or do not want to be there. The
title also suggests that the public hospital system is rarely a system of
choice but is merely the default provider when the primary system
fails to meet a need. Despite these negative connotations, the public
hospital system, with all its problems, has a definable mission and in
many respects has carved out for itself a specific niche in the nation’s
healthcare system. While there has been much debate surrounding the
problems of the system, there has, until recently, been little argument
about the need for its continued existence… (p. 347)
Charity and its inspired public hospital system are among “the special categories.” A
hold-over remnant of Keynesian economics in a country of private enterprise, Charity continued
shouldering its indigent healthcare burden long enough to view what was perhaps the dawn of a
renewed state commitment, fortuitously aligned with new federal support for safety net hospitals.
35

In the last five years, the state has used its Charity Hospital system
like a money machine.
Peter Shinkle, The Advocate (Shinkle 1994)

LSU … is steeped in knowledge about the Charity system, where it
has trained doctors for decades. But the law properly stresses that
patient care, not medical training, must be LSU’s top priority.
Editorial, The Advocate (1997)

The Louisiana way in medical treatment for the less well-off has no
parallel in the United States, but that unique status hasn’t served as
protection.
Adam Nossiter, The Advocate (Nossiter 2003b)
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The Louisiana Health Care Authority (LHCA) oversees Charity Hospitals;
proposes the end of the name ‘Charity’ and to close New Orleans’ Charity Hospital
Conveying the grave condition of Charity Hospital in the late 1980s, Roberts and
Durant (2010), citing Salvaggio (1992) called for Charity’s reform:
Charity was closer to death in 1990 than it was following the
hurricane of 1799 or the great fire of 1809, or during the terrible postCivil War years. The question is whether or not it will rise like the
phoenix from its ashes as it has in the past. Perhaps a better question
is, ‘should it rise? Or can Louisiana develop more efficient and
humanitarian means to care for its truly indigent ill and train its future
physicians? … (pp. 307-308)
As hospital conditions worsened, questions arose over the need to change Charity’s
administrative governance to afford it a more focused management. In 1936, the State Hospital
Board was created to oversee Huey Long’s vision of a statewide network of Charity hospitals
(LSU Health Care Services Division / LSU-HCSD 2011a). Aside from the 1940s when Charity
was under outside management, the State Hospital Board was responsible for Charity system
hospitals until 1970, when the Department of Health and Human Resources was created. Seeking
to streamline oversight, Charity in 1988 was placed under the control of the Department of
Health and Hospitals (DHH). Yet Charity’s woes worsened (Salvaggio, pp. 138-139, 284).
“A new concept of governance” to transform state-owned general hospitals, the
Louisiana Health Care Authority (LHCA) passed into law in 1989 under Governor Buddy
Roemer (Roberts and Durant, p. 44). The LHCA was charged with “developing long-range plans
to revitalize the entire statewide charity hospital system” (Salvaggio, p. 291). Taking over nine
Charity hospitals in 1991 from the Department of Health and Hospitals (apart from Shreveport,
which was run by LSU), LHCA’s nine member board, appointed by the governor and confirmed
by the state senate, had “the ability to independently set policy, funding and sell bonds for the
charity hospital system” (Yacoe 1991).
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Presenting its “strategic plan” before the 1991 Regular Louisiana Legislative Session,
The LHCA highlighted key problems facing Louisiana’s public hospitals – including the
prospect of some system facilities ceasing operations. It detailed both broad and specific
categories: fiscal woes, loss of residency slots due to budget shortfalls, long waits for medical
procedures, and the flight of experienced healthcare professionals. It also found that even as
Charity hospitals generated the bulk of Louisiana’s Medicaid budget, Medicaid patients
themselves were fleeing the system – with their Medicaid funds – furthering imperiling the
safety net system (Louisiana Health Care Authority / LHCA 1991, pp. xviii-13).
The LHCA report set out several overarching goals to address what it viewed as the
crisis facing Louisiana’s Charity Hospital system. Emphasizing “replacement and modernization
of physical plant,” the report called for the imminent replacement of New Orleans’ Charity
Hospital, Baton Rouge’s Earl K. Long Memorial Hospital and Pineville’s Huey P. Long
Memorial Hospital. Charity and Huey P. Long in particular, the LHCA report said “should both
have been replaced thirty years ago.” It remarked that the renewal of Big Charity Hospital could
be the keystone in the development of a “New Orleans Medical Center Complex.” LHCA’s
report also extolled in its first priority the goal of planning and design work to replace aging and
neglected charity hospitals in Independence, Bogalusa and Lake Charles; system-wide
installation of modern medical equipment and upgrades; streamlined funding, governance and
management; more comprehensive resource allocation and integration of medicine and academic
training residencies across the entire state hospital system; and enhanced relationships with
counterparts in both the state welfare system, the state psychiatric care system and private
healthcare providers. The LHCA said that much of this change would either be ongoing or
completed within five years from the date of its strategic plan (LHCA 1991, pp. 20-31).
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Much as the LHCA’s strategic plan detailed the Charity Hospital system’s deficiencies
and challenges, it also extolled Charity Hospital and its distinctive public safety net healthcare
system as “a model for the nation” – Indeed, it branded it “The Louisiana Model”:
Every state faces the question of how to provide a safety net of health
care for those without insurance and how to provide clinical training
experience for physicians and other health professionals. Few states
have answered this question more simply or more comprehensively
than Louisiana. The concept underlying Louisiana’s hospital system is
a considerable improvement on those of many states. Elsewhere, a
patchwork of local public hospitals, usually in urban areas, provides
uneven access to care and incomplete integration with medical
education. Louisiana’s approach has several beneficial features that
are the envy of many… (LHCA 1991, pp. 31-32).
Despite heralding the Louisiana Model as one worth emulating, the LHCA said that for
the health system to realize its full potential, it had to rebrand itself away from the institutional
identity on which its own extolled model developed – by removing the name “Charity”:
The hospitals, which currently are known as the “Charity system,”
represent Louisiana’s principal mechanism to deliver health care for
the uninsured and others with inadequate access, and to provide
clinical training opportunities for new physicians and other health
care professionals. Both roles will remain critical elements of public
policy in the state. Despite the System’s clear and important purpose,
its popular name leads to misunderstanding. That name should be
changed (to) the Louisiana Medical Centers (LHCA 1991, pp. 17-18).
While Salvaggio (1992, p. 196) recorded a 1966 failed attempt to “remove the word
charity from the titles of all state charity hospitals,” twenty-five years later, the LHCA put forth
its rebranding as its first task toward the hospital system’s revitalization. It argued:
The “Charity system” (fails to describe its) critical role played in
medical education (and) suggests that the hospitals are part of the
state welfare system … (They) are not “free” and are not available to
our citizens through “charity.” They represent a form of health
insurance that is paid for by all Louisiana taxpayers. … If “Charity
system” is a misnomer now, the “charity” image will be even less
appropriate in the future (LHCA 1991, p. 18).
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Though Roberts and Durant (2010, pp. 48-49) echoed the LHCA’s characterization that
the name “charity” failed to adequately describe the hospital system’s modern role, they also
offered two key counterpoints on the rebranding of New Orleans’ Charity Hospital. First,
Charity’s physicians and medical residents actively resisted the proposed name change.
Charity’s “physician training at the hospital is world-renowned and the medical community
recognizes Charity Hospital … not “MCLNO” (Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans) as
a prestigious training ground for doctors…” Secondly, Roberts and Durant record throughout
their work that although all but the downtown New Orleans flagship hospital would ultimately
shed the Charity name, 16 they aptly observed Louisianans resisted doing away with Charity’s
identity – and suggested they would not do so – unless a major change in the system occurred:
It appears that the longstanding label and image of these facilities as
“charity hospitals,” has become ingrained in the culture of Louisiana
and thus, will be difficult to change without major alterations in the
structure and character of the public healthcare system (p. 281).
Charity came under the threat of closure in 1991 with the loss of its hospital
accreditation (Kazel 1991). The LHCA nevertheless immediately set out to implement its
proposal toward rebranding the state hospital system away from the Charity name by seeking to
close its iconic but disheveled flagship. In 1992, the LHCA purchased the former Hotel Dieu
hospital and renamed it “University Hospital” (Laborde 1993). The “University Hospital” name
seemed to imply that it would now become LSU Medical School’s private practice hospital.
Salvaggio (1992, pp. 193-196) noted that LSU as early as the late 1960s sought to shed its
reliance upon what it viewed as an outdated hospital facility. LSU also built a considerable
expansion of its medical school between its original location next to Charity and Hotel Dieu.

16

Roberts and Durant recorded that ‘Big Charity’s’ main hospital building was renamed “the Reverend Avery C.
Alexander Charity Hospital” under a 1991 Louisiana State Legislative resolution – to recognize the late civil rights
activist and state representative who stalwartly defended social welfare programs and Charity hospitals (p. 48).
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Tulane University, for many of the same reasons LSU sought a new practice hospital,
built its own hospital downtown, apart from Charity in 1975 (Salvaggio 1992, pp. 193-196). In
contrast to catering to the specific desires of LSU doctors wanting to keep separate their Hotel
Dieu private practice patients, while relegating their medically indigent patients to Charity,
Roberts and Durant (2010, pp. 47-48) said renaming Hotel Dieu as University Hospital had more
to do with making a clear break from “Charity” by underscoring its teaching hospital status
under the MCLNO brand name. This decision however left many LSU physicians wanting.
Roberts and Durant said the LHCA, backed by the gubernatorial administration of Edwin
Edwards, announced publicly that the main reason for ordaining Hotel Dieu as the new
University Hospital would address medical accreditation issues by “(facilitating) the movement
of patients, regardless of financial status, from the dilapidated Charity Hospital campus” that was
neglected by the lack of appropriations on social welfare programs and facility maintenance. 17
Stating it would close Charity within 5 years, the LHCA asked the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) to “let Charity Hospital operate with
safety defects that would take $20 million to fix” (Pope 1993b). Criticism flared however, that
the state would “gamble” on patient’s lives by refusing to spend money to meet the fire code (de
la Houssaye 1993). Charity lost its accreditation in 1993 (New Orleans City Business / CB 1994).
With promises to address code deficiencies, JCAHO accreditation of Charity was
restored by early 1994 (CB 1994). Roberts and Durant (pp. 49-50) said the LHCA’s attempt to
construct a separate LSU Medical School “critical care tower” adjacent to University Hospital –
apparently intended to placate still disaffected LSU private practice faculty – ran up against the
threatened loss of federal funds, as well as uncertainty posed by a national health reform attempt,
putting on hiatus more than $1 million already spent in its construction planning and design.
17

LSU-HCSD (2007c): “Forty-five Years of Studies: Construction of a New Public Hospital in New Orleans, p. 1.
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While the LHCA had independent statutory authority to execute purchase contracts and
even its own agency fiscal increases, its wanton excesses as other state agencies faced budget
cuts brought widespread criticism. LHCA’s original purchase of the private Hotel Dieu hospital
– at a cost of $58.5 million – was criticized “because the purchase process was not subjected to
regular capital outlay procedures and the price of the debt was high” (Alexander 1993). Ignoring
calls from the State Treasurer and one of Louisiana’s two U.S. Senators to curb agency spending,
LHCA’s creation of “a new $120,000-per-year job to oversee the merger” of Hotel Dieu and
Charity Hospital campuses and its departmental addition of 450 employees led to widespread
calls for the LHCA to be abolished (The Advocate 1994a; Shuler 1994a; Shuler 1994c; The
Advocate 1994b). The agency ultimately was abolished in 1997.
Anticipation in governmental and healthcare circles originally was that the LHCA
would become the departmental vehicle to revitalize Louisiana’s venerable yet neglected and
severely underfunded Charity Hospital system. Roberts and Durant (2010, pp. 44-54) said that
the LHCA’s failure to be the agency of Charity’s institutional renewal occurred because the
LHCA micromanaged decisions “for personal and political reasons” while utterly failing in its
policy oversight of Charity Hospitals through “poor leadership and irresponsible behavior.…”
Roberts and Durant’s account does not mention the LHCA’s lack of leadership in
contending with the main funding source for Charity hospitals of the period: the federal
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) program. Commonly identified by its acronym (and
pronounced as “dish”), DSH funds were first created by Congress in 1981 to support hospitals
that treated a disproportionate share of the uninsured. Enacted to shore up mostly public safety
net hospitals that saw the exodus to private hospitals of patients having qualified for Medicare
and Medicaid, Charity likely could benefit, if it could return to its priority programmatic status.
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Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) funds enrich private providers at Charity expense
Fishman and Bentley (1997, pp. 31-36) said targeted support for certain hospitals
treating people usually ineligible for Medicaid – yet still poor and uninsured prompted Congress
to “(mandate) an explicit payment adjustment…” Originally intended as a temporary measure,
DSH funding became a permanent federal budget item in 1990.
While the DSH program was originally enacted as part of legislation to correct
inflationary deficiencies in Medicaid payment reimbursements, because program requirements
were “broad and vague, many states ignored (them)” (Mechanic 2004, p. 5). Spivey and
Kellermann (2009) said the DSH program was originally conceived as a federal-state shared
Medicaid responsibility. 18 While the federal government would contribute the bulk of
designated DSH funding reimbursement, significant state resistance toward making even modest
matching payments from which designated hospitals could then receive full reimbursement
prompted Congress to mandate that states make matching DSH fund payments:
When most states ignored their obligation to make (DSH) payments,
Congress … deemed certain hospitals to be DSH providers and
established methods to force states to make DSH payments to those
hospitals (p. 2599).
Mechanic detailed how several states, including Louisiana, managed to overcome
putting up their own money to provide a match for federal DSH reimbursement:
In the late 1980s several states, starting with West Virginia,
determined that it would be permissible to collect donations from
hospitals, use the donations to draw down federal matching funds, and
make DSH payments to those same hospitals without actually putting
up state dollars (p. 6).
Fishman and Bentley noted also that “states became very creative in increasing their
Medicaid funding via provider-specific taxes (and) intergovernmental transfers…” (p. 36).
18

E.g., a 28% state/federal match means the state puts up $28 (the amount which is advanced to it from a
participating DSH hospital such as Charity) and the feds $72 to equal $100 for a DSH provider.
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Mechanic (2004, p. 7) said by 1992, DSH payments made up 36 percent of Louisiana’s
program. Spivey and Kellermann (2009, pp. 2599-2600) said nationally “between 1990 and
1996, federal DSH payments ballooned from $1.4 billion to more than $15 billion annually…”
with Louisiana in particular taking advantage, ranking fourth per capita in DSH payments.
Wall, et al (2002) said from 1989 during the Roemer administration through 1994 in the
Edwards administration, the state Medicaid budget went from $1.1 billion to $4.2 billion:
Louisiana discovered the golden egg laid by the Medicaid goose …
With its large numbers of poor people Louisiana had no difficulty in
meeting the “disproportionate share” criterion... (p. 409)
Notice however that it was Louisiana’s Medicaid budget – not Louisiana’s Charity
hospitals – that overwhelmingly benefitted from the program intended for safety net hospitals.
Indeed, Coughlin, Ku and Kim (2000, p. 148) noted this aspect of public hospitals being shorted:
When public hospitals have net gains, it is possible that they do not
get to keep their gains. That is, the net DSH gains experienced by
state hospitals may be returned to the state treasury … states often
reduce other subsidies to those hospitals that offset the gains.”
The advantage of matching DSH funds with Medicaid reimbursement is significantly
greater than just earning reimbursement from Medicaid funds alone. The excess revenue comes
both from the disproportionate share of hospital care provided by an eligible hospital, and a “per
patient per day” charge available because Medicaid recipients received care (Pope 1993a).
Substantial Louisiana DSH fund payments resulted from the state “taking care of a
disproportionate number of poor people in its charity hospital system.” This added “up to about
three times the actual cost of care for the patients” (Shuler 1994b). “Hundreds of millions of
dollars” of DSH payments were made annually – but “instead of allowing public hospitals to
keep that huge amount of federal tax money, [state government] forced state hospitals to ‘donate’
those millions” to the Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) (Shinkle 1994).
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Wall, et al (2002, pp. 409-410) found meanwhile that “the quality of medical care for
Medicaid recipients did not improve – what did were opportunities for politically connected
individuals to make handsome profits …” Wall, et al specifically cited Times-Picayune reporter
Chris Adams’ 1995 “Medicaid Madness” investigation into the phenomenal growth of private
psychiatric facilities that received substantial Medicaid reimbursement for questionable expenses
– enriching several former state officials and Edwards’ gubernatorial campaign contributors.
Adams detailed how DSH funds, generated wholly from Charity Hospital system care,
were re-appropriated to benefit private psychiatric facilities:
In the arcane rules that govern Medicaid finances, a few carefully
placed words can mean millions of dollars. That’s what happened in
1993, when a three-sentence provision inserted into the state’s
Medicaid guidelines pumped $7.6 million into a group of politically
connected, high-profit private psychiatric hospitals … Because most
of the new private psychiatric hospitals were almost exclusively
treating Medicaid patients, and most of the large public hospitals in
the Charity Hospital system had thousands of non-Medicaid patients,
the new provision represented a windfall for the private hospitals
(Adams 1995b).
Columnist James Gill of The Times-Picayune quipped that “anyone who has had the
feeling from time to time that we might be living in a Charles Dickens novel can forget it”:
Not even the formidable Dickens imagination could have conjured up
the sinister, money-grubbing caricatures of humanity that populate the
latest story of Louisiana’s political class (Gill 1995).
Engendering charges that “the state has used its charity hospital system like a money
machine … $1.7 billion (was taken) out of the public hospital system” for a whole host of
Medicaid programs “including some that enrich(ed) private companies” (Shinkle 1994). Roberts
and Durant (2010, p. 54) meanwhile, citing information from a former LHCA official, said
approximately $2 billion in funds was shifted from the Charity Hospital system “to fund other
items in the overall (state) budget.” Charity, unfortunately, would not recoup this loss.
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Facing an end to the golden egg era of DSH funds, Gov. Edwards proposes a Charity HMO
New federal rules were enacted to end profiting off of DSH funds. Facing a $750
million Louisiana Medicaid loss, Governor Edwards proposed that the Charity Hospital system
“would be dismantled” and “the state would begin paying a set amount to insurance companies –
such as health maintenance organizations – to provide health care coverage for the poor” (Shuler
1994d). With a year left in his last term, Edwards’ bid to convert state Charity Hospitals into a
health maintenance organization (HMO) would become the latest twist in which Charity assets
would be maximized – while promising little for Charity’s institutional longevity. Critics cried
foul against Edwards’ apparent administrative probity in developing “a plan for the delivery of
health care to Louisiana’s poor people … being hatched in secret without an opportunity for
input or discussion among the people who will pay the bill” (The Advocate 1994c).
The state’s argument to support a new Charity Hospital HMO plan seemed to employ a
variation of the old DSH funding scheme to put up as little state funding match as possible –
except this time professing reform, by promising an alternative to the very Medicaid program its
own administration ran up extraordinary costs upon:
The state is hoping for federal help out of a $750 million state healthcare financing shortfall in return for experimenting with an alternative
to the costly Medicaid program. The $750 million fuels $3 billion of
Louisiana’s $4.5 billion health-care program” (Shuler 1994e).
With uncanny parallels to the discarded “public option” proposal that was originally
part of President Obama’s 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), the
LHCA fifteen years earlier sought enactment of “The Louisiana Safety Net Plan for Managed
Care.” LHCA Chairman Dr. Arnold Lupin said it proposed to establish “a ‘medical home’ for
Medicaid and indigent populations in the state and for populations with special health needs” by
incorporating use of the state’s Charity Hospital system (Shuler 1995a).
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More than six months of debate ensued over the Charity HMO proposal, with
objections arising from virtually every quarter. “Some legislators … complained that moving to
the HMO system will only take dollars away from health care and put them in the pockets of
insurance companies who are seeking big profits.” Private hospitals decried that the private
insurance market would be put at an unfair advantage (Shuler 1994e). One legislator also warned
that employers might drop their insurance coverage (Shuler 1995f). State Insurance
Commissioner Jim Brown echoed the private provider sentiments: “Some private HMOs are
wondering whether there would be enough of a client pool left” for them (Shuler 1995d).
In another twist, the relationship between Charity and the HMO would also be wholly
defined by a medical neoliberal administration in the form of a public private partnership:
The LHCA will have to contract with a private firm to handle HMO
administrative functions for the first two years because the health care
authority does not have the in-house capacity to do the job – [at a cost
of] about $30 million annually (Shuler 1995c).
The outsourcing cost of the Charity HMO administration later was raised to cost $40
million. LHCA officials also provoked some ire with their demand to approve the contract in “21
days instead of the regular 45 days allowed for the procedure. The idea is to have the public
HMO ready to go by July 1” – the beginning of the new fiscal year. Meanwhile, the required
federal approval for the proposal remained uncertain (Shuler 1995e).
Charity’s HMO contract cost was revised upward again to $45 million. The escalating
cost coupled with the expedited timeframe to solicit and review proposals heightened suspicions
of renewed administrative corruption favoring politically well-connected firms. State
Representative Melissa Flournoy exclaimed: “It looks like it’s been cooked from the very
beginning. That’s why people want to blow up the health care authority.” In response, state
legislators proposed the LHCA’s abolition (Shuler 1995g).
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Governor Edwards faced almost total revolt for his Charity HMO proposal. His own
legislative floor leaders, “some members of the Legislative Black Caucus … and the Acadiana
Caucus (were) vocal in their dislike for parts of the plan.” Election-year politics and the
uncertainty of what the federal government would do with the DSH program seemingly led
everyone to dissent against the proposal. The Advocate also said that the state requested “13
deviations from regular Medicaid rules” in order to advance the HMO plan (Shuler 1995h).
Federal officials meanwhile remained steadfast against forgiving Louisiana’s Medicaid
shortfall, even after “Gov. Edwin Edwards, lawmakers and state health officials went to
Washington on bended knee … imploring … to let Louisiana skip out on following new
Medicaid rules,” saying they weren’t to blame for past excesses. The Congressional closure of
loopholes in the DSH funding program now required “Louisiana … to use its own money to pay
the state’s 28 percent match – not federal dollars” (Zganjar 1995).
While respective state and federal officials shared the same Democratic political party
affiliation, larger events also impacted Louisiana’s plans – as a troubled attempt toward
implementation of national healthcare reform was simultaneously underway. Some national
Democrats even suggested that Louisiana “get out of hospitals” (Coates 1994).
Federal officials rejected both the Charity HMO, and a bailout of Louisiana’s $750
million Medicaid shortfall – leading Governor Edwards’ to end his quest (Shuler 1995j and k).
Republican Congressman Robert Livingston of Metairie, chair of U.S. House Appropriations
Committee, urged top federal health officials to kill Louisiana’s Medicaid salvage proposal:
Our beneficiaries and our taxpayers cannot be served if they are
subjected to a new system which would become fiscally insolvent and
could be administered by those same people who created the current
situation, which is replete with allegations of fraud and
mismanagement (Shuler 1995i).

48

Unable to bail out Louisiana’s Medicaid program through creation of a Charity
Hospital system HMO, out-going Governor Edwards’ administration actions to tackle a looming
$750 million budget deficit confirmed widespread public skepticism that past Medicaid spending
largely enriched private medical providers at the expense of Medicaid recipients:
Officials with the state Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH)
made an initial $130 million in cuts to the state Medicaid health care
program … (yet) people on Medicaid will continue to receive the
same level of in-patient hospital services they now receive, although
the hospitals will be paid less (McMahon and Shuler 1995).
To address the remainder of the $750 million shortfall, state health administrators
returned to utilize the same DSH mechanisms – and money – which generated the hundreds of
millions of dollars in excess Medicaid program expenditures. Indeed, officials suggested a large
chunk of the match funds still remained in the state budget, cycling through Louisiana state
government coffers, without any expected loss in revenues! While millions of dollars of federal
DSH funds would no longer be matched in the way they were because of new Congressionallymandated spending restrictions, Edwards’ administration officials argued the level of budget cuts
required to balance the state’s remaining $3 billion Medicaid budget was now much lower –
meaning that meaningful programs would not see once feared cuts (Shuler 1995m).
The first bill seeking transfer of Charity hospitals to LSU failed – but only because of
LSU’s opposition, not for any lost love of the widely viewed-as-corrupt LHCA (Shuler 1995g).
The Advocate’s Shuler also confirmed that the LHCA engaged in the “double counting” of
Medicaid dollars. “Because of that double counting … the state never really had a $4 billion
Medicaid program from which cuts were to be made.” Shuler incredulously observed:
It seems there was some recycling of Medicaid money involved …
Maybe that’s why $1 billion cannot be found on paper anywhere. It’s
the cut that never was (Shuler 1995m).
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Bobby Jindal saves Louisiana Medicaid by shrinking it; Jindal leaves unaddressed the
continued diversion of millions of dollars in DSH funds from Charity hospitals
The November 1995 election of Republican Governor Murphy J. “Mike” Foster
signaled the end of the LHCA’s administration of the Charity Hospital system. Though it would
take another year to dissolve the agency, the LHCA’s demise would be just one of several
significant healthcare policy shifts impacting Charity during Foster’s two terms in office.
Within days of his gubernatorial inauguration, Foster selected 24-year-old Rhodes
Scholar Piyush “Bobby” Jindal for Secretary of the Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH).
Calling him “a genius,” Foster addressed Jindal’s youthfulness as an asset for DHH:
I am not a gambler. I am a very conservative person. And, I am very,
very comfortable that this is not a gamble. This man is going to go
into (DHH) and engender a lot of respect (Shuler 1996a).
Jindal was employed after his university studies for the consulting firm McKinsey and
Company (Konieczko 2008). He was a healthcare advisor to U.S. Representative Bob Livingston
(Shuler 1996a). Espousing both neoconservative and neoliberal viewpoints, Jindal pledged “to
transform the public health system” away from the state-run Charity hospitals. Jindal said:
Neither the Medicaid nor other working poor populations will be
denied necessary health care services. (However) neither group
should receive services unavailable to state workers or individuals
with private insurance … There are no sacred cows … (DHH’s)
mission will require a shift of focus from being a health care provider
to a wise purchaser of services (Shuler 1996b). 19
Jindal also vowed to “aggressively seek recovery of an estimated $26.6 million in
Medicaid overpayments made to 15 hospitals providing care for the state’s poor.” Specifically
targeted were two private psychiatric facilities run by former Lieutenant Governor Bobby
Freeman, and a drug treatment program with ties to former Louisiana House Speaker Pro-tem
Sherman Copelin housed at New Orleans General Hospital (Shuler 1996c).
19

See Klein (2007, pp. 14-15). Neoconservatism and neoliberalism extols privatization of public services.
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DHH Secretary Jindal’s administration’s first few months provoked widespread outcry.
Nursing homes still in business after stepped up enforcement of state and federal regulations
faced reduced payments. And citing the need to trim costs, DHH moved “toward making
Medicaid recipients pay a small fee each time they receive health care services” (Shuler 1996d).
Patients chafed at a proposed charge of “$25 to be admitted to the hospital” (Shinkle 1996). In
response, the state legislature nixed the hospital admission fee (The Advocate 1996).
Jindal attempted worker layoffs at several state-run psychiatric facilities (Shuler
1996e). He instituted a system of rationing in substance abuse programs to allow “more people to
be served per year, helping to relieve waiting lists” (Shuler 1996g).
Amongst policymakers however, Jindal gained wide renown. Vowing that Medicaid
would not grow beyond a designated threshold, Jindal pledged “the state (would) not fund any
new initiatives or add to optional programs until we can control spending” (Shuler 1996f).
Jindal’s pledge, coupled with “accepting a cap on federal Medicaid payments for two years,”
prompting federal officials to work out a deal which “averted a catastrophe” of massive budget
cuts in Louisiana’s Medicaid program. Attending a news conference announcing the deal, LSU
Medical Center Chancellor Dr. Mervin Trail said “we dodged a nuclear explosion” (Gyan 1996).
Congressional critics were quick to point out Louisiana Medicaid was able to finesse a
substantial bailout because U.S. House Appropriations Chairman Bob Livingston was from the
suburban New Orleans suburb of Metairie. “What Louisiana is getting is a very sweet deal,” said
Congressman Henry Waxman of California. “It is very special treatment. It is pork barrel
money.” Recounting Louisiana Medicaid’s maximization of DSH funding, Congressman John
Dingell of Michigan said “[this] is an indefensible Medicaid giveaway … apparently based on
the philosophy that no bad deed should go unrewarded” (McKinney and Shuler 1996).
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The Advocate acknowledged the Congressional criticisms as justified. It editorialized
that indeed, Louisiana “pled guilty as charged, threw itself on the mercy of the court and got off
easy.” “Easy” however, was a $400 million cut in Medicaid – instead of “an immediate cut of
$1.5 billion” from the Fiscal Year 1996-1997 budget. The Advocate said:
The sins were committed by past administrations. But the massive
cuts in services would fall on the 900,000 Louisianans who rely on
the state for health care. The poor and the sick are not the bad guys …
Louisiana can’t expect another reprieve … We got off easy. Let’s not
blow our second chance (The Advocate 1996).
DHH Secretary Jindal’s administration of Louisiana Medicaid substantially ended
outright fraud and advance payments to private providers, “recouping $35.4 million” refunded
under threat of state litigation (Shuler 1998). He left the program two years after his appointment
with a fiscal surplus – earning him national acclaim and an appointment to “(lead) the staff of
(the National Bipartisan Commission of the Future of Medicare charged with heading off an)
impending financial crisis in federal health programs for the elderly” (The Advocate 1998).
Jindal did not alter the basic formula to utilize the Charity hospital system’s dominant
capacity – to provide healthcare for the uninsured – by generating federal DSH match
contributions. Indeed, DHH continued siphoning millions of dollars for private hospitals and
other Medicaid providers. And with less overall funding, Charity system hospitals now faced the
prospect of significant budget cuts even as its DSH “money-machine” functions continued. 20
Before leaving Louisiana’s capital for the nation’s capital, Bobby Jindal assisted
Governor Foster in abolishing the LHCA – and transferring the Charity Hospital system to
Louisiana State University’s (LSU) medical school. Previously in 1976, LSU had converted
Shreveport’s Charity Hospital, the former Confederate Memorial Medical Center, into what is
now known as the LSU Health Sciences Center (LSUHSC) at Shreveport (LSUHSC-S 2011).
20

See McMahon (1996a and 1996b); Shuler (1996h); Walsh (1996b) and Weiss (1996).
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LSU assumes administration of Charity hospitals; and faced a continued loss of DSH funds
Louisiana House Appropriations Chairman Elias “Bo” Ackal of New Iberia first
proposed “turning over the state’s charity hospitals to the LSU Medical Center” to provide an
alternative to DSH funding. LSU Medical Center Chancellor Merv Trail said “there’s a potential
for an academic health center such as ours to be a source of matching funds, but the hospitals
would have to come under our governance” while pledging to “fight any attempt to implement
the plan if any medical school money is at risk” (Shuler 1995b). Though abolition of the LHCA
and transference of Charity hospitals to DHH was overwhelmingly passed in the Louisiana
House of Representatives as the centerpiece of its 1995-96 state budget, its proposed use of LSU
Medical Center “in-kind matching” funds “to produce … federal funds for Medicaid” was
rejected by the State Senate after the LSU Board of Supervisors opposed the measure (McMahon
1995; Shuler 1995L). LSU System President Allen Copping demanded funding guarantees
before it would administer all ten of Louisiana’s Charity hospitals (Myers 1995).
Roberts and Durant (2010, p. 54) noted that LSU’s early reticence of taking on
budgetary administration of a Charity Hospital system it medically dominated since the 1930s
came in part from its desire to just exercise control of New Orleans’ Charity and University
hospitals – but the legislature insisted LSU “accept all nine of the LHCA hospitals or none of
them.” Governor Foster, who originally favored “setting the free market loose on the 260-yearold Charity Hospital system,” welcomed LSU administration (Walsh 1996a).
Tulane University Medical School officials originally challenged LSU’s administration
of Charity system hospitals, after “expressing dissatisfaction at the prospect of having their
teaching programs controlled by LSU, their direct competitor” (Redfearn 1996). Following
negotiations, Tulane endorsed the LSU Charity system oversight proposal (Zwolak 1997).
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LSU’s reputation that it had what it took to run a successful academic medical center is
showcased with its LSU Health Sciences Center in Shreveport. Added onto Shreveport’s charity
hospital in 1975, it is now LSU’s largest with over 500 staffed beds. 21 LSU-Shreveport has also
been praised for having the best ratio of insured/uninsured patients, the most diverse patient base
and the greatest integration of public and private medicine practice (LSU Health 2010;
McDonald 2002). Yet it also has the ability to self-generate its budget without having to return
funds to the state, and retains self-generated funds in accounts that went across budget years.
LSU Shreveport has a solid, up-to-date capital infrastructure and does not need
legislative approval for its operations. With a combined medical school and charity hospital
administration and budget, its faculty practice only in its hospital, thus referring their significant
book of private patients to LSU Shreveport, reinforcing fiscal sustainability (McDonald 2002).
Former chancellor and surgeon Dr. John McDonald noted that LSU Shreveport has had
the ability to treat rich and poor alike without segregating their healthcare, which he argued made
the institution one of a kind in Louisiana (McCauley 2002). He noted however that this had not
always been the case; and that the state’s elites are responsible for the ‘two-tier’ system:
The most tragic aspect of the history of medicine in Louisiana has
been the segregation of public and private care. For almost 200 years
now it has been philosophically accepted in Louisiana that the poor
get their care in one place and the affluent get their care in another.
Further, that care has been qualitatively different, and that has been
acceptable to the state’s power structure. I submit that this philosophy
is unacceptable. It is akin to advocating separate but equal schools.
Not only is it morally wrong, it does not work. It separates the teacher
from the practitioner and the student from best practice. The clinical
investigator cannot supplement income … I do not know of a single
world-class medical center that does not have some access to private
patients (McDonald 2002).
21

Shreveport’s Charity hospital, founded in 1876, was renamed Confederate Memorial Medical Center following its
1953 building dedication. It was renamed LSU Shreveport Medical Center in 1976 (http://lsuhscshistory.org 2011).
LSU Board of Supervisors member Dr. Jack A. Andonie said LSU Shreveport has 550 beds (Andonie 2011); while
the 2010 LSU Health Annual Report says there are 459 licensed beds – both sources indicate 90% + occupancy.
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Amidst expressed fears of privatization and the closure of all the public hospitals except
those in Shreveport and New Orleans, LSU School of Medicine dean Dr. Robert Marier voiced
support for the Charity system. Testifying before Louisiana’s House Appropriations Committee:
The state’s charity hospitals, under public stewardship for more than
260 years, won’t be handed over to a big for-profit corporation if
Louisiana State University is put in charge. We want to make it
emphatically clear that there are no deals to privatize the hospitals.
We intend to manage the hospitals as a safety-net system (Walsh
1997a).
Louisiana House Bill 1162 authorized the LSU takeover of Charity hospitals and the
abolition of the LHCA. The state senate voted 31-7 for passage, despite fear that the proposal
would not work – or that Charity’s historic mission would be subverted (Shuler 1997). A
Constitutional Amendment also passed “(giving legislators) ultimate control of the hospital
system” (Walsh 1997b). Louisiana voters affirmed it in 1998 (Louisiana Constitution 1998).
Change of administration of Charity system hospitals from the LHCA to LSU
immediately brought forth absorption of all LHCA employees and property into LSU. “The LSU
Medical Center (also transacted) a cooperative endeavor agreement with Tulane University
Medical Center for the administration of the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans
(Charity Hospital) and Huey P. Long Medical Center” in Pineville (Legislative Fiscal Office /
LFO 1997). LSU also sought to resurrect some delayed LHCA projects, including construction
of “a critical care tower on South Johnson Street alongside University Hospital” (Walsh 1997c).
While LSU pledged to uphold Charity’s safety net system, it also sought to discard Big
Charity as the physical center of its medical enterprise. It additionally promised to overcome
historical restrictions as applied to Charity system hospitals limiting them to patients without
insurance, prohibitions against discharge of employees protected by Civil Service and automatic
qualification without means-testing of the uninsured for free hospital care (Pope 1997).
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In an editorial, The Advocate acknowledged that the resulting bill transferring the
Charity Hospital system from the LHCA to LSU overcame many of their initial concerns. While
praising LSU’s ability and the certainty of public oversight, “some nagging concerns” remained:
We also wonder if LSU can run the hospitals with no increase in state
funding, as the Foster administration promises, without sometimes
scrimping on needed medical services to poorer citizens. Finally,
there is no guarantee that LSU officials, after their long allegiance to
their (graduate medical education) mission, can change their attitudes
to keep patients foremost in their minds (The Advocate 1997).
The new LSU Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD) administration of the
Charity Hospital system engendered praise for having “brought stability to a system that had
been bedeviled by short-staffing and political interference” (Pope 1998). Yet LSU also faced
immediately the dilemma of the continued flight of Charity-generated DSH funding.
Concluding that all assets left by the LHCA included unspent DSH funds, LSU took
ownership of “$86 million in cash the charity hospitals had on hand at the end of the 1996-97
fiscal year” – even as Governor Foster “assumed the same money reverted to the state general
fund and counted it as part of a $135 million surplus for 1996-97” (Redman 1998).
Having spent the entirety of the surplus to pay down long-term state indebtedness, the
Governor’s Office sought a legal opinion: The Louisiana Attorney General ruled in favor of the
Governor and against LSU “because of an accounting error...” (Redman 1999a).
Shortly after suffering the loss of the $86 million, “top officials with the LSU Medical
Center warned … they might have to shut down as many as 15 percent of the beds in the state’s
charity hospital system to cope with budget pressure (in the 1999-2000) fiscal year.” While
stating that emergency care “(wouldn’t) be jeopardized … patients with conditions that are not
life-threatening may not get treatment.” LSU officials said such a drop in patients would also
negatively impact Charity’s graduate medical residencies (Redman 1999b).
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Miraculously, the feared cuts did not occur, due in part to “the state’s expected $4.4
billion share of a national $206 billion settlement of tobacco litigation” which Governor Foster
said “health care and improvements to the (LSU) operations of the state’s charity hospitals
probably would be the best way to spend the money…” (The Times-Picayune / T-P 1998).
LSU faced other challenges. Big Charity was nearly closed in 1999 when a deadline for
mandatory installation of fire sprinklers passed (Scallan 1999). The state legislature ultimately
intervened with legislation which gave “high–rise structures used as state hospitals or prisons
until Jan. 1, 2005 to install the sprinkler systems” (Anderson 1999). The legislature provided
funding in 2002 to complete the project (Louisiana House Bill 2 (HB 2) 2002, p. 50).
In the midst of the 1999-2000 Fiscal Year, DHH Secretary David Hood proposed
cutting $30.5 million from Charity hospitals (Ritea 2000). However, “the Joint Legislative
Committee on the Budget approved tapping money in some special agency funds to prevent
some $90 million in pharmacy program and charity hospital cuts …” (Shuler 2000a). Even so,
New Orleans’ Charity Hospital’s HIV-HOP outpatient clinic curtailed free distribution of several
vital medications and limited their formulary, leaving patients compromised: “Those with private
insurance (were) no longer able to get prescriptions filled through the clinic” – severely
impacting one patient whose “insurance policy will pay 80 percent of his drug bill cost, but only
after he pays the entire cost” – effectively barring the patient from his medicines (Pope 2000a).
During the remainder of Governor Foster’s term, LSU endured several additional
rounds of budget cuts. Charity hospitals in Bogalusa, Independence and Lake Charles barely
escaped permanent closure. LSU Health Sciences Center-New Orleans Chancellor Merv Trail
said, “LSU did not take over these hospitals to close them. It will be a decision made by this
legislature and administration” (Shuler 2000b).
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Only through state legislative intervention was Charity Hospital’s system budget often
safeguarded (Pope 2000b). DHH often retaliated by shutting down parish health units and laying
off personnel – which usually sent patients into Charity system clinics and emergency rooms
(Shuler 2000c). In response, the Legislature approved authorization “giving the charity hospital
system more flexibility in managing its funds” (Shuler 2002a).
LSU was also told that Charity system hospitals now had to pay for healthcare for
prisoners. The Advocate reported “the prisoner-care shortfall cropped up when U.S. Medicaid
officials said the state could not tap federal (DSH) health-care dollars to treat inmates” (Shuler
2002b). This situation worsened when $48.4 million in state health spending cuts ballooned into
a proposed $168 million financial hit in the largest areas of Medicaid spending – leading one
LSU official to predict a “health care Chernobyl” – equating the fiscal outcome to the infamous
1986 Ukrainian nuclear reactor meltdown (Shuler 2002c).
In an effort to calm budgetary chaos and produce a common DSH payment rate for
state and private hospitals alike, the state legislature enacted Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 of
2002 to prompt development of a common “payment methodology” for LSU-HCSD and
LSUHSC-Shreveport Charity hospitals as well as for private provider Medicaid reimbursement
under DHH administration (LSU-HCSD 2003, p. 17). The report reviewed past legislative efforts
and proposed creation of a payment system “based upon current costs and inclusive of annual
adjustments for inflation.” The legislative committee report recommended “that the manner in
which additional DSH funding is structured and implemented be consistent with … meeting the
health care needs of the state’s medically indigent and uninsured and to improve overall health
outcomes for Louisianans” while recognizing possible cuts in federal DSH funding (Louisiana
Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 (SCR 27) Report 2003, pp. 2-6).
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The report called for a profound break from what many in the healthcare community
saw as years of inequitable DSH reimbursements. It recognized the preeminent and historic role
played by Louisiana’s Charity Hospital system – and proposed for the first time a dedicated set
of financial and medical benchmarks that would afford greater predictability in DSH funding –
while also affording non-state hospitals (especially rural providers) DSH funding reimbursement
for the first time (SCR 27 Report 2003, pp. 2-6).
Ignoring the legislative findings, the Foster administration took advantage of another
increase in federally-designated safety net hospital DSH funds, meant expressly for Charity:
The federal government passed a bill allowing for enhanced DSH
payments to state owned safety net hospitals. This enhanced payment
is limited to Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 and would allow for up to
175% of costs to be reimbursed. This enhanced funding is also
designed to allow state safety net hospital(s) additional capital for
investment and infrastructure (LSU-HCSD 2003, p. 17).
Louisiana DHH already received additional Medicaid incentive payments to “ease
budgetary pressures to cut the program (by) temporarily raising the federal matching rate for
Medicaid – the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage or FMAP” without needing to divert
safety net hospital DSH payments. Louisiana’s enhanced FMAP rate increased to 74.58 for
October 2003 to June 2004 (Ku 2003). This increased Louisiana’s Medicaid program spending to
take advantage of the enhanced 2.95% federal match under FMAP (LHR 2003, p. 46).
Yet DHH forced Charity system hospitals to lose its enhanced DSH funding – and
forced Charity to bear an additional system-wide budget cut, together totaling $274.7 million:
State match generated from the use of the “175% overpayment option.
For FY 03-04 and FY 04-05, the state may pay public hospitals 175%
of their indigent care costs under federal Medicaid-DSH rules. To
generate this overpayment, Medicaid will pay to state hospitals and
DHH will recoup from them $274.7 million. After paying the state’s
matching share, DHH will net $196.8 million for use in the Medicaid
program… (Louisiana House Fiscal Division / LHFD 2003, p. 48).
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Federal and LSU officials cried foul, “arguing that the (DSH funding) was not intended
to be used for anything besides the state’s charity hospitals” (AP 2003; Shuler 2003g). Under the
special federal match rate of 175%, “the charity system (was) eligible to collect $671 million …
but the Legislature capped the hospitals’ revenue at $345 million … the rest (was) diverted to
(DHH) ...” -- leaving an additional $52 million unaccounted for (Moller 2003).
State legislators decried the cuts endured by Charity system hospitals – but did not
succeed in restoring the lost funds in the same budget year. The spending cuts totaled $66.5
million, with 291 people losing their jobs (Shuler 2003c). New Orleans’ Charity Hospital
endured the largest cut: $27 million and 59 jobs lost (Moller 2003). Nine operating rooms, the
diabetic clinic, Charity’s home health department and the urgent care W-16 walk-in clinic were
shuttered. (Butler 2003) “W-16 alone saw 40,000 patients each year, and its closure was
disastrous for the emergency room” (Reckdahl 2004).
This round of austerity also came at the time LSU began to gain wider authority to
manage its own budget, without what they viewed as onerous legislative restrictions. Act 906 of
the 2003 Regular Legislative session proclaimed the end of “Open Access” – Louisiana’s
historic commitment to the poor to receive free hospital care without means testing, circa 1926:
Any bona fide resident of the state of Louisiana who is medically
indigent or medically needy shall be eligible to be admitted for any
form of treatment by any general hospital owned and operated by the
state of Louisiana (Revised Statute 46:6, LSU-HCSD 2004, p. 3).
Act 906 “(provided a means-tested) definition of “medically indigent” as any person
below 200 percent of the federal poverty level and uninsured … requiring that persons above this
income threshold be responsible for contributing toward the cost of their care” (LSU-HCSD
2004, p. 15). It also allowed LSU to “reduce hospital spending by up to 35 percent of the
previous year’s actual expenses without legislative approval” (Barrouquere 2003).
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Though commanding a legislative majority, critics vowed to make the passage of Act
906, as well as the DHH diversion of DSH funds meant for Charity hospitals an issue in
forthcoming 2003 state legislative and gubernatorial election contests. Senator Don Cravins of
Arnaudville worried that LSU would not “keep their commitment to the people of Louisiana they
made when they took over the charity system…” (Barrouquere 2003). Senator Diana Bajoie of
New Orleans said “the change would prompt people who truly need care to stay away from the
hospitals” – worsening the situation for emergency departments (Shuler 2003c). Senator Joe
McPherson of Woodworth “said lawmakers were “misled” when they were told flexibility would
allow the hospitals to better serve the needy.” LSU System President William Jenkins retorted:
“Flexibility is important for us, but at the same time without funding that flexibility has made it a
very difficult challenge for us” (Shuler 2003d). Indeed, the massive Charity system budget cuts
threatened seven Tulane and LSU medical residencies with dissolution: “Three (of these)
programs received warning letters from the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical
Education, a board that certifies all U.S. medical resident programs” (Butler 2003).
The future of the Charity Hospital system dominated Louisiana’s gubernatorial contest.
Republican candidate Dan Kyle advocated Charity’s dissolution by privatization (Dyer 2003).
Democrats Claude “Buddy” Leach and Richard Ieyoub vowed to keep all the hospitals open.
Most of the rest of the candidates however, be they Republican or Democrat, supported the
original Charity flagship facilities’ operation; but differed on details of their mission to serve the
poor and the level of administrative control the remaining ones should be placed under. The
Advocate observed: “All the major candidates for governor agree that LSU’s teaching hospitals
in New Orleans and Shreveport should be preserved. But the fate and role of the other seven
hospitals in urban and rural communities is another question” (Shuler 2003e).
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The fate of Charity hospitals were a deciding factor in the 2003 LA. Governor’s race
The two leading candidates in the 2003 Louisiana Governor’s race shared remarkably
similar views on the fate of the Charity Hospital system. Democratic Lieutenant Governor
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco suggested that urban non-state hospitals “are saying just pay us for
indigent care. If you give us the same amount as charity hospitals, we will take care of it and the
state doesn’t have to worry about bricks and mortar.” Meanwhile the former DHH Secretary and
Republican Party’s choice Bobby Jindal, under whose watch LSU became the administrative
operator of the Charity Hospital system, “(advocated) local governance of the state hospitals…”
(Shuler 2003e). Jindal lead the voting in Louisiana’s multi-party primary. Blanco came in
second. Blanco “was the target of negative advertising” by Richard Ieyoub, a fellow Democratic
Party challenger who charged that Blanco would close Charity hospitals (The Advocate 2003).
Ieyoub then endorsed Blanco, after she pledged to keep the Charity system open (Frink 2003).
In a case of political turn-about, Blanco ran television commercials charging that Jindal
sought to dissolve the Charity system. They “featured Evan Howell, a former staff neurologist
who served at Lallie Kemp (Charity) Medical Center … while Jindal was cutting the DHH
budget” (Frink and Dyer 2003). Blanco narrowly won the election (Nossiter 2003b). Adam
Nossiter opined in The Advocate that Blanco:
Throughout the primary, for instance, (Blanco) was distinctly
lukewarm on a hot-button issue for Democrats, the state’s charity
hospitals … A campaign statement released by her back in May said:
“The Charity Hospital System is clearly broken. We can no longer
afford to financial support a two-tiered health-care system in this
state.” But standing on the Capitol steps this week, at a boisterous
rally with health-care professionals, she said firmly: “I stand here in
full commitment to our state’s charity hospital system. Over 1 million
Louisiana citizens depend on our charity hospital system as their
primary means of getting health care. These citizens cannot be
abandoned” (Nossiter 2003a).
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Governor Blanco’s reform panel grapples with Charity’s centrality in state healthcare
The enormous role played in securing the election of Louisiana’s first female governor
by voter concerns about future of the Charity Hospital system cannot be overstated. Had
Kathleen Blanco not shifted her original lukewarm position to favor Charity hospitals, there
would have been very little to distinguish herself from her primary opponent Bobby Jindal.
Supposed conservative voter hostility to her gender otherwise cancelled out any conservative
voter hostility to Jindal’s Indian national heritage and complexion. 22 In a curious bid, an effort
was made to keep in place Governor Foster’s DHH Secretary David Hood (Shuler 2004b). Yet
Hood’s view, that “the Charity Hospital system died in 1965 when Medicaid and Medicare were
invented by Congress – We have just not had the funeral yet” (Shuler 2003a) was soundly
repudiated by Louisiana voters. Whatever misgivings Charity Hospital supporters had about
Blanco, advocates now thought LSU had a solid chance to modernize the iconic network.
Governor Blanco’s choice for DHH Secretary, internal medicine specialist Dr. Fred
Cerise, received wide acclaim. He previously served as administrator of Baton Rouge’s charity
hospital, the Earl K. Long Medical Center (Shuler 2004c). Cerise set out to organize a statewide
health reform summit held March 2004 in a downtown New Orleans hotel (The Advocate 2004).
Continued federal scrutiny over the diversion of Congressionally-earmarked Charity
Hospital DSH funds as well as the drastic cuts to Charity’s system budget threatened to up-end
the entire state budget by nearly $800 million. Secretary Cerise admitted the diversion was
wrong – but “as head of the state health agency” he appealed to the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) to uphold the spending (Shuler 2004d). CMS ruled in favor of DHH,
on the pledge that there would be no additional Charity Hospital cuts (Madigan 2004).
22

Author comment: Some commentators have suggested that Jindal was a victim of racism in his first gubernatorial
bid. Whatever the validity of that assessment, Jindal went on to win four years later an unprecedented first primary
victory by one of the largest margins in Louisiana history, overcoming several well-financed white candidates.

63

Thanks in part to increased oil prices, LSU-run Charity hospitals were fully funded for
2004-2005 (Moller 2005b; LHFD 2004, pp. 2-3). 23 It was also fully funded in the 2005-2006
fiscal year, even with the loss of 175 percent federal DSH match. Indeed, the State General
Fund’s contribution was $68 million higher than 2004-05 fiscal year (LHFD 2005, p. 11).
Governor Blanco’s “Health Care Reform Panel” prompted the creation of “permanent
regional health care consortiums” born out of the summits organized by DHH Secretary Cerise.
Launched by Senate Health and Welfare Committee Chair Joe McPherson and House Health and
Welfare Committee Chair Sydnie Mae Durand, the regional health consortiums sought to
capitalize on “grass roots input into the problems of, and possible solutions for, the health care
system in Louisiana.” Established in the nine defined regions surrounding Charity hospitals,
invitations to participate were advertised by DHH in conjunction with the Louisiana Senate
district offices of each region represented. Notably, participation was expanded beyond just
healthcare industry representatives to also include patient groups and healthcare workers.
Members’ terms were slated for three years with “consortium members … selected by plurality
vote of each region’s legislative delegation” (Louisiana SCR 95 2004, pp. 1-2).

24

Rather than diminish the role played by Charity system hospitals, Governor Blanco and
DHH Secretary Cerise emphasized its centrality, yet also its overburdened capacity in providing
healthcare for the uninsured. With surveys finding “the Charity Hospital System is the First Line
of Defense for many” (EP&P Consulting 2004), Cerise emphasized:
Current demand for care is greater than the system can accommodate.
In addition to its service obligation, this system provides the
environment for much of the medical education enterprise in the state.
Chronic underfunding of maintenance has produced serious facility
problems in several regions of the state… (Cerise 2004a).
23
24

Louisiana is the third largest oil producer in the U.S., allowing it to earn severance taxes based on the price of oil.
The author was appointed to a three-year term for the Region 1 Health Care Consortium (representing healthcare
consumers in Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines and St. Bernard parishes) in October 2004.
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The public conversation which unfolded from Governor Blanco and DHH Secretary
Cerise’s health care reform initiative attempted to couple Louisiana’s poor health indicators with
the state’s high rate of poverty, rather than just blame either the impoverished or the inadequacy
of the public health system which predominately served them. The state’s poverty and health
indicators nevertheless were grim. Louisiana indeed was ranked 4th highest in the U.S. in the rate
of poor residents as well those with family incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty
level for family size; and was 49th or 50th in state-by-state rankings during the period in overall
health status. Yet state officials also pointed out, in an unprecedented level of self-criticism, that
though over one million Louisianans were covered by Medicaid in 2003, restrictive policies
effectively limited participation to “children, pregnant women, age 65 and older, and people with
disabilities.” Louisiana, said DHH, had “the second lowest (Medicaid) income threshold of any
state” – 13 percent of federal poverty level (Cerise 2004b, pp. 2-6).
A report from metropolitan New Orleans’ – “Region 1 Consortium Update” offered a
starker comparison. “The big picture problem in Region 1 is a large underserved population that
suffers with poor health status – among the worst in the nation.” Almost 28% of New Orleans
residents in 2004 lived in poverty, with “approximately 50% of non-elderly adults … uninsured
and over half of the children are on Medicaid … (with) minorities … the most uninsured
segment ...” (Stephens 2005, p. 3). The report also noted:
Further exacerbating this problem was the closure of services at the
Medical Center of Louisiana (Charity Hospital). This has reduced the
primary care capacity to less than 20% of what is needed to
adequately cover the needs of the uninsured alone. These cutbacks
have resulted in six month waiting periods for medical clinic
appointments, and have further extended the already overburdened
emergency rooms of our region. For example, the average service
time in the Emergency Room (at Charity) is now eight to twelve
hours (Stephens 2005, p. 4).
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Region 1’s “Care for the Uninsured Committee,” 25 in issuing its report to the regional
consortium, placed the leading emphasis on “(protecting) resources allocated for the Medical
Center of Louisiana (Charity Hospital) as the major provider of care for the uninsured in the
region.” It also extolled many of the professed aims of the Governor’s Health Care Reform
Panel, including expanded health insurance access and integration of primary care and mental
health services – while leaving MCLNO/Charity as the epicenter of care to be accessed and
improved upon (Williams and Ott 2005).
As friendly to Charity Hospitals as the Blanco/Cerise administration seemed to be,
justifications to abandon or move from them by redirecting its main DSH funding away from the
Charity system sometimes echoed the previous Foster/Jindal administration. A DHH discussion
paper that would form the basis of the Governor’s Health Care Reform Panel recommendations
proposed a “Louisiana DSH Demonstration … to place all of the state’s DSH allotment in a
pool.” The paper cited as justification “(the) high rate of uninsured residents” … “an oversupply
of hospital beds compared to the rest of the nation” and “a growing number of uninsured are
receiving episodic care in private hospital emergency departments, most of which do not have a
coordinated, associated outpatient clinic network.” This concept paper proposed underwriting
private insurance coverage at the expense of the public hospital system (DHH 2005a, pp. 3-6).
DHH Secretary Cerise however stopped the wholesale diversion of Charity Hospital
system DSH-operating funds to private providers. Freed for the first time from the threat of
Charity Hospital’s dissolution since assuming administration of the Charity system, LSU began
asserting more directly what it could do to “leverage educational resources to provide access”
and “organize indigent care to provide training opportunities” to further its “dual mission” of
graduate medical education and safety net healthcare (LSU-HCSD 2004, p. 6).
25

The author was Co-Chair with Clayton Williams of the 19-member committee.
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LSU proposes building a new hospital – and closing Charity
Clark (2010a) said LSU’s administration of the Charity Hospital system since 1997
defied the usual operational and financial obstacles to provide a successful safety net network:
Louisiana’s state hospital system is an unusually comprehensive
access-to-care model in a particularly poor state … (LSU has made)
Louisiana’s access-to-care model a workable avenue for providing
healthcare services for its low-income population. (LSU’s) disease
management programs help patients control chronic conditions and
reduce preventable admissions and emergency department visits. An
enhanced medication assistance program compliments disease
management efforts by helping patients secure the drugs they need to
adhere to treatment protocols and avoid health crises… (p. 122).
Louisianans, whether or not they were patients, concurred by a wide margin that the
Charity Hospital system was vital. A late 2003 Baton Rouge Advocate poll found:
Louisiana voters … made it clear they want to preserve the state’s
charity hospital system. Eighty-seven percent of those interviewed
said Louisiana should continue its charity hospital system instead of
closing the hospitals and paying to have needy patients cared for at
private hospitals (Shuler 2004a).
A similar poll conducted by The Advocate in late 2004 found similar results:
Support for the charity system crossed all demographic regions, with
[no support ranking] less than 81 percent [Baton Rouge and Acadiana
areas]. The greatest support came from respondents in the New
Orleans metropolitan region at 91 percent and next north Louisiana at
86 percent … [and also commanded] 84 percent among white
respondents and 89 percent among black respondents (Shuler 2005a).
Despite a high regard for LSU’s improvements and the Charity system overall,
“lawmakers simmering frustration with long waits and closed beds” reached a boiling point,
prompting legislators to threaten LSU with higher education cuts if Charity hospitals didn’t
receive higher consideration. Some charged LSU “(favored) its educational missions above
providing hospital services to the indigent.” State Senate Finance Committee Vice-Chair Joe
McPherson said, “You all need to get your priorities straight” (Moller 2005a).
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Six years after it took over the Charity Hospital system from the Louisiana Health Care
Authority, LSU commissioned its first comprehensive infrastructure assessment. Citing longstanding deferred maintenance, LSU found its “public hospitals … physical condition so bad that
they need more than $300 million in repairs just to keep them open … (with) the total cost of all
recommended improvements … is $1.1 billion” (Shuler 2003f).
The two-year study proposed building entirely new hospitals in Baton Rouge, Pineville
and New Orleans. The 2003 LSU hospital facility assessment, conducted by Washer-Hill &
Lipscomb and Adams Project Management (ADAMS), found other Charity hospitals in fair
condition; though it questioned whether the smallest facility in the safety net network, Lallie
Kemp Medical Center in Independence, should remain open. The 2003 study also urged LSU not
to add a “critical care tower” as was originally planned for University Hospital, the old Hotel
Dieu Hospital the state purchased in 1992 as Charity’s replacement (Shuler 2003f).
In preparation for a push in the state legislature to secure capital outlay funding for new
replacement hospitals, LSU commissioned its own poll to determine the depth of public support:
The poll found that, when given a choice, 83 percent of those
surveyed said they favor having the state continue the LSU-run public
Charity Hospital system over closing the hospitals and having “needy
patients” cared for in private hospitals. Only 7 percent favor private
hospital care. The rest gave no answer (Shuler 2005b).
More than 66 percent of respondents said that private hospitals would not provide the
same level of care for the uninsured (Shuler 2005b). Critics, including the Louisiana Hospital
Association, called for the closure of all Charity hospitals “except those attached to medical
schools in Shreveport and New Orleans.” Even Governor Blanco, who otherwise publicly backed
LSU’s new hospitals initiative, endorsed “community-by-community assessments of the future
of the Charity hospitals within them,” prompting LSU to step up lobbying efforts (Shuler 2005c).
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A newly enacted “hospital provider tax” purportedly designed to more equitably
distribute DSH funds to private hospitals that treat the uninsured, also placed additional pressure
onto LSU. They charged that “private hospitals get a higher reimbursement rate,” whereas LSU
Charity system hospitals Medicaid reimbursement was arbitrarily capped, producing what they
lodged was an unjust disparity that will annually cost LSU over $100 million (Shuler 2005c). 26
Closure and replacement of Charity and University Hospitals, known together as the
Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO), was proposed in a May 2005 report:
Due to years of deferred maintenance, lack of reinvestment in
facilities, and changes in privacy regulation, MCLNO is housed in
hopelessly outmoded facilities. Without action, MCLNO will likely
lose its facility accreditation. The loss of this accreditation will cause
MCLNO to fail to meet its mission of providing healthcare access to
the uninsured, resulting in the redistribution of the area’s medically
indigent to New Orleans’ other hospitals at a potentially higher cost to
the state, and could possibly cause the evaporation of key health
profession education programs in New Orleans (ADAMS 2005, p. 7).
The report said that a new hospital that would emulate “the Shreveport model” of
academic medical centers. One option was new construction located next to University Hospital
(known as the “South Option”) and converting the 1970s campus into outpatient clinics. Adams
Management however recommended “that LSU-HCSD seriously consider locating the
replacement facility north of Tulane (Avenue) with an address facing Canal Street” allowing for
“the necessary future expansion” and “(providing) a better image and better transportation
access” (ADAMS 2005a, pp.3-4, 7) – the same location planned for the post-storm LSU UMC.
Structural deficiencies cited overwhelmingly focused on Charity’s campus. Consultants
urged that any “potential reuse of Charity” be for “non-hospital uses” and recommended
“avoiding any research related or major educational functions” (ADAMS 2005a, p. 216). Issued
just three months before Hurricane Katrina, the report urged Charity Hospital’s demise.
26

The hospital provider tax was delayed then repealed entirely. See HB 131 (2005 FES) and SB 246 (2006).
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It was an amazing spirit of people in the community doing the right
thing, trying to open up this landmark institution to be a beacon light
for the recovery of New Orleans.
Dr. James Moises, quoted by Lolis Eric Elie, The Times-Picayune
(Elie 2006)

If I have anything to say about it, we’re not going to rebuild Charity.
Jerry Jones, Louisiana Office of Facility Planning and Control (FPC)
quoted by Jan Moller, The Times-Picayune (Moller 2006a)

Katrina was not the only catastrophe for the poor of New Orleans.
The event has been used as an opportunity to close the doors of
Charity Hospital…
Lt. Gen. Russel L. Honoré (2008, p. S6)
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Charity Hospital’s patients, staff and families weather Hurricane Katrina; LSU left all
hospitals to fend for themselves; Federal health response compounds LSU’s failure
A day after Hurricane Katrina’s August 29, 2005 landfall, electrical switchgears located
in the respective basements of Charity and its sister campus University Hospital were inundated
by floodwater. Conditions at both hospitals rapidly deteriorated. In a matter of hours, the largest
medical complex in Louisiana and one of the largest public safety net hospitals in the nation was
transformed from a modern medical center into a Third World facility hobbled without
electricity, air conditioning and running water. As in much of New Orleans, Charity and
University hospital’s patients, staff and their families were literally marooned for days awaiting
rescue. Some patients died awaiting rescue. Everyone endured great hardship and discomfort as
the languid summer heat swamped the hospital inside as floodwaters swelled outside. 27
Surviving Hurricane Katrina’s winds, only to succumb to its encroaching floodwaters,
several framed accounts are filled with heroism and humanism amidst fatalism. Barkemeyer
(2006) recalled caring for infants at University Hospital without access to electricity or
sanitation. Baldwin, Robinson, Barlow and Fargason (2006) outlined the interstate transfer of
these same neonates. Gray and Hebert (2007) recounted sanitary improvisation at Charity and
other area hospitals when New Orleans’ municipal water services were shut off just a few days
after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. Kline (2007), deBoisblanc (2006) and Van Meter (2006)
balanced out the challenges and frustrations with camaraderie and humor abounding in
improbability. Van Meter in particular recounted an evacuation scene:
Later, semi tractor-trailers backed up the ambulance ramp to evacuate
the remaining Charity Hospital patients. To everyone’s amazement,
Charity’s 120 psychiatric patients cooperated very well by standing in
lines in the hospital’s front lobby as they waited to be loaded into
military trucks that had backed up to the front steps” (p. 253).
27

Amongst numerous in-depth news reports documenting Charity and University hospital’s crisis, representative
were ones by The Associated Press (2005a), Sternberg (2005) and Freemantle (2005).
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About 200 patients evacuated from Charity and 167 from University Hospital. Three
had died because of post-storm conditions (United States House 2006, p. 286). 28 Loewenberg
(2005) contrasted the evacuation response between Charity Hospital and Tulane Medical Center:
One of the most dramatic, and horrible, examples of the inequality of
the disaster was that of Charity Hospital, where 600 patients and
medical staff were trapped for more than 4 days behind torrents of
sewerage and contaminated water, cut off from electrical power, clean
water, and medical supplies. While Charity, the largest public hospital
in Louisiana, went without relief … the private facility across the
street, Tulane University Medical Center, hired 20 private helicopters
to evacuate its 1400 patients and family members (p. 881).
Loewenberg noted however that this inequity was no direct fault of Tulane, as chair of
Tulane School of Medicine Dr. Lee Hamm, went by boat immediately to confirm the deplorable
conditions at Charity and University Hospitals with Associated Press journalists – only to find
that no immediate state rescue response was forthcoming (p. 881). Van Meter (2006) also noted
that Tulane received “some of our sicker Charity Hospital patients…” (p. 253).
Several observers suggested that much of what actually happened could have been
avoided – had disaster plans simply been read and followed. Said Loewenberg:
Government officials had warned about the disastrous results of a
major storm for years. A particularly detailed briefing was given
(2003) by a group of scientists at the Center for the Study of Public
Health Impacts of Hurricanes at Louisiana State University (p. 882).
Franco, Toner, Waldhorn, Maldin, O’Toole and Inglesby (2006) and Brevard,
Weintraub, Aiken, Halton, Duchesne, McSwain, Hunt and Marr (2008) noted that the 2001
flooding of Houston’s Hermann Memorial Hospital in Texas during Tropical Storm Allison was
referenced in the LSU Health Care Service Division’s disaster preparedness plans. Federal
officials concurred, finding that LSU failed to uphold its responsibilities for hospitals under the
state emergency operations plan in advance of Katrina (United States Senate 2006, p. 600).
28

Eight patients total died; three at Charity / University were wholly attributable to post-storm conditions.
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LSU’s inadequacy in disaster preparedness left both its own Charity and University /
MCLNO complex as well as other non-LSU hospitals to fend for themselves. Guin, Robinson,
Boyd and Levitan (2009, pp. 51-53) noted that 25 New Orleans metropolitan area hospitals with
2,500 patients and 11,000 staff and their own family members – even the three not requiring
evacuation assistance – “were overwhelmed with the needs of their own patients and largely
unable to provide assistance to others.” The Louisiana Superdome special-needs clinic, run by
the New Orleans Health Department, relocated to the adjacent New Orleans Arena for more
space – but quickly was inundated with acute admissions. Aid and evacuation stations were
erected on Interstate 10 near the 17th Street Canal and the Causeway interchange. Another
improvised (and chaotic) triage center was staged at the Louis Armstrong New Orleans
International Airport for transfer to Air Force evacuation flights. Guin, et al (p. 47) also noted
that search teams 29 made 65,000 rescues to areas outside of the floodwaters – but often just to
places like roadway overpasses, where people were marooned for up to 5 days without shade or
provisions – until the full-scale U.S. military evacuations were completed.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) only ‘man on the ground’ in
advance of Katrina, Marty J. Bahamonde, observed the Superdome “shelter of last resort”:
The Superdome had opened as a special needs shelter, but on (the day
before Hurricane Katrina’s scheduled landfall), as thousands of
residents were unable to evacuate, the Superdome became a shelter of
last resort for anyone left in the city. By noon, thousands began
arriving and by midday, lines wrapped around the building … I met
with the National Guard inside the Superdome to discuss a range of
things including the expected arrival of a FEMA Disaster Medical
Assistance Team (DMAT) from Houston. The National Guard also
told me that they expected 360,000 “meals ready to eat” “MREs” and
15 trucks of water to arrive that night … Instead of 360,000 MRE’s
only 40,000 arrived. Instead of 15 trucks of water, only 5 arrived, and
the medical team did not arrive either (Bahamonde 2005, p. 2).
29

Guin, et al said the U.S. Coast Guard and other military, the LA. Dept. of Wildlife and Fisheries and many
independent persons made rescues with limited air and water craft, to any available spot of dry land or roadway.
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The first team to reach the Superdome shelter, New Mexico DMAT, arrived one day
after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, and was immediately swamped with meeting the medical
needs of 20,000 people (Bahamonde 2005, pp. 3-4). Guin, et al (2009, p. 75) said only one
federal DMAT, Oklahoma 1, arrived in advance of the storm to provide immediate healthcare. A
special report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
entitled Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, recognized that “Charity Hospital in
New Orleans, rendered inoperable by flood water, was one of only two major trauma centers in
the entire state” (U.S. Senate 2006, p. 399). Guin, et al (p. 75) summarized its findings:
• Activation of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) was
severely hampered by “a limited number of federal medical teams
(that) were actually in a position prior to landfall to deploy into
the effected area” – and only one was in place before the storm.
• “The federal government’s medical response suffered from a lack of
planning, coordination, and cooperation, particularly between the
U.S. Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)” (inclusive of FEMA).
• Federal medical agency providers lacked “adequate resources or the
right type or mix of medical capabilities to full meet the medical
needs … of large evacuee populations…”
• “Although FEMA eventually deployed virtually all of its (NDMS)
resources … there was a greater need for such teams than could be
filled, and those teams that did deploy experienced difficulties…”
• No “federal medical supplies were prepositioned in the Gulf
region;” it was impossible to fill “a last-minute request from the
City of New Orleans” before Hurricane Katrina made landfall. 30
Though not officially called upon by the federal Department of Homeland Security
until after that agency realized the enormity of Hurricane Katrina, the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) under the command of “Lieutenant General Russel Honoré was already leaning
forward pro-actively and moving assets and personnel into (the storm impacted) region”
(Keating 2005, Broderick 2006). Charity Hospital would also be seen as a key military asset.
30

Instead of the required 12 hours delivery, supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile took 3 days (AP 2005e).
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The attempt to reopen Charity Hospital by its workers and the U.S. military is thwarted
Charity’s patient evacuation was completed on September 3, 2005 – five days after
Hurricane Katrina’s landfall (Freemantle 2005). Charity’s Emergency Department (ED) chief
doctors subsequently were summoned by U.S. Army Special Forces units under the command of
Captains Jason Howard and Robert Byerley, staged at the Morial New Orleans Convention
Center, to assume its medical operations. Lead personnel from both groups returned September 6
to find that all of the first floor doors of Charity were left open and unsecured! 31 Charity’s ED
doctors and military forces promptly agreed to embark on a plan to assess whether the hospital
could be reopened, and once given clearance, proceed to do so (Moises 2009b, p. 115).
More than 150 soldiers under the command of General William Caldwell IV,
Commander of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, accelerated the restoration of Charity by its ED
doctors, nursing staff and medical residents (Evans 2009). Noting that “a building and not a tent”
was needed for doctors to treat patients, Captain Howard said the 82nd Airborne’s decision to
support Charity Hospital’s reopening was based on solid strategic evidence:
1) The first floor of the hospital was not compromised by flood
water, only the basement was. This made it easiest to salvage.
2) The location and elevation of Charity Hospital was high
enough and well located that if the levees broke again, patients
and employees could be easily rescued by a large truck and
evacuated via the nearby interstate. This was not so for the
other hospitals.
3) Charity Hospital was also centrally located so that
(Emergency Medical Services) could stage from there on dry
ground so they could better provide medical support to the
surrounding areas.
4) Charity Hospital suffered the least amount of damage
compared to all of the hospitals in the area.
5) When the building was surveyed by a team of physicians who
had set up several (field) hospitals, they were all in agreement
that Charity was easily salvageable, (and) that it could be up
and running within a few weeks (Howard 2006).
31

See Gratz (2011): “…participants in the post-storm cleanup described seeing signs of outright sabotage.”
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U.S. military efforts to reopen Charity were authorized under Emergency Support
Function (ESF) Annex #8 – Public Health and Medical Services, pursuant to the Department of
Homeland Security’s National Response Plan on disasters and mass casualty incidents. Its first
use of ESF-8 since its creation in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. military formally
received clearance from the Department of Health and Human Services and FEMA to restore
hospital facilities in this “presidentially-declared” disaster (Lister 2005; ESF-8 2003 and 2008).
As called for under ESF-8, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers evaluated Charity’s
structural integrity and found it structurally sound. Howard said he then consulted with an
“industrial hygienist” about the floodwaters then standing in Charity’s basement “(deciding) it
was no where as bad as what was in the city streets.” Four million gallons of floodwater were
pumped from Charity’s basement, Howard said, with the help of the crew of the Navy Battleship
Iwo Jima, and by German engineers (Howard 2006). The USS Iwo Jima’s Damage Control team
finished “dewatering” Charity’s basement September 14; and went on to drain floodwaters from
the basement of the former Baptist Hospital Uptown and other facilities (Jones 2005). The Naval
Mobile Construction Battalion 40 (NMCB) also made continual structural and environmental
assessments of Charity – and boarded more than 300 windows in advance of Hurricane Rita’s
landfall September 20, 2005 (Louisiana House Concurrent Resolution 8 (HCR 8) 2005).
Airline Ambassadors International (AAI), a non-governmental organization of airline
employees affiliated with the United Nations assessed Charity’s new role in military operations:
Airline Ambassadors (AAI) assisted the [U.S. Army Special Forces]
as they conducted interagency coordination during Katrina relief. AAI
provided Special Forces with (a) 2 megawatt generator to keep
Charity Hospital functional … After Charity Hospital was cleaned up
and pumped out (of floodwaters) … Charity Hospital turned out to be
a military asset that provided training for Special Forces medics.
Reopening Charity Hospital was critical to the health care strategy of
the entire southern [part of the U.S. impacted by Katrina] (AAI 2008).
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One of the first people who had originally arrived at Charity to affect the rescue of its
patients and hospital personnel, Staff Sergeant John A. Johnson, Prime Power Electrician, 205th
Engineering Battalion U.S. Army, testified to his role in Charity Hospital’s restoration:
Beginning on about September 7, 2005, I played a leadership role in
restoring power to Charity Hospital, and in assisting in the cleanup of
Charity in an effort to make it ready for possible quartering of
soldiers. Between September 7 and September 19, 2005, I personally
witnessed and participated in the complete restoration of the first and
second and parts of the third floor of Charity Hospital … Among the
work done by me and others, we rerouted power from the basement,
which was flooded when I arrived, and restored power to the first
floor of Charity. We powered up the entire emergency room. We also
used a backup generator to power up floors 3 through 19, and saw the
generators successfully do that… (Johnson 2009, p.2).
Johnson estimated that there had been over 200 people involved, including the Coast
Guard, Navy Seabees and various state National Guard units, as well as many civilian
volunteers. Johnson said under Howard’s command, the 21st Chemical Company attached to the
82nd Airborne oversaw the removal of all perishable refuse from Charity Hospital – and
meticulously cleaned and certified Charity’s emergency room and intensive care units as well as
other floors for medical use. Johnson remarked: “I can attest from personal knowledge that the
emergency room was cleaner than it was before (Hurricane) Katrina” (Johnson, pp. 2-4).
LSU Health Sciences clinical assistant professor of emergency medicine and ED
physician Dr. James Moises said the “spotless” clean up of Charity’s first three floors was
“essentially complete by September 21.” He said that electric power, sanitation services and air
conditioning was also restored to the hospital (Moises 2009a, p.4). 32
While initially granted authorization by LSU officials to proceed with Charity’s clean
up, ED doctors were warned not to admit patients. General Caldwell nevertheless expressed
confidence about the necessity of standing up Charity for patient care (Moises 2009b, p. 118).
32

Photos of Charity’s restoration taken by its workers and U.S. military personnel are in Appendix A.
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Within days of the restoration of Charity’s first three floors being fully completed,
Sergeant Johnson had requested and “arranged for the delivery of powerful state of the art
generators from General Electric, which would have the capacity to provide power to floors 3
through 19 on a longer-term basis” – only to have “LSU officials, in my presence, refused to
accept the generators, and as a result, General Electric took them away.” LSU, backed by state
officials, ordered an end to all efforts to reopen Charity Hospital (Johnson 2009, pp. 2-5). 33
LSU officials also warned its workers not to return. Indeed, Charity Hospital security
intimated that if they did, the workers would be charged with criminal trespassing. Charity
Hospital was then permanently closed by September 30, 2005 (Moises 2009b, p. 121).
Military commanders who questioned the closure order were told by Louisiana
Governor Kathleen Blanco their help was no longer needed. Lieutenant General Russel Honoré,
Commander of Task Force Katrina, remarked:
“Ma’am, we got the hospital clean, my people report … if you want to
use it,” I recalled telling Governor Blanco. Her reply to me: “Well
general, we’re not going to open it; we’re working on a different
plan” (Burdeau 2009).
General Caldwell said Charity was ready to reopen after three weeks of intense
restoration. Said Caldwell: “We were actually thinking of having a ribbon-cutting ceremony,
give ‘a thumbs up’ and turn it over to the health care professionals” (Burdeau 2009).
Reflecting on reasons state officials wanted to keep Charity closed, Honoré said:
This is about business, man. This is about rich people making more
money. This is not about providing health care (Burdeau 2009).
Former Charity doctor James Moises said it was about getting a new medical complex:
It was their orchestrated plan. It was ‘How can we manipulate the
disaster for institutional gains?’ (Burdeau 2009).
33

YouTube A/V interview: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E2QCUslXFDU&feature=player_embedded.
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For her part, Governor Blanco told The Associated Press she didn’t recall speaking
with General Honoré about Charity’s closure – nor did she even know about their efforts to stand
up the hospital for medical use (Burdeau 2009). Nevertheless, it was well known that Blanco had
refused to permit Joint Task Force Katrina to exert full control over the Louisiana National
Guard and other post-Katrina efforts during the same time period as the Joint Task Force
Katrina-backed attempt to reopen Charity Hospital (Bowman, Kapp and Belasco 2005).
Tensions between the Bush Administration and Governor Blanco flared in the storm’s
aftermath, heightening the failure of emergency response that stranded tens of thousands until the
cavalry under Honoré’s command came. U.S. Representative Tom Davis, Chairman of the Select
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, said:
We all acknowledge the heroic efforts that (the Department of
Defense), National Guard, and Coast Guard personnel made, efforts
that saved many, many lives. The mobilization was massive and, at
least once the call went out, swift. But we also need to acknowledge
that there were problems with the military response … There were
problems … with an early and persistent disconnect between DOD
and state and local authorities… (Davis 2005).
Congressman Davis went on to frame the boundaries of conflict on disaster response
“with regard to the National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Index – the annex that
authorizes federal agencies to act when state and local capacity even to know what they need is
compromised by the sheer size of the calamity.” Yet Davis also cites a statement by the National
Governors Association – stating that governors should lead any disaster response (Davis 2005).
Major General Bennett C. Landreneau, Adjutant General of the Louisiana National
Guard, testified that it was under Governor Blanco’s command and that DOD’s Joint Task Force
Katrina under the command of Lt. Gen. Honoré was “one of working partners” – directly
coordinating with Governor Blanco their hurricane response (Landreneau 2005, p. 3).
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Louisiana returns $340 million in emergency FEMA aid meant to repair Charity Hospital
The lengths to which the U.S. military sought to restore Charity Hospital’s most vital
functions cannot be overstated. In addition to being granted advance authorization under the
ESF-8 provisions, “FEMA authorized expenditures up to $1 billion” for the military to transport
and distribute relief supplies and set up medical facilities. In turn, “Department of Defense
(DOD) granted commanders a ‘blank check’ to do whatever was necessary to help the people of
Mississippi and Louisiana” (U.S. Senate 2006, p. 425; Wombwell 2009). According to a
Congressional Research Service assessment of early Department of Defense Katrina-related
appropriations, FEMA reimbursed the DOD $4.6 billion (Bowman, Kapp and Belasco 2005).
A possible attempt by the Department of Defense to allocate substantial monetary
resources to cover necessary repair costs of Charity Hospital was initiated – but declined by
Louisiana state officials in September 2005. Under normal FEMA Public Assistance program
guidelines, the federal agency would pay 75 percent of project costs and a state would be
responsible for 25 percent. Under special expedited rules, FEMA pledged “to reimburse state
agencies and local governments for costs involved in lifesaving emergency work related to
Hurricane Katrina” reimbursing 100 percent of all eligible costs (FEMA 2005).
Louisiana’s Department of the Treasury received $352 million during the third week of
September 2005, adding to $105 million already on hand for a total of $457 million in FEMAapproved disaster assistance. Louisiana’s Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) officials
however expressed confusion over what the funds were intended to reimburse. DHH officials
said if they accepted the funds without accounting for actual expenditures, the state would be
charged interest, and potentially blocked from future FEMA Public Assistance funding – so
DHH promptly returned to FEMA almost $340 million (Maggi 2005).
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In a departmental press release, DHH acknowledged numerous questions from the
public, but said that its handling of the FEMA “overpayment” – which DHH said never actually
reached their coffers – was disclosed to Governor Blanco, as well as to the Legislative Auditor
and the state inspector general’s office. DHH Secretary Dr. Fred Cerise cited the federal Cash
Management Improvement Act of 1990 that “only allows state agencies such as DHH to get
federal reimbursement for actual expenditures, not for anticipated needs” (DHH 2005b).
DHH interdepartmental electronic communications revealed that “Charity hospitals
might also be included in this $350 million dollar request” (Reynolds 2005). The
communications also indicated that the funding was being arranged as part of a mid-year state
budget adjustment, known as a BA-7, to account for the expenditure of funds within state
government. The communications do not indicate whether the funding request was being made
on behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense – though its Louisiana counterpart known as the
Military Department was seeking to line up “$350 (million) on the Military’s BA-7 for (the
Office of Public Health)” (Dusse 2005). DHH said in its press release that the agency “received
$352 million from FEMA, but spent only $9.6 million on (Office of Public Health) special needs
shelters that were opened throughout the state, overtime pay and medical supplies”(DHH 2005b).
Under ESF-8 provisions both DHH and LSU have federally-mandated state-directed
responsibilities during emergencies and disasters. Both state administrative bodies came under
fire for their lack of professional competency (Rainey, Scardina and Updike 2005, pp. 131-132).
Yet nagging questions also loomed that questioned the state’s assertion that Charity Hospital
could not be made suitable for medical use. LSU-HCSD chief Don Smithburg said “Charity
Hospital would cost $340 million to repair” (Moller 2005d). This was the same amount which
the U.S. military apparently attempted to give Louisiana officials for Charity’s reopening.
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The healthcare consequences of Charity Hospital’s forced closure
After rebuffing Task Force Katrina’s efforts to reopen Charity Hospital, LSU had
attempted to retain the U.S. Navy hospital ship USNS Comfort to become Charity’s substitute.
The ship had arrived at the Port of New Orleans September 29 after spending nearly three weeks
on the Mississippi Gulf Coast treating more than 1,800 people in Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath.
The 800-bed floating trauma center however saw no more than 100 patients during its two week
New Orleans stay. Charity Emergency Department (ED) Dr. James Aiken said he was “very
concerned” that the Comfort’s departure would leave “New Orleans without a fully functioning
public hospital as residents began to return” (The Associated Press / AP 2005c; Moller 2005d). 34
Following the closure of Charity Hospital and the Comfort’s departure, Charity’s
remaining medical staff practiced medicine in several makeshift locations. First, six tents were
set up outdoors as an urgent care MASH unit five blocks away in a parking lot from the Charity
campus they had restored just days before. More serious trauma cases were treated in a joint
Army Special Forces-Charity ED unit inside the Morial New Orleans Convention Center (Young
2005). Dr. Peter DeBlieux, director of resident training at Charity, responding to the provision of
“E-MED” emergency medicine tents, rather than just reopening the hospital:
Now my fear is the entire country will think it’s appropriate to care
for our patients in a tent. I don’t think the rest of the country
appreciates we are seeing people in a tent (Connolly 2005).
DeBlieux said the unit, dubbed “The Spirit of Charity,” saw about 150 patients daily.
Because of the makeshift nature of E-MED tents, it failed to meet federal health standards – and
hence was unable to receive Medicare, Medicaid or private insurance reimbursement. The unit’s
funding was drawn instead from Charity hospital system state budget allocations for its physical
building – monies that LSU officials acknowledged were running out (Connolly 2005).
34

For healthcare consequences related to Charity’s closure that prompted internal displacement, see pp. 111-115.
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After Charity’s closure, just 250 out of nearly 4,000 Charity and University hospital
employees remained working, with the rest placed on unpaid furlough (Connolly 2005).
Displaced health professionals warned that these job losses could become permanent – and
would compromise the very recovery of the city:
We read in the paper that the governor wants to keep as many people
as possible in the state; that the mayor wants to repopulate the city
soon and start building business again. I could not agree more. But
not addressing Charity Hospital / MCLNO and leaving employees’
employment status in limbo is not the way to do this (Danos 2005).
Two months after Charity’s closing, over 2,600 hospital employees would be fired
(Moller 2006c). LSU and Tulane graduate medical education programs were destabilized,
leading to the reassignment of 550 medical residents and fellows. The Delgado Charity School of
Nursing and other schools, in addition to LSU allied education and dentistry programs were also
impacted by the displacement of 2300 nursing and allied health students (LSU-HCSD 2005).
And “The Spirit of Charity” was forced to wander again, as the Morial New Orleans
Convention Center sought to prepare the site where the tent hospital stood for pre-storm booked
conventions (Callimachi 2006). They moved to a once-flooded department store next to the
Louisiana Superdome (still used as outpatient clinics); while a mothballed hospital in Jefferson
Parish was reopened as a temporary 40-bed Level 1 trauma center. LSU-HCSD spent nearly $5
million for the makeshift facilities, which were later reimbursed by FEMA (Louisiana Public
Records Act request 2006; United States General Accountability Office / U.S. GAO 2006a, p. 6).
Charity Hospital’s closure in the months and years following Hurricane Katrina
underscored its utter centrality to southeast Louisiana healthcare, both public and private.
Charity’s Level 1 trauma center was the only one on the Gulf Coast – forcing remaining
hospitals to receive patients with medical conditions rarely experienced (Barringer 2006).
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Coupled with the near-total closure and / or destruction of area nursing homes and
rehabilitation facilities, the few remaining open hospitals quickly filled with patients that would
not be so easily discharged (Barringer 2006). A severe shortage of nurses, aides, home hospice
and service workers compounded the crisis (DHH 2006). A veritable Katrina Doctors’ Diaspora
– “the largest single displacement of doctors in U.S. history” – added pressure to those remaining
(American College of Emergency Physicians / ACEP 2006). This loss of health workers, federal
officials said, resulted in “staffed hospital beds (inside New Orleans’ city limits) that were about
80 percent less in February 2006” than before the storm (U.S. GAO 2006a, p. 35).
Charity’s closure also compromised trauma services beyond New Orleans -- especially
in Baton Rouge – the latter where many evacuees endured lengthy wait times that threatened to
adversely affect patients’ health (ACEP 2006). Many primary care practices and outpatient
clinics citywide, already decimated by flood damage and the dislocation of their patient bases,
lost the only hospital which would accept their referrals (Ferdinand 2006).
The finances of remaining private and non-state hospitals also hemorrhaged due to the
virtual overnight inundation with patients that Charity would have normally seen. Charity’s
sudden closure sent shock waves of pain – even on those which had proclaimed this iconic but
neglected hospital to be outmoded (Zigmond 2006; Larkin 2007, p. 58; Sternberg 2007).
Testifying before a U.S. House subcommittee on post-Katrina healthcare, Colorado
U.S. Representative Diana Degette remarked about the private providers’ apparent underlying
stance when it comes to Charity Hospital – and especially its care for the uninsured:
I asked the panel of the private hospitals if their long-term business
plans included providing care to the population previously served by
Charity; and everybody got a look of shock on their face and said no,
that was not in their business plan for assuming the care of Charity’s
patients in the long term (Degette 2007, p. 7).
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Diane Rowland, Executive Director of the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the
Uninsured, characterized Louisiana healthcare as “a two-tier system” with private hospitals and
providers serving those with insurance and Charity system hospitals serving the uninsured – and
that the closure of Charity after Hurricane Katrina had a profoundly negative impact on both:
Our household interview survey (revealed) the fact that 90 percent of
our respondents did not feel there were enough services, hospitals,
clinics, medical facilities in the New Orleans area to meet their needs
and that it was one of the most troubling factors in their decision of
whether (to return or stay) in New Orleans (Rowland 2007, p. 21).
Though licensed at 714 beds in two campuses at the time of Hurricane Katrina, there
were 300-500 regularly staffed beds between Charity and University hospitals (LSU-HCSD
2005; Hartley 2012). Before Katrina, Charity had 70 ED beds and University 14 (Moises 2009a,
p. 1). Charity also had a 128-bed psychiatric “Crisis Intervention Unit” (BKA 2007). PreKatrina, Charity had more than 160 outpatient clinics on its MCLNO campus (Smithburg 2007,
p. 176). Another 21 free clinics apart from LSU were situated throughout metro New Orleans
(Partnership for Access to Healthcare / PATH 2003). Six years later, 76 safety net clinics 35 are
open, including ones run by LSU-HCSD inside LSU Interim Hospital and other locations
(Greater New Orleans Community Health Connection / GNO CHC 2011).
Charity’s sister facility, University Hospital, once declared “unsalvageable,” reopened
in late 2006 as LSU Interim Hospital (Smithburg 2005, Moran 2006). Staff shortages initially led
to only 60 of 150 beds available for its opening (Moller 2006c). Its Level 1 trauma center did not
return until February 2007 (LSU-HCSD 2007f, p. 19). Six and a half years later, LSU Interim
has 255 staffed beds with 38 intensive care unit beds (Hartley 2012). FEMA has reimbursed LSU
$101 million of the hospital’s total repair costs (FEMA 2011).
35

“Safety net” indicates access to free inpatient and outpatient healthcare, exclusive of prescription drugs and
certain tests, for those with incomes of 200% of the federal poverty level for family size, qualifying under either
under the 1115 Medicaid waiver (DHH 2010) or LSU-HCSD Free Care (LSU-HCSD 2011b).
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Nowhere has the impact of Charity’s closing been more acute than with inpatient
psychiatric care. The closure of the hospital’s psychiatric Crisis Intervention Unit (CIU) – once
the city’s largest facility – left Orleans Parish Prison’s 60-bed psych-ward to become the default
provider and the largest place for inpatient psychiatric care (Stephens 2007). A clinician noted:
Without Charity Hospital and the VA Medical Center, the psychiatric
public sector bed capacity was reduced 96% four months after the
disaster; one year later the reduction remained at 70% (CalderonAbbo 2008, p. 305).
Years after Charity’s closure, the inundation of area general hospital emergency rooms
with mental health patients continues to be a seemingly insurmountable obstacle. Such patients
often remain for weeks and crowd out other acute care patients. Within the first year of the
storm, hospitals effectively were closed to new admissions – even as ambulances and police
continued to drop off emergency patients (Potash and Winstead 2008, p. 122).
The American College of Emergency Physicians said psychiatric care was “deficient
before the storm (and) now close to non-existent” – and that Charity’s closed psychiatric CIU
was “the number one cause for the mental health crisis” in New Orleans (ACEP 2006, p. 3).
Three years after the storm, 20 beds were staged in trailers outside LSU Interim as a “Mental
Health Emergency Room Extension (MHERE) (Eggler 2008). This makeshift unit received more
than 350 people in September 2010 alone “with a mental health crisis” (Tebo 2010).
Baton Rouge Mayor Melvin “Kip” Holden noted that his city was also adversely
impacted with the loss of “900 of the state’s 2,100 licensed beds when New Orleans was
evacuated” (Holden 2005). Baton Rouge mental health professionals “reported a 72 percent
increase in patient volume at their three mental health clinics, 100 additional cases per month of
patients in mental health crisis presenting to area emergency rooms” … and a near doubling of
“commitment orders for mental health treatment” (Potash and Winstead 2008).
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A study conducted in early 2006 of all Tulane University faculty and staff (including
administrators) found “a significant burden of (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) PTSD symptoms
was present 6 months following Hurricane Katrina among a large group of adults who had
returned to work in New Orleans” – and this was from a workforce, researchers said, that had
“universal health coverage and the benefits of an employee assistance program” (DeSalvo, Hyre,
Ompad, Menke, Tynes and Munter 2007). Meanwhile a study of LSU Interim ED patients
surveyed right after the hospital was reopened found a PTSD prevalence of 38.2 percent – ten
times higher than the national PTSD prevalence of 3.6 percent (De Wulf, Mills, Levitan, Macht,
Afonso, Avegno and Mills 2007). In a 2007 survey by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation,
access to mental health services declined – and “that three out of four people support the
restoration of Charity Hospital as a primary health care resource for the poor” (Shields 2007).
New Orleans had “15.8 suicides per 100,000 persons in 2009 – well above both the preKatrina rate of 9.8 and the national rate of 10.96” (UNITY for the Homeless of Greater New
Orleans / UNITY 2010). A rash of suicides at Orleans Parish Prison, compounded by inadequate
staffing and procedures, underscore the need for more outside treatment options (T-P 2009b).
Heightened levels of violence also have come define the post-storm landscape.
Incidents such as the killing of two children by their uncle, who suffered from schizophrenia, led
New Orleans Police Department Crisis Commander Cecile Tebo to observe:
This is what happens when a city does not provide in- and out-patient
services for people with mental illnesses (Urbaszewski 2011).
Tebo has long warned of “the ticking time bombs” of people suffering from debilitating
mental illness and lacking mental health resources, who are “poised to harm themselves or
someone else.” She also said that many in prison wouldn’t be there if proper treatment options
were made available (Tebo 2007).
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Some public education, healthcare and homeless advocates have sounded the alarm that
the failure to replace the mental healthcare services once provided by Charity Hospital has
heightened disaster-induced PTSD – leading to enhanced rates of chronic homelessness and an
intractable wave of crime since Hurricane Katrina (UNITY 2010; Andrews 2011).
Following demands from New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin and the City Council to
restore or replace Charity’s psychiatric CIU, the state and LSU announced in 2007 a slight
expansion of inpatient mental health services, with 20 additional adult psychiatric beds each at
DePaul Hospital and the New Orleans Adolescent Hospital (NOAH) (Nagin 2007; Hong 2007;
Calderon-Abbo 2008, p. 307). The state also evaluated whether Charity could be reopened for
just its psychiatric CIU – finding that Charity’s “deficiencies are correctable” (Blitch Knevel
Architects / BKA 2007a and BKA 2007b).
Despite the expansion of adult psychiatric beds, mental health capacity remains
strained. Planners for the proposed replacement of Charity Hospital acknowledged that the
current 38 beds “are nearly 100 percent occupied and the unit is frequently on ‘diversion’ status”
– and that 22 additional beds for 2015 “rapidly will be filled” (Verité 2011, p. 17). 36
Health professionals from around the nation decried Charity Hospital’s closure. Robert
E. Suter, President of the American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) wrote to LSU:
The emergency medical services provided at Charity Hospital are an
essential public service that needs to be restored and maintained to
avoid further tragedy (Suter 2005).
Charity’s workers never waned, though their patience frayed. Dr. DeBlieux said:
Within 2 weeks after the storm, our entire residency contingency and
many of the academic faculty were back in the building salvaging, in
hopes of delivering care in that facility. The leadership at the state
level told us to stand down. They did not think that was a salvageable
enterprise. It was very difficult [to accept] (Flynn 2006, p. 311).
36

See Epilogue for the 2012 status of LSU Health system budget cuts, furthering the loss of Charity Hospital.
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Senator Coburn and others demand that Charity be reopened and independently evaluated
LSU officials, under fire for keeping Charity closed in the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
confronted head-on their critics. Dr. Michael K. Butler, Chief Medical Officer of LSU’s Health
Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD), in a letter to the ACEP’s Suter, caustically remarked:
The first casualties of [Hurricane] Katrina were truth and sound
reasoning. Much misinformation has been promulgated in the media,
and from well-meaning staff and providers (Butler 2005).
Butler replied to Suter that Charity cannot be revived, despite the attempt to do so:
People now think that Katrina was a hospital renovation improvement
project which will “magically” convert Charity to be appropriate for
[Emergency Department] work when it wasn’t appropriate prior to the
storm. The “cited” experts and their reports have not materialized. We
are concerned, more than you, about retaining our faculty, our
education programs, and our patients. We understand you are
concerned about the specific emergency department program and
your concerns are noted. Promulgation of rumors and innuendo is not
appropriate or productive. We are concerned about 87 residency
programs with 800-plus residents (Butler 2005).
LSU’s expulsion of its doctors and military personnel from Charity Hospital also
reached the halls of Congress. U.S. Senator Tom Coburn, a practicing physician, received
complaints from members of the Oklahoma National Guard that Charity could have reopened.
During a hearing October 6, 2005 before a U.S. Senate subcommittee, Coburn suggested that
LSU was taking advantage of the storm to get a new Charity replacement (Moller 2005d).
Senator Coburn (2006) wrote LSU-HCSD’s Chief Executive Officer Don Smithburg,
expressing his awareness of New Orleans’ “decimated hospital infrastructure” and urged that
Charity be reopened, to “provide a temporary solution to a crisis situation.” Coburn stated that he
was impressed with “the heroic efforts of the medical staff to clean the rest of the hospital –
without pay or credit.” He then reiterated that assessments made by the U.S. military certifying
that Charity could be used for interim medical care not be summarily dismissed (Coburn 2006).
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Senator Coburn also called for an independent review of Charity’s medical viability:
I understand that in order to allow military personnel in to clean up
the place, the Army Corps positively assessed the hospital for its
structural soundness. In addition, the 82nd Airborne, (the
Occupational, Safety and Health Administration), and the (U.S.)
Public Health Service have all visited the hospital and informally
assessed its soundness. I understand that these reports were
preliminary. However, their positive outcomes (underscore) that a full
and professional evaluation be conducted. So far, the only
“comprehensive” assessment of the Charity Hospital facility was
conducted by Louisiana’s consulting engineer from Atlanta, Walter
Adams. As a member of the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and
Government Affairs Committee (HSGAC), I strongly recommend that
the LSU system commission a completely independent evaluation of
the facility (Coburn 2006).
LSU-HCSD’s Chief Executive Officer Don Smithburg responded to Senator Coburn,
referencing the Adams Project Management assessment. Smithburg expressed appreciation for
the doctors’ attempt to reopen Charity, while reiterating that LSU had no intention of reopening:
Like you, we have heard views expressed that it would be a relatively
easy matter to clean and reopen Charity Hospital. However, it would
be derelict for us to act on anything other than the best evidence
available … We appreciate the help and concern from others who are
well-intended and motivated by a shared concern for patients and
education. In fact, it is a testament to the dedication of our LSU
physicians that many are willing to endure all manner of adverse
conditions, whether obvious or hidden, in order to continue serving
the New Orleans population. But, our fiduciary duty to our patients,
medical staff, and the community requires us to make decisions based
on written assessments by qualified engineering experts… (Smithburg
2006).
Smithburg warned Coburn that unseen damage and dangerous mold and other hazards
lurked behind Charity’s walls. 37 He ignored skepticism of Adams Management’s impartiality.
Nor did he mention Adams’ recommendation two years before Katrina for “the replacement or
relocation of the Charity campus …” with “a new replacement 600-bed health-care center (to)
become the centerpiece of a bold, new Medical Center of Louisiana” (This Week at MCL 2003).
37

Photos taken by LSU of Charity’s storm destruction and medical response are in Appendix B.
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Despite LSU’s proclamation of closure, Charity’s workers make a last public stand for
reopening; FEMA disputes LSU’s amount of Charity’s storm damage reimbursement
LSU-HCSD’s chief Donald Smithburg proclaimed to the LSU Board of Supervisors
that Charity and University hospitals “were issued their ‘death warrant’ by Katrina” (AP 2005b).
This contention that it was Hurricane Katrina that had done in Charity Hospital – while LSU
and the state long sought the hospital’s closure in advance of the storm – particularly rankled
Charity’s Emergency Department doctors. Nearly three months after being barred from
reopening their unit along with Charity’s first three floors, The New York Times reported:
The state officials who manage Charity say Hurricane Katrina dealt
this Huey Long-era landmark a deathblow and want it torn down. In
its place, they say, they want to build a hospital with a “new mission,”
one that treats both public and private patients and relies less on
government money. But doctors who work there sharply disagree
with that plan. They say Louisiana officials are using the storm as an
excuse to achieve the state’s long-sought goal of demolishing Charity,
and then moving away from a promise that has long been made to the
city’s poor (Nossiter 2005).
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) infrastructure specialist David
Fukutomi previously suggested that federal rules under the Stafford Act allowed funds to be
applied to replacement construction, noting that LSU and the State of Louisiana could take
advantage of “a fantastic opportunity to implement a vision for the future” (Connolly 2005).
Adam Nossiter’s New York Times’ reportage showcased for a national audience Charity’s ED
doctors’ contention that the hospital was not damaged beyond repair and could had been
reopened on an interim basis to address New Orleans’ post-Katrina vital health needs. Signaling
a shift that set up a new phase of contention between those favoring and opposed to reopening
Charity, The New York Times’ report now quoted FEMA’s Fukutomi expressing skepticism
about LSU and the state’s “very impressive public relations campaign to publicize their desires”
to keep Charity closed and reapply its replacement value toward a new facility (Nossiter 2005).
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Indeed, FEMA was fully aware of the clean-out of Charity Hospital by both its workers
and military units under the command of Joint Task Force Katrina, as authorized under the
National Response Plan: “FEMA funded all of these emergency protective measures in an
expedited manner as it was assumed Charity Hospital could be re-opened to provide criticallyneeded medical and emergency services care to the New Orleans area” (FEMA 2009, p.11). In
contrast to the state’s $257.7 million damage assessment, FEMA said its late 2005 assessment
found Charity sustained storm damages of $23.9 million (FEMA 2009, pp.12-15).
In what was described as “a 2-hour tongue lashing,” Charity Hospital ED members
quoted in the December 2005 New York Times report were summoned to a January 2006 meeting
by LSU-HCSD chief Donald Smithburg and HCSD Chief Medical Officer Dr. Michael Butler.
The workers were warned against continuing their public dissent against Charity’s closure – or,
suggested Butler, there would be grave consequences of “Biblical proportions” – meaning the
potential loss of their medical emergency department operating contract and other actions. The
most outspoken member, Dr. James Moises, weeks after the meeting, formally resigned his
Charity clinical appointment in protest (Moises 2009b, pp. 134-137, 168). His continued public
dissent, joined by medical residents, sparked continued public resistance to Charity’s closure. 38
While it is thought that some Charity workers continued to
dissent behind the scenes, for 100 medical personnel, joined by former
patients, New Orleans City Council President Oliver Thomas and the
grandson of Charity’s architect, their last public expression was held
March 25, 2006 outside Charity’s shuttered ED ambulance ramp. 39

38

The author joined with Moises in this public resistance. A list of organizations calling for the reopening of Charity
Hospital – as well as saving the Lower Mid-City New Orleans neighborhood from demolition for the proposed
University Medical Center replacement are provided in Appendix C.
39

Reporting by Haber (2006) and Martel (2006); Commentary by Elie (2006) and LSU-HCSD (2006d)
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Though Charity Hospital’s doctors could no longer publicly dissent against LSU and
the state’s abandonment of Charity Hospital and keep their jobs, their attempted disaster
recovery efforts to restore healthcare by reopening Charity Hospital had significantly influenced
FEMA’s challenge on reimbursement for actual storm damages versus pre-storm and post-storm
facility neglect (FEMA 2009, pp. 11-12). Clashing with LSU and the state’s unyielding response
to keep Charity closed at all costs – only an unprecedented political intervention would convince
FEMA to approve releasing the funds for Charity’s full replacement cost. 40
LSU often cited a March 2006 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report to back
its decision to keep Charity closed by not spending tens of millions of dollars on an outdated
facility. 41 Yet that report also suggested, in the same cited paragraph, that LSU faced “a
complicated decision” because of Charity and University hospital’s centrality as a healthcare
safety net – and that not reopening “could have significant implications for health care service
delivery in post-Katrina New Orleans and for statewide graduate medical education and Level 1
trauma care” (U.S. GAO 2006b, p.10). Six months later in a follow-up GAO report:
As we reported, the availability of health care services – which
includes those provided within and outside of a hospital facility – is
one of the factors that can affect whether and how quickly residents
return to an area after a disaster (U.S. GAO 2006c, p. 2).
The September 2006 GAO report reflected more deeply the absence of Charity and
University hospitals. While it said bed capacity across metro New Orleans had rebounded to “a
sufficient number of staffed inpatient beds” – it did not qualify that most of the beds were at
private facilities. And further, finding any empty psychiatric beds remained next to impossible;
and retaining nursing staff was almost as challenging. Without Charity Hospital, emergency
room occupancy was 96 percent for adult critical care beds (U.S. GAO 2006c, p. 13-14).
40
41

See Gallegos (2009) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2009a-b) – and further described below.
E.g., Webster (2007): “SPECIAL TREATMENT: Reopening Charity Hospital’s first three floors possible”
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In its assessment of the LSU and FEMA dispute, the September 2006 GAO report
detailed initial FEMA repair estimates of storm damage to Charity Hospital were raised slightly
to $27 million, while LSU’s storm repair estimates rose to $257 million. The significant gap in
costs was gauged primarily between LSU and the state’s desire to be fully reimbursed for what
they termed “whole building repair” versus just storm damage repair. LSU’s addition of a “cost
escalator,” built into the estimates to account for the rise in cost of post-Katrina building
materials and labor, led LSU and the state to claim that the needed repair costs exceeded the 51
percent FEMA threshold for a full building replacement (U.S. GAO 2006c, pp. 19-21).
FEMA responded that “LSU (could) select a few projects at Charity Hospital and put
them out for bid” to serve as a baseline for real costs. The GAO said LSU demurred on this
request, deeming it potentially wasteful spending on an obsolete facility they had no plans to
resurrect even “to perform the functions for which the hospitals were being used immediately
prior to the disaster.” LSU suggested federal regulations allowed for the costs of code upgrades,
combined with storm damage that the costs rose above the fifty percent FEMA replacement
threshold (U.S. GAO 2006c, pp. 19-21). Curiously, LSU did repair University Hospital with full
FEMA funding under the agency’s emergency services regulation that it originally offered to
LSU and the state, if Charity was allowed to be reopened (Darcé 2006; FEMA 2011).
Representing LSU and Governors Blanco, then Jindal in negotiating FEMA’s Charity
storm damage determination was Jerry Jones, head of the Office of Facility Planning and Control
(FPC) under the state Division of Administration. As designated by a Blanco executive order
(remaining in effect as of this writing), no repairs or rebuilding of damaged facilities are allowed
without Division of Administration sanction (Blanco 2006). Jones unabashedly noted: “If I have
anything to say about it, we’re not going to rebuild Charity” (Moller 2006a).
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Governor Blanco and Jerry Jones’ resolve not to reopen Charity was met with
significant opposition. The New Orleans City Council unanimously demanded Charity’s
reopening (R-06-143 2006). A 2006 Louisiana state legislative resolution also called for the
reopening of Charity Hospital – specifically its first three floors – on an interim basis until its
replacement could be constructed; and that the facility is independently evaluated “to determine
the advisability of repairing or restructuring the entire facility…” (Louisiana HCR 89 2006).
Though Charity never reopened for medical care, Charity’s maintenance shop, laundry
building and power plant returned to service the LSU Interim Hospital. 42 Meanwhile the
independent group recognized by the state legislature, the Foundation for Historical Louisiana,
contracted and funded a $600,000 study completed by RMJM Hillier in August 2008 – which
found that Charity could be revitalized to become a 21st century LSU academic medical center. 43
As previously referenced, FEMA rejected Adams Management’s storm assessment of
Charity on behalf of LSU and the state. FEMA’s stated concern was Adams’ format, since it was
presented as a summary document from which FEMA said it could not verify the findings as
qualified for storm reimbursement. FEMA, in conjunction with state officials and LSU, launched
a “scope alignment” process to better evaluate Charity Hospital’s storm damages. Over an 18month period beginning in late 2006, the state’s selected contractor, Blitch/Knevel and
Associates and FEMA “scoped” out the damage. (FEMA 2009, pp. 13-14) Responding to calls
for the state and LSU to reopen Charity, Jones replied:
We’re trying to show and convince FEMA this damage was done by
the storm. And if we go in there and start occupying the facility
FEMA may say, ‘You’re OK,’ and that there’s no need for all these
repairs (Webster 2007).

42

Confirmed thru participant observation. Charity’s Laundry Building (405 LaSalle), Maintenance Shop (433
LaSalle) and Entergy facility (Gravier and South Claiborne) all were reopened by LSU Interim Hospital’s opening.
43
See http://www.fhl.org/fhl/news/presvalerts/charityhospitalsyn.shtm; and list in Appendix C.
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Initially FEMA and the state FPC agreed to a process of review which served both
parties interests. FEMA upheld its original claims of Charity’s damage without contestation; the
state in particular justified Charity’s continued closure, as well as effectively delayed by nearly
two years the release of independent state legislative-authorized evaluative findings that might
call for Charity’s reopening. Intriguingly, the state’s contractor, Blitch/Knevel and Associates
(BKA) also conducted two evaluations of Charity’s psychiatric Crisis Intervention Unit (CIU) –
finding that it could either be reopened under limited repairs bringing Charity’s first three floors
and 128-beds into operation for $38 million; or reopen after a total upgrade to current life codes
for about $50 million (BKA 2007). Blitch/Knevel and Associates’ finding that Charity’s
“deficiencies are correctable” ran contrary to the state’s contention that Charity could not be
returned to use as a hospital of any sort.
It became evident by the spring of 2008 that the joint FEMA/FPC “scope alignment”
process of Charity Hospital to determine eligible storm damages was going off its procedural
track. After stopping joint evaluations that April, in July 2008 the state filed a claim with FEMA
revising upwards the cost of replacing Charity to almost $492 million. FEMA in turn raised its
Charity repair estimates from $23 million to $150 million. In response, the state planned to
appeal (FEMA 2009; FPC 2009; Moller 2008d).
While FEMA expanded its award, it would not relent on its core contentions: 1) that
Charity’s damages had not met the 51 percent criteria for full replacement; 2) that the state
hadn’t adequately secured Charity Hospital against post-storm elements or new damage – nor did
it attempt to make even minimal fixes such as roof and window repairs to limit further damage;
and 3) that the state was trying to claim as storm damage years of deferred maintenance and
facility neglect (FEMA 2009, pp. 9-10; Moller 2008a; Moller 2008b).
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LSU overcomes FEMA through the political intervention of Cao, Landrieu and Obama
Louisiana state officials acknowledged the urgency of settling the FEMA issue, as well
as the climate of profound distrust between them and FEMA officials. Dr. Fred Cerise, LSU’s
vice president for health affairs and medical education, referenced FEMA’s Charity damage
award should at least match what the state legislature had already pledged:
The biggest issue we’ve got to resolve is the FEMA issue. If we can
come to the $1.2 billion [LSU University Medical Center] project
with $800 million in equity, that makes it much easier to get the bond
folks into the conversation (Moller 2008c).
Jerry Jones of the state FPC addressed the issue of trust between it and FEMA:
It’s like they don’t trust us, that we’re trying to beat the system and
we really aren’t. Pretty much throughout this disaster that’s how
FEMA’s treated us (Moller 2008a).
To meet FEMA statutory guidelines, the state filed an appeal March 11, 2009 of
FEMA’s $150 million award to settle all matters. The state contended that in denying the state’s
assessment that damages exceeded 51 percent of replacement costs, or almost $492 million,
FEMA, said the state, had responded with “various vague, unspecific and factually …
unsupported reasons” (Moller 2009a; FEMA 2009, p. 30).
On May 8, 2009, FEMA’s acting regional administrator denied the state’s first appeal.
The state then filed a second appeal – but with the proviso that “FEMA take no action on the
appeal request” until the state could determine whether a substitution of binding arbitration could
occur (FEMA 2009, pp. 30-31). State officials had previously sought this possibility from their
U.S. Congressional delegation (Moller 2008c). The near-constant advocacy of senior Louisiana
U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu, as well as from newly-elected New Orleans Congressman Anh
‘Joseph’ Cao – was about to yield the political intervention that LSU and the FPC had long
hoped for – to have FEMA pay for Charity Hospital’s replacement.
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LSU had already reached two significant milestones since Hurricane Katrina:
•

Reclamation of LSU Health Sciences Center-New Orleans campus was in full swing; 44

•

The United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) not only agreed to create sideby-side medical centers with LSU in Lower Mid-City New Orleans – the deal received
the VA’s full financial commitment by 2008. 45
To be sure, significant challenges remained for the LSU University Medical Center

project – not the least of which were several lawsuits challenging Charity’s closure, violations of
the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), and a lawsuit against New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin for permitting the
expropriation of property in Lower Mid-City for the proposed VA Medical Center without public
hearings. Grassroots activism that was originally sparked by Charity’s workers had almost died
out in late 2006, but re-emerged in 2007, reigniting the “Save Charity Hospital!” movement. 46
The 2009 inauguration of President Barack Obama however was the watershed moment
for LSU and the state in its quest to total out Charity Hospital for its full replacement value, in
order to fulfill its new University Medical Center. Previously cool relations with FEMA and
other federal agencies warmed considerably for the state. Widely assailed for its unyielding and
incomprehensible bureaucracy, FEMA’s ineptitude under the leadership of Michael Brown,
along with much of the rest of the federal response, resounded as part of the failure of the Bush
Administration. Along with the Iraq War and 2008 economic crisis, FEMA’s mishandled
response in advance and following Hurricane Katrina also paved the way for Barack Obama’s
election victory (Lipton 2008; New York Times 2008; Stolberg 2008; Lipton 2011).

44

See the LSU Health Science Center-New Orleans’ recovery progress websites: http://www.lsuhsc.edu/biweekly/,
http://www.lsuhsc.edu/DailyUpdates/ and Chancellor Larry Hollier’s Notes: http://www.lsuhsc.edu/chan_notes/
45
See LaPlante (2006); LSU Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) Presentation (2006); Lynch (2007).
46
A list of reopen Charity groups are in Appendix C; Also confirmed by direct participant observation.
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As a signal of FEMA regime change, Janet Woodka, former legislative director for
Senator Landrieu, was appointed as Gulf Coast recovery czar (United States Department of
Homeland Security / U.S. DHS 2009a). Tony Russell was also named to head up FEMA’s
Louisiana Transitional Recovery Office, replacing “embattled” director Jim Stark, Said Russell:
We are going to collaborate as full partners. We are never going to be
an adversary. Any hint from my staff or myself of being an adversary
will not be tolerated. That is in the past (Johnson 2009).
But before the ice thawed completely, in remarks before a U.S. House Committee
considering FEMA’s operations, now retired Lt. General Russel Honoré, Commander of Joint
Task Force Katrina, reiterated his contention that the state took advantage of Hurricane Katrina
to close Charity Hospital. He charged state officials “used FEMA as a get-out-of-jail-free-card” –
and that “the state of Louisiana needs to pay for its own damn medical center” (Tilove 2009a).
Honoré later shifted his position to being in favor of FEMA funds to replace Charity – though he
never waivered on his contention that Charity could’ve reopened (Tilove 2009c). 47
First term New Orleans Congressman Anh ‘Joseph’ Cao, following Honoré in his
testimony before the U.S. House Committee, blamed FEMA for fiddling “about the value of
doorknobs and toilets” as other New Orleans-area hospitals took up in Charity’s absence care of
the uninsured – and flirted with bankruptcy in the process. Later Cao met with Honoré and said
that Charity had facility accreditation issues before Hurricane Katrina. Reopen Charity Hospital
advocates however produced evidence that the hospital had earned JCAHO (Joint Commission
for the Accreditation of Health Organizations) certification before its permanent closure by LSU
and the State of Louisiana one month after the storm (Tilove 2009a). 48

47

See Honoré (2008) Journal of Public Health Management and Practice, p. S-6; Honoré, Moises, Harden, Walker,
Washington and Ott (2009); Honoré (2010) (C.V. citing works which said Charity could have reopened).
48
See: Honoré, Moises, Harden, Walker, Washington and Ott (2009); Cao (2009); FPC (2009, p. 7) – attesting that
Charity was a JCAHO (Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Health Organization) certified facility.
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Congressman Cao arranged for a special Congressional site visit and hearing held June
1, 2009 in the first floor lobby of Charity Hospital. It was cast as an effort “to break loose the
backlog of FEMA recovery projects still pending after the 2005 hurricanes” (Bolar 2009). The
location of the special U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure hearing
unmistakably accented the main issue – that “under the federal Stafford Act, FEMA is obliged to
pay the full cost of replacing Charity if, as LSU contends, it was more than half damaged in the
storm.” The hearing also was one of the first public opportunities to showcase Senator Mary
Landrieu’s new arbitration system, passed into law as part of original Obama American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act legislation, designed to speed up the resolution of FEMA public
works claims – “of which Charity is by far the largest” (Tilove 2009b; Hammer 2009).
The special Katrina-Rita arbitration panel was set up to expedite settlement of FEMA
claims as an alternative to the federal court system. Unlike regular federal proceedings, appellant
bodies are barred from the process of discovery, have pre-determined time limits for filings and
answers, and any decisions rendered are binding without further appeal. A panel of three
administrative law judges of the United States Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (U.S. CBCA)
would hear cases. After a series of procedural motions and filings from both the state and FEMA
throughout the fall of 2009, the FEMA arbitration proceedings were held January 11-15, 2010. 49
In a key procedural ruling issued before the start of the proceedings, the U.S. CBCA
panel ruled unanimously December 9, 2009 that the state could introduce evidence not
previously presented, as well as call outside witnesses. More crucially, the panel also overturned
the previous FEMA standard for undoing public assistance amounts determinations – which was
only possible if FEMA’s actions were “arbitrary and capricious” (Moller 2009d; U.S. CBCA
2009). Through this ruling LSU and the state overcame a previously insurmountable FEMA rule.
49

See 44 CFR Part 206 (2009); U.S. DHS (2009b); Moller (2009a-d); Shuler (2009); U.S. CBCA (2010, 2011).
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Much as the three judge panel affirmed the new arbitration process to trump previous
FEMA agency procedures and appeals of FEMA public assistance determinations, it did not rule
on an attempted citizen intervention (Intervention 2009) seeking to also submit outside evidence
and “consideration of facts, arguments … when time, the nature of the proceeding and the public
interest permit.” The intervention was lodged on behalf of “parties with a fundamental interest in
the outcome of the FEMA appeal” including former Charity Hospital patients who were
plaintiffs in a suit against LSU, along with two community health advocates. 50 LSU System
legal counsel Ray Lamonica, who as lead attorney for the state would later successfully argue for
the inclusion of outside evidence on behalf of LSU and the state in its pursuit of its FEMA
arbitration claim, said the arbitration panel “should not consider any information or evidence
other than the documentation FEMA and the state provided” (Barrow 2009; Intervention 2009).
The FEMA arbitration hearings produced few variations from prior months of filings
and stated contentions. FEMA stated that the state was seeking full replacement value on a
facility they called deficient before the storm. FEMA also challenged the actual level of asset
protection following the storm to prevent deterioration of Charity. Lamonica contended that the
state engaged in good asset protection. He said that FEMA’s 18-month scoping process had
major shortcomings, foremost its ‘room-by-room’ evaluation failed to take into account
mechanical systems that served entire hospital areas – hence the state’s “zone” method of
estimating damages was more factual. Lamonica reasserted that the state deserved to receive full
replacement value because storm damage exceeded 51 percent of Charity’s replacement value.
He also scored rhetorical points by noting that “it takes an act of Congress to get something
done” – in this case the arbitration process could resolve this matter instead of the bureaucracy of
FEMA (U.S. CBCA 2010b).
50

The author was one of the two community health advocate intervenors represented.
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Per the actual nature of the arbitration process, a curious departure occurred from usual
federal court and even regular Civil Board of Contract Appeals proceedings. After noting that
this special FEMA arbitration was the result of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,
Judge Stephen Daniels said that the 3-judge panel had reviewed carefully the respective
statements from FEMA and the state of Louisiana’s Office of Facility Planning and Control –
and that these proceedings would not require sworn testimony:
We are here this week to supplement the documentary record and to
gain a better understanding of it by taking testimony from people, and
in likeness as to the appropriate amount to be paid to Facility
Planning and Control. We’ll hear from witnesses called by both
Facility Planning and Control and FEMA. Because this is an
arbitration hearing, not a judicial proceeding, the witnesses will not be
asked to testify under oath. We do expect the witnesses to tell us the
truth in response to questions asked of them, however. We need all
the truthful information we can get in order to resolve the case (U.S.
CBCA 2010a, pp. 4-5).
Charity Hospital’s Director of Facility Planning Robert Arnold was asked under
questioning by FEMA attorney Chad Clifford whether Arnold had turned away General Electric
generators for providing permanent electric power back-up to Charity Hospital – as attested in a
sworn affidavit by U.S. Army electrician Staff Sergeant John Johnson. Arnold said he had not –
though he also intimated in his testimony that the generators might not had even been delivered:
Q: Now you’re saying to your knowledge, Mr. Arnold, you’re now
claiming that this sworn statement from a respected veteran and
current member – Armed Forces member is not – you – don’t have
personal knowledge as to whether or not generators were brought and
rejected?
A: Not to my knowledge, no.
Q: Is it possible that they were and you simply don’t know?
A: Unlikely.
Q: Unlikely. Were you the main person for LSU working –
A: I was on the ground from that Thursday until today.
(U.S. CBCA Transcript 2010a, pp. 91-92; Moller 2010b).
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Arnold also said he wasn’t “personally aware” that LSU had ordered an end to
Charity’s disaster recovery operation, the removal of U.S. military units and Charity’s workers
(U.S. CBCA 2010a, p. 93). Under this special FEMA arbitration proceeding, Sergeant Johnson
was never called to elaborate in person on his contrasting sworn testimony.
The proceedings did offer some variation from contentions that both FEMA and the
state contended were true. Arnold testified for example that Charity’s basement had been drained
of floodwaters by the time that the U.S. military left the facility in late September; and that
power had been restored to most parts of the building, not just from temporary connections, but
from upgraded electrical switchgears located on the hospital’s upper floors – contradicting the
state’s formal request for arbitration drafted by the Office of Facility Planning and Control:
The major mechanical, electrical, and plumbing (MEP) systems in
Charity Hospital were located in the basement which was totally
inundated by contaminated and corrosive floodwaters for more than
40 days. Unlike more modern constructed facilities, this facility was
constructed in 1939 when it was a common practice to put critical
MEP in the least utilized spaces. The critical MEP of this hospital
sustained its entire operations; it was the heartbeat that allowed the
hospital to function. The contaminated floodwaters incapacitated all
utility infrastructure of the entire building, not for a few days or
weeks, but for months… (Italics indicate their emphasis) (FPC 2009,
pp. 8-9; U.S. CBCA 2010a, pp. 28, 52-53, 57-63).
Issuing their ruling just twelve days after the conclusion of their hearings, the U.S.
Civilian Board of Contract Appeals ruled unanimously in favor of granting $474,750,898 to the
state for the full replacement value of Charity Hospital. It said that FEMA’s representatives
“were less experienced and less credible” than the state’s experts. Since FEMA essentially
acknowledged it had been verifying the state’s findings of damages through eighteen months of
the joint FEMA/BKA scoping process, the 3-judge panel found that the state knew better of
Charity’s storm damage situation, since it produced detailed analyses (U.S. CBCA 2010c, p. 4).
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Though Louisiana officials plainly acknowledged they had long sought a Charity
Hospital replacement before Hurricane Katrina, their testimony and presented evidence to the
panel claimed that they made conscientious efforts to retain the hospital’s accreditation. Even if
the measures taken were “at a sub-optimal level before the storms occurred” – the judges said
they could not be repaired cost-effectively from the storm damage they had incurred. A major
determining factor, which raised the level of storm damage considerably above the 51-percent
qualifying threshold, said the panel, was the probability that Charity’s potable water “piping on
the upper floors had been contaminated…” The judges doubted FEMA contentions that with a
system flush and cleanse safe drinking water could be assured. BKA’s contention was that:
When the basement flooded, toxic wastes inundated the piping system
for potable water, up through an indeterminate number of floors. The
system had been modified over time, and because as-built drawings
were lost in the flood, the number and location of dead ends was
unknown. The BKA engineers determined that the entire system had
been compromised and had to be replaced … On the whole, the
record supports the (state Office of Facility Planning and Control)
position as to disaster-related damage (U.S. CBCA 2010c, pp. 3-4).
Though the FEMA arbitration panel dismissed FEMA’s contentions on the scope of
storm damages and the levels of asset protection by the state FPC following Hurricane Katrina, it
did agree with FEMA’s cost “estimate (as) the best approximation available of the cost of
replacing Charity Hospital with a new facility” – affirming reopen-Charity advocates’
contentions of the cost of revitalizing the building within its Art Deco shell. 51 The panel said:
The panel understands that differences of opinion exist in New
Orleans as to whether the public is better served by rebuilding Charity
Hospital in its present location or by constructing a new hospital
elsewhere in the city. This issue is not relevant to our determination in
this case, and we did not consider it in the course of our deliberations.
How to proceed with the rebuilding or new construction is a matter
for decision by other authorities (U.S. CBCA 2010c, p. 5).
Any hopes in trying to reopen Charity Hospital now appeared to have evaporated.
51

See RMJM Hillier (2008); Roberts and Webster (2010); Sack (2010); and Shuler (2010a).
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I think we have a clean sheet to start again. And with that clean sheet
we have some very big opportunities.
Joseph Canizaro, Member, Bring New Orleans Back Commission
(BNOB), quoted by Gary Rivlin, The New York Times (Rivlin 2005)

Hurricane Katrina essentially right-sized the overbuilt hospital
system…
Pricewaterhouse Coopers “Report on Louisiana Healthcare Delivery
and Financing System” (PwC 2006, p. 6)

[Charity Hospital’s closure] created a significant barrier to return
for displaced residents in need of medical care.
Chris Kromm and Sue Sturgis, Institute for Southern Studies (ISS
2008, p. 26)
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Charity was closed when New Orleans was virtually emptied of its populace; Its patients
were the heart of the Katrina Diaspora; Fears of exclusion from recovery decisions
Nossiter’s 2005 New York Times report on Charity also broached another controversy –
whether, by keeping Charity Hospital and other institutions serving the city’s poor closed, that
the entire cultural and economic complexion of New Orleans could be permanently transformed:
As one of the two oldest hospitals in North America – it was founded
in 1736, the same year as Bellevue Hospital in New York – Charity
has from the beginning been a symbol of a social commitment to the
poor, and its wards are empty at a moment when thousands of poor
New Orleans residents are struggling to return home and fear that
government has abandoned them. In many ways, the debate over its
future parallels that of New Orleans itself, as it chooses whether to
become a more middle-class city or return to earlier traditions
(Nossiter 2005).
The closure of Charity Hospital slowed recovery of the region and blocked the return of
many of New Orleans’ poor, elderly and most vulnerable residents who relied on Charity for care
(Connolly 2005; Eaton 2007). Months after the storm, many displaced residents were scattered
around the nation; having lost their homes, schools, community and their main source of
healthcare, while navigating the whirling tempest of the Katrina Diaspora.
Roberts and Durant (2010, pp. 226, 243) noted that since the Civil Rights movement,
Charity system patients have been predominantly African American. Citing LSU figures, in the
2004-2005 year, Charity/MCLNO* black patients constituted over 70 percent of the total. 52

Table 2: Charity/MCLNO* Inpatient Admissions/Outpatient Encounters by race, 2004-05
Inpatient

Admissions (Percent)

Outpatient

Encounters (Percent)

Black
White
Other

16,549 (70.2%)
5,548 (23.6%)
1,465 (6.2%)

Black
White
Other

331,320 (75.9%)
84,521 (19.3%)
20,834 (4.8%)

Source: Roberts and Durant. 2010. A History of the Charity Hospitals of Louisiana. p. 243. Table by K. Brad Ott
*Totals include both Charity and University hospitals of the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO)
52

LSUHSC Planning, Program Development and Governmental Affairs, Baton Rouge, LA. FY 2004-2005.
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Table 3: Charity system* Inpatient Admissions / Outpatient Encounters by race, 2004-05
Inpatient

Admissions (Percent)

Outpatient

Encounters (Percent)

Black
White
Other

33,161 (58.2%)
20,758 (36.4%)
3,088 (5.4%)

Black
White
Other

888.515 (55.6%)
660,646 (41.3%)
50,051 (3.1%)

Source: Roberts and Durant. 2010. A History of the Charity Hospitals of Louisiana. p. 243. Table by K. Brad Ott
*Totals include nine LSU hospitals including New Orleans (but excluding LSU-HSC Shreveport)

VanLandingham (2007, p. 1614) said “New Orleans was essentially emptied by
Hurricane Katrina at the end of August 2005.” Guin, et al (2009) adjusted VanLandingham’s
austerely-stated population amounts and departure by another few weeks – 12,000 people rode
out the storm at the Louisiana Superdome; 25 area hospitals held 2,500 patients and 11,000 staff
and their families; another 130,000 didn’t leave until a week after the storm, with 65,000 of those
being rescued. Guin, et al said that with the close of the evacuation by mid-September 2005, “an
estimated 10,000 people remained in Orleans Parish” (pp. 34, 45, 51). 53
A RAND Corp study said the city’s December 2005 population was about 91,000; and
projected it at 155,000 by March 2006 (McCarthy, Peterson, Sastry & Pollard 2006, pp. xi-xiii).
It often swelled on the weekends to 275,000 as displaced residents cleaned up (Connolly 2005).
Fears arose that decisions about the future of the city would be made absent the most
impacted storm victims. New Orleans public housing and public schools reports noted that the
lack of stakeholder participation significantly impacted policy outcomes (Rose and Tuggle 2010,
pp. 2-3; Perry and Schwam-Baird 2010, p.6). Proponents of privatization to supplant Charity
Hospital’s public health mission also admitted the widespread absence of public participation –
but were more circumspect about the impact (Louisiana Public Health Institute/LPHI 2005, p. 6).
At the time of Charity’s September 2005 closure, the city was virtually emptied of its populace.
53

The Louisiana State Medical Examiner said 1,464 people died between August 28 and October 1, 2005 (Guin, et
al, p. 45). Another 2,300 “excess deaths” were recorded in a study comparing Times-Picayune obituary listings from
the first six months of 2006 with 2004 (pre-storm): Stephens, Grew, Chin, Kadetz, Greenough and Burkle (2007).
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The Bring New Orleans Back Commission attempts to capitalize on the Katrina Diaspora
Just days after the last of the mass evacuations from New Orleans were completed,
about 60 corporate and political leaders met in Dallas with Mayor C. Ray Nagin to plot out the
city’s future (Scott 2005). The 17-member Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) Commission,
formed out of the Dallas meeting, held its first public session one month after the storm (Donze
and Varney 2005). Commission member Jimmy Reiss, Chair of the Regional Transit Authority,
voiced what many African Americans and advocates for the poor were the worst fears:
Those who want to see this city rebuilt want to see it done in a
completely different way: demographically, geographically and
politically. I’m not just speaking for myself here. The way we’ve been
living is not going to happen again, or we’re out (Cooper 2005).
Largely void of its populace at the time of Charity’s late September closure, the city’s
population status in the months following the storm remained a paramount issue. The BNOB
Commission, joined by the Urban Land Institute (ULI), proposed a building permit moratorium
and permanent land buyouts in areas flooded greater than four feet in depth (ULI 2005). A
Brown University study found that “if nobody was able to return to (these) damaged
neighborhoods – New Orleans is at risk of losing 80% of its black population” (Logan 2006, p.
1; Dao 2006). BNOB commissioner and developer Joseph Canizaro observed:
As a practical matter, these poor folks don’t have the resources to go
back to our city just like they didn’t have the resources to get out of
our city. So we won’t get all those folks back. That’s just a fact. It’s
not what I want; it’s just a fact (AP 2005d).
The outcry over the BNOB Commission proposal granting just four months for
residents to decide on their neighborhood viability before being “green-spaced” dominated the
headlines (Donze and Russell 2006). Mayor Nagin joined the New Orleans City Council in
ultimately rejecting implementation of BNOB Commission / ULI land use provisions. 54

54

Nossiter (2006); Rivlin (2006) and Powell (2007).
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In contrast, BNOB Commission co-chairs Mel Lagarde, head of the Hospital
Corporation of America’s Delta Division, and Barbara Major, director of the St. Thomas Health
Clinic (Scott 2005), along with BNOB “Health and Social Services Committee” chair and
attorney Kim Boyle (Henderson 2009) recorded virtually no public outcry over Charity
Hospital’s closure. Much the same way the BNOB Commission attempted to couch its land use
planning in the language of safety and equity, its Health and Social Services Committee
proclaimed “the need for courageous conversations to change the delivery of health and social
services” (BNOB Health 2006a, p. 4). As would be the case with most post-storm “health
reform” initiatives, the BNOB Commission ignored the attempt of Charity’s workers and the
U.S. military to restore hospital services, and formulated the transformation of the healthcare
landscape from one which held Charity Hospital as its historic epicenter. The BNOB Health and
Social Services Committee effectively recommended Charity’s continued closure in order to
realign its public healthcare mission and financial resources toward corporate medicine; while
also endorsing LSU’s academic medical center model (BNOB Health 2006a; Webster 2006).
Nelson, Ehrenfeucht and Laska (2007, p. 27) posed that the BNOB Commission
deliberations, though nominally open to the public, “were not designed to include
nonprofessional residents.” The BNOB meetings “out of perceived necessity, occurred before
most people returned, residents had to seek them out, and engaging residents as participants was
not a priority. Subsequently many residents opposed the BNOB Commission’s proposals.”
In comparison with the land use deliberations, few patients, non-health professionals or
others without a pecuniary interest participated in the BNOB Commission’s Health and Social
Services deliberations. BNOB participants overall were predominately white males. 55
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It has been said many times that “Hurricane Katrina … laid bare deep, social, economic
and cultural divisions that have long plagued New Orleans” (McKiven 2007, p. 742). McKiven’s
critique of the political advantage taken (or lost) during New Orleans’ 1853 yellow fever
epidemic presaged the parade of “reform” initiatives abounding in New Orleans in the months
and years following Hurricane Katrina’s August 2005 landfall. For example, backers of the
BNOB / ULI plan to shrink the city’s inhabitable footprint attempted to forge lines of support
based on avoiding “racial polarization” and supporting “the common good” toward creating a
new city that would be more equitable and humane for the displaced to return – while clamoring
for the active silencing or disregarding of active dissent to discourage community disunity in a
time of crisis (Cowen 2006). These appeals also attempted to extol the fear of avoiding “real
estate speculators and unchecked market forces” (Nolan 2006a). Curiously, the leading
supporters of the BNOB plans were real estate interests and developers (Davis 2006).
The idea of viewing a catastrophe as a chance for societal reordering and investment
opportunities has been heightened in recent decades by what Naomi Klein (2007) calls “disaster
capitalism.” She defines the term in its broad scope as the use of a disaster or major event for the
deliberate re-engineering of economic, political and community spheres while affected
populations are internally displaced; by its “military speed and precision” and in its “treatment of
disasters as exciting market opportunities” (pp. 5-6). Klein quotes New Orleans’ developer and
BNOB commissioner Joseph Canizaro’s response to a New York Times reporter on the city’s
future in the wake of the storm: “I think we have a clean sheet to start again. And with that clean
sheet we have some very big opportunities” (p. 4; Rivlin 2005). Klein lambasted “using moments
of collective trauma to engage in radical social and economic engineering” when most disaster
survivors seek the opposite: to rebuild, not remake their homes and communities (p.8).
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Considering Charity’s closure as a human rights violation of the internally displaced
In virtually any other global setting, failure to open a working hospital would have
sparked a United States government condemnation. Federal authorities apart from FEMA
however never seriously contested the forced end of Charity’s disaster recovery operation.
News of Charity Hospital’s forced closure, together with reports of the abandonment of
Orleans Parish Prison inmates to drown in their cells, the mass firings of teachers and municipal
workers, and demolition of public housing while its residents were internally displaced aroused
notice of human rights activists and organizations from around the world. 56
The American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) National Prison Project, investigating
charges of some Orleans Parish Prison inmates being left to drown in their locked cells, also
uncovered “the criminalization of mental illness” as a result of the closure of Charity Hospital’s
psychiatric Crisis Intervention Unit’s (CIU). In the ACLU’s 2007 follow-up report:
Perhaps the biggest blow to the region’s mental health system is the
loss of Charity Hospital … With so few psychiatric services available
to the public, mentally ill people are being funneled into the criminal
justice system. Some families have grown so desperate that they have
sought to have their mentally ill relatives arrested in the hopes of
getting them psychiatric care… (ACLU 2007, p. 22). 57
Even with significant improvements to community-based treatment programs under the
purview of the Metropolitan Human Services District, the combination of inpatient hospital unit
closures (particularly the New Orleans Adolescent Hospital (NOAH) and outpatient program
budget cuts has continued to hobble the mental health system (Levin 2010). Indeed the city has
just half the inpatient beds, with double the need, since the storm (Hudson 2009).
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Underscoring the impact of the loss of Charity’s psychiatric CIU has had on the
criminal justice system, Orleans Parish Sheriff Marlon Gusman, in a sworn affidavit in support
of a lawsuit to reopen Charity, said the closure of the CIU added to his “incredible burden”:
As Sheriff of Orleans Parish, I have been confronted with the
incredible burden of dealing with mental health issues in the
criminal and prison systems. While the prison in New Orleans has a
facility for mentally ill inmates and can treat inmates who are
suffering from mental health issues, before the storm police officers
could take people whom they suspected were exhibiting criminal
behavior as a result of mental problems to Charity Hospital. Since
the closure of Charity’s Crisis Intervention Unit, police officers have
limited options as to where they can take people with mental health
problems outside of jail (Gusman 2008).
The ACLU report indicated that in addition to Orleans Parish Prison’s 60-bed
psychiatric unit, “300 prisoners in the general population receive psychiatric medication.” Many
of these prisoners have been declared incompetent to stand trial by reason of insanity, or not
mentally competent to stand trial. The lack of outside psychiatric beds often results in prisoners
languishing for months “and in some cases years” at Orleans Parish Prison and other jails. Once
able to enter Louisiana’s only forensic mental hospital, the Feliciana Forensic Facility, many
prisoners then cannot leave because of the lack of community outpatient group and nursing home
placements willing or able to accept them (ACLU 2007, p. 22). The ACLU report noted:
Without community mental health services and a functioning
emergency system for acute psychiatric care, mentally ill people will
continue to be incarcerated for behavior that is a product of their
illness, and will spend increasingly long periods of time in jail, rather
than in a proper therapeutic setting (ACLU 2007, p. 23).
NESRI’s report on Charity Hospital’s closure cited Article 25 of the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services…” (NESRI 2008, p. 2).
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Principle 18(2) of the UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement states:
At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without
discrimination, competent authorities shall provide internally
displaced persons with and ensure safe access to: a) Essential food
and potable water; b) Basic shelter and housing; c) Appropriate
clothing; and d) Essential medical services and sanitation. 58
Charity Hospital’s closure “created a significant barrier to return for displaced residents
in need of medical care.” With Charity’s psychiatric CIU closed, Orleans Parish Prison’s 60-bed
unit was the largest inpatient facility “(contradicting) Guiding Principle 28, which calls on
authorities to establish conditions allowing (internally displaced persons) to return home “in
safety and with dignity” (ISS 2008, p. 26).
The AGFE report highlighted the inherent loss of healthcare space with LSU’s choice
to restore the smaller University Hospital rather than the much larger Charity facility:
University Hospital has just one-fourth of Charity Hospital’s capacity.
This forces many uninsured, underinsured and poor residents of New
Orleans to travel long distances to receive treatment at one of
Louisiana’s other public hospitals. In fact, many residents simply
forego needed medical care. More than one in three New Orleans
residents postpone needed medical care and one in four report that
they had no doctor, clinic, or pharmacy to turn to for needed care
(AGFE 2010, p. 43).
Amnesty International’s report echoed the ACLU and ISS reports on the loss of mental
health care, but also emphasized Charity’s closure as a disproportionate loss for the working
poor and the uninsured:
Charity served a largely poor, predominately minority population
through inpatient care, a network of outpatient clinics and the busiest
emergency department in the city. Nearly three-quarters of its patients
were African American, and 85 percent had annual incomes of less
than $20,000. Over half of the indigent care provided by (Charity and
University hospitals) was for patients without insurance, representing
two-thirds of the care to the uninsured in the city (AI 2010, pp. 17-18)
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The forced expropriation and demolition of the Lower Mid-City New Orleans
neighborhood for the proposed LSU/VA Medical Center, resulting in the internal displacement
of hundreds of residents and dozens of businesspeople and their enterprises, have been according
to the AGFE mission no less human rights violations than the internal displacement and forced
relocation of public housing residents. Citing the U.S. as a signatory of the International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the AGFE mission reiterated that
under articles IX and XXIII of the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
“every person has a right to own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent
living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home” (AGFE 2010, p.36).
Both the AGFE and CCR reports also referenced that planning for the LSU/VA project
was accomplished without the effective consultation of those facing forced internal displacement
as the result of the plans – in violation of human rights covenants (CCR 2009, pp. 20-21; AGFE
2010, pp. 28, 34-45, 49).
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Walter Kalin, Representative of the U.N. Secretary General on the Human Rights of
Internally Displaced Persons, and Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement observed the
U.S. governmental response before, during and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina:
The U.N. Human Rights Committee, a body of independent experts
entrusted with the task of monitoring the implementation off the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, when examining
the report submitted to it by the USA, expressed its concerns “about
information that the poor, and in particular African Americans were
disadvantaged under the reconstruction plans” and recommended to
the U.S. “review its practices and policies to ensure the full
implementation of its obligation to protect life and of the in matters
related to disaster prevention and preparedness, emergency assistance
and relief measures … that the rights of the poor, and in particular
African Americans, are fully taken into consideration in the
reconstruction plans with regard to access to housing, education and
healthcare” (Kalin 2008).
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More than six years after Hurricane Katrina, there remains an unprocessed
conversation about human rights that first arose when the BNOB Commission plan to leave
fallow much of the city of New Orleans that flooded deeper than four feet failed to take hold.
The conversation is rooted in the fact that most white residents were able to immediately return
to the city and determine the course of their storm recovery while many African Americans
remained internally displaced for months and even years. 60 It also remains within the still
contested terrain of a “recovery” climate set up by the mass firing of mostly African American
female certified public school educators from New Orleans’ public schools, facilitating mass the
arrival of privately-managed “non-profit” charter schools to occupy new school buildings
constructed with public disaster relief funds; closure and demolition of the city’s public housing
developments, to be replaced by market-rate, privately-managed apartments; and the closure of
Charity Hospital. This disaster capitalist paradigm has contributed to the continuing internal
displacement of our poorest citizens and the profound abridgement of their human rights. 61
Indeed, predominate is the mindset of those who proclaim that storm “recovery” has
ended. This is epitomized best by New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu’s often spoken response:
We are no longer rebuilding. We are now creating. Let’s stop thinking
about rebuilding the city we were and start dreaming about the city
we want to become (Davis 2010; Landrieu 2011).
The 118,000-fewer African American residents and 24,000 fewer white residents
according to the 2010 U.S. Census seem to represent the failure of recovery. In fact many
represent what Robertson dubbed “a shadow city” of people wanting, but unable to return. 62
Also caught up within the shadow city, this thesis author suggests, is Charity Hospital.
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LA. Health Care Redesign Collaborative also attempted to capitalize on Charity’s closure
Klein (2007) suggests disaster capitalism has transformed the provision of crisis relief
and social reconstruction to reflect neoliberal values – that is to instill classic private free market
economic attributes through the marshalling and reallocation of once public resources:
Disaster capitalists have no interest in repairing what was. In Iraq, Sri
Lanka and New Orleans, the process deceptively called
“reconstruction” began with finishing the job of the original disaster
by erasing what was left of the public sphere and rooted communities,
then quickly moving to replace them with a kind of corporate New
Jerusalem – all before the victims of war or natural disaster were able
to regroup and stake their claims to what was theirs (p. 8). 63
Emboldened by acceptance of the BNOB Commission Health and Social Services
Committee recommendations, advocates of “Louisiana healthcare redesign” laid the groundwork
for a massive reworking of the state public hospital system along medical neoliberal lines. U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (U.S. DHHS) Secretary Michael Leavitt joined
Louisiana Governor Blanco’s administration with consent of the state legislature in 2006 to
launch the Louisiana Health Care Redesign Collaborative. Its chief aim was the redirection of
federal Medicaid DSH financing, garnered predominately by Charity system hospitals and clinics
to care for the poor, toward funding vouchers for the purchase of private health insurance. 64
Like the BNOB Commission, the “Collaborative” held its meetings in public, yet the
public sparsely attended. The Collaborative’s decision-making body included healthcare and
hospital administrators, private foundation interests and health lobbyists, Blanco administration
health officials, state House and Senate Health and Welfare committee chairs, along with LSU
graduate medical education and LSU Health Care Service Division (LSU-HCSD) officials. 65
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LSU-HCSD officials professed support for “the broad objectives” of the Collaborative,
including the proposed “medical home” outpatient model, and use of “health information
technology” and “electronic medical records.” But they cautioned that Collaborative
deliberations had not addressed “the unlikely prospect of being able to effectively achieve zero
un-insurance,” and challenged the redirection of DSH funds away from the Charity system:
Retention of DSH funds for safety net providers will still be needed in
the event that reforms are only partially successful [as] patients who
depend on the safety net are as important as those we can move into
insurance programs (Comments from Collaborative members 2006).
Like the BNOB Commission, many Collaborative sessions revolved around mapping
out a redesigned healthcare system that was without Charity Hospital. Much to the displeasure of
the Bush administration and private healthcare interests, state legislative authorization of the
Collaborative limited any healthcare redesign to the New Orleans area (HCR 127 2006).
Ultimately, state officials rejected the federal scheme of replacing Charity Hospital
system coverage with insurance vouchers, saying it would cost $500 million more per year than
having Charity care just in the New Orleans area – and cover only 80 percent of those eligible. If
extended statewide, state health officials said the cost could double and leave nearly 500,000
people that use the Charity system without coverage (Moller 2006e; Moller 2007c).
Many healthcare redesign supporters in response called for dissolution of LSU-run
Charity, apart from their teaching hospitals in New Orleans and Shreveport. Citing Louisiana’s
poor health standing in national rankings, researchers, private foundations and medical lobbyists
issued papers detailing the woeful state of Louisiana healthcare pre- and post-storm. 66
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Though many critics attributed the entirety of the state’s poor health outcomes to the
“inefficient” Charity hospital system, very few of them acknowledged the data that showed
private medicine was far more responsible than Charity for failing to improve these woeful
indicators. For example, the nation’s highest Medicare costs with the worst health outcomes
occurred not at Charity, but in private settings. 67 Oddly, Charity had been also criticized by the
same forces for causing the “two-tier” system because of its disproportionate care for the
uninsured, often the same patients excluded from private healthcare. Based on 2005 inpatient
discharges, just 2.6 percent of Charity/MCLNO patients were covered by private insurance, 12.6
percent on Medicare, 21.5 percent on Medicaid, and 63.3 percent uninsured (Verité 2010, pp. 89). Costs would be much higher if uninsured patients’ only access was via private providers. 68
Paradoxically, the sternest admonitions against changing or devolving Charity’s
inspired statewide safety net hospital network came from the same LSU apparatus whose closure
of Charity Hospital sparked the Collaborative in the first place. LSU responded to research
reports suggesting that it concentrate on its educational rather than safety net healthcare
missions, divest some or all of its public hospitals to local control, and generally recast its public
operations entirely under free market outlines. Much in the spirit of its 1997 acquisition of the
Charity system from the Louisiana Health Care Authority (LHCA), LSU extolled the virtues of
Charity’s public system being far superior to the vagaries of private insurance coverage 69
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LSU’s contradictory exhortations about Charity notwithstanding, legions of healthcare
lobbyists and foundation reformers in New Orleans in Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath said that a
“medical home” was possible now that Charity was closed. An independent community clinic
network did arise in a laudable attempt to meet healthcare needs once met by Charity’s 160 prestorm primary care clinics. They prided themselves on reframing the entry point away from
hospital emergency rooms. Lovell (2011b) observed this discourse as “ripe terrain for
modernizing and rationalizing healthcare provision,” but it cannot ever hope to replace Charity:
This network has provided New Orleans a nationally-heard narrative
of redemption, not only from disaster; but from corruption, collective
ineptitude, widespread poverty and supposedly antiquated ideals of
pre-Katrina healthcare embodied in Charity Hospital. But primary
care clinics cannot meet the tertiary care needs of an already
chronically ill, disabled and aging New Orleans population.
In fairness, what would become “504 Health Net” did not physically close Charity
Hospital, LSU and the State of Louisiana did. 70 Yet few of the 504 providers have honestly
addressed the reasons for Charity’s closure. Indeed, several supported the Louisiana Health Care
Redesign Collaborative attempt to reallocate Charity’s operating funds toward the purchase of
private insurance vouchers. And their collective failure to demand the full restoration of
Charity’s safety net hospital and clinical services limits their own viability to fully serve
Charity’s former patients, too many of whom remain without a medical home since the storm.
Interest in reopening Charity Hospital persists years after its closure primarily because
the healthcare that it provided has never been fully replaced (Walsh and Moller 2006). 71 Yet
LSU continues to divest itself from areas of healthcare “not core to (its graduate medical
education) mission” and which no other entity public or private can adequately or expeditiously
fill (Cerise 2005, p. 13; Spiegel 2007). Without Charity, many have become medically homeless.
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Continuity or Rupture? Comparing LSU’s pre-storm plans to close
Charity Hospital with its disaster capitalized closure following Hurricane Katrina 72
Lovell (2011b) juxtaposes the hallmark of Charity’s iconic safety net network with the
new challenge arising from the federal government’s creation of the Medicaid program, which
concentrated the poor and uninsured exclusively to Charity system hospitals:
The uniqueness of Louisiana Charity Hospital system is rooted in the
principle that everyone has a right to medical care – certainly
anathema to American neoliberalism and hardy individualism, but
founded in the 1930s populist doctrine of the Long dynasty that
governed Louisiana for decades. However, the arrival in the 1960s of
Medicaid, the major program to assist low-income individuals with
obtaining health services, intensified a two-tiered system of healthcare
(Lovell 2011b).
Though LSU gained administrative control of Charity in 1997, it has not freed it from
dueling with state administrations against reallocation of much of its self-generated DSH budget.
Thus LSU has sought to “(avoid) replicating the ‘old Charity model’ of reliance on State
funding” (ADAMS 2007, p. 5.1). Lovell suggests LSU’s planning process was already underway
in the months before Hurricane Katrina toward the replacement of Charity Hospital:
Burdened with hospital accreditation problems and a deteriorating
facility, LSU had long envisioned building a new hospital, in part to
attract a private patient base and unburden itself of nonpaying patients
… Lack of adequate financing for new facilities stood in the way of
that plan. Katrina provided the opportunity to narrow that gap by
accessing federal funds to replace the old facility (Lovell 2011b).
Vice President of Communications and External Affairs Charles Zewe clarified that
LSU’s new academic medical center model “turns it more from a charity matrix to a university
teaching hospital matrix.” One part of this matrix shift is to replace the pre-storm Charity’s 160
on-site outpatient clinics with a network of neighborhood clinics (Moller 2006b). LSU and its
new University Medical Center (UMC) announced it will qualify for the Jindal administration’s
privatized Medicaid HMO clinic network (Maginnis 2011a; Verité 2011, pp. 18-19).
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Louisiana’s Department of Health and Hospitals’ (DHH) Coordinated Care Networks
(CCN), once known as “Community Care,” historically have been arranged to favor individual
physician and group practices dispensing fee-for-service care. Their new CCN program, dubbed
“Bayou Health,” shifts this payment and delivery model to private managed care organizations.
Medicaid participants must sign-up or be assigned a private Medicaid HMO plan. LSU officials
acknowledged their public discomfort with the CCN privatized contract process (Verité 2011,
pp. 18-19; Shuler 2011c). LSU public hospitals and clinics will now have to compete for
Medicaid patients amongst a group of private insurers, narrowing even further its indigent patient
pool. The DHH CCN process also serves to interrupt LSU’s process to cultivate its own
physician network to make referrals exclusively to the new LSU UMC, as LSU already has with
its highly-regarded “Shreveport model” out of LSUHSC Shreveport. In effect, the DHH CCN
HMO scheme undermines LSU’s attempt to transcend its “Charity model” by reinforcing
dependency on DHH / Louisiana Medicaid funding, rather than move towards a more diverse
payer mix (such as LSU Shreveport) where private insurance and Medicare plays a greater role.73
The new CCN scheme fulfills a long-time ideological goal of Governor Jindal, who
favors neoliberal / neoconservative privatized purchase of services rather than supporting public
healthcare delivery and administration (Shuler 1996b). These private CCN contracts are now
“the most lucrative in state government” (Shuler 2011b). The program was passed into law over
state legislative objections through an inserted “technical amendment” on an unrelated bill
during the final hours of the 2011 Regular Legislative Session. The inserted CCN language,
while serving as “fine print” that most legislators simply overlooked, had the profound impact of
instituting privatization over the objections of legislators by removing requirements of prior
legislative approval and codifying CCN rule making exclusively within DHH (Maginnis 2011b).
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After more than five years of planning, winning the FEMA Arbitration and legislative
budget scrutiny (and withstanding several lawsuits challenging both Charity’s closure and the
expropriation of land in Lower Mid-City New Orleans for the combined LSU/VA Medical
Center), LSU and the state won final approval from the Louisiana state Joint Legislative
Committee on the Budget on September 16, 2011 to begin construction of its Charity Hospital
replacement known as the University Medical Center (UMC) (Barrow 2011f; Deslatte 2011). 74
Despite pledges by local, state and federal officials to consider meaningful public input
of alternatives to the abandonment of Charity and the demolition of a federally-designated
historic Lower Mid-City neighborhood, LSU’s academic medical center plans, along with new
Veterans Administration Medical Center plans, have for the most part remained intact since their
inception. Indeed, decisions on how the process would unfold were finalized before much of the
affected public even knew they were made (Moran 2008).75 The state legislature originally
demanded Charity’s reopening for interim use in the year after Katrina. Yet it has largely
afforded Charity’s replacement to proceed even as legislators scrutinized the financial details. 76
New Orleans officials in particular, also initially demanding Charity’s reopening, enabled
fruition of LSU/VA plans by authorizing the expropriation and destruction of Lower Mid-City. 77
Though LSU appears to have received its crucial “green light,” many uncertainties
remain. Ironically, those unknowns, coupled with LSU agreeing to scale back and self-finance
parts of their UMC, afforded its ultimate approval since it reinforced perceptions that LSU must
move beyond “the old Charity model” to have a viable project (Barrow 2011c). But this outcome
underscores that the result will be far fewer hospital services than offered by “Mother Charity.”
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In the months after the storm, LSU spokesperson Marvin McGraw said one thing that
was certain: “When we build a new hospital in New Orleans to replace Charity, we would plan to
at least return with the services that we had there before” (Moller 2005e). Its 2011 business plan
approved by the legislative budget committee however states that LSU’s new UMC will be less
than what Charity provided. In general, increased numbers of beds available for the new UMC
as projected are compared to 275 available before current fiscal year budget cuts in LSU Interim
Hospital, as opposed to those that were in operation at Charity in 2005 (Verité 2011, pp. 3, 11).
To underscore the previous example, “expansion of inpatient psychiatry services” plans
60 beds, an increase of 22 from Interim LSU Hospital levels. Yet officials acknowledge the beds
“rapidly will be filled” with patients (Verité 2011, p. 17). Charity had a 128-bed psychiatric
Crisis Intervention Unit (BKA 2007) – apart from 84 emergency department beds (Moises 2009).
The proposed UMC also projects an increase in “urgent care clinic” visits (Verité 2011,
p. 18). Yet LSU Interim Hospital’s urgent care center, originally open 24 hours a day, has
reduced service hours as of July 1, 2011, belying the stated assumptions of the proposed UMC. 78
Gauging the continuity of pre-storm plans, LSU in this instance has experienced a
profound rupture. Medicine clinics and services which once defined Charity Hospital and trained
generations of medical professionals have been discontinued. Nor will these services necessarily
be a part of the new UMC. LSU-HCSD closed “its inpatient pediatrics program in the face of a
diminished population of children” which severely impacted pediatric training across the region
(Berggren and Curiel 2006, p. 1551). On August 1, 2010, LSU Interim Hospital also ceased labor
and delivery services, closing its neonatal intensive care and nursing care units (McGraw 2010).
If this decision stands, a major New Orleans legacy will end – the creation of “Charity babies.” 79
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MCLNO (2011a-b): Clinic hours’ change substantiated via: http://www.mclno.org/mclno/menu/, p. 3.
Lovell (2011a): “Debating Life After Disaster: Charity Hospital Babies and Bioscientific Futures…”
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LSU announced its opening of the UMC will be 2015 – ten years after Hurricane
Katrina (Barrow 2011a). There will likely be a change in its management, to the UMC
Management Corporation; “a non-profit corporation (which) will retain a CEO.” The
“destination programs in identified specialties” have not been identified. The UMC will also
have an immediate impact upon the six LSU-HCSD hospitals outside of New Orleans, as
“activities that were displaced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will be transferred (back) to the
new (UMC)” (Verité 2011, p. 3). The result could be more service cuts and hospital closures. 80
The UMC Business Plan notes that if the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (PPACA) insurance purchase mandate requirements are overturned, “UMC’s safety net
services may be greater than assumed” (Verité 2011, pp. 27-28). Nevertheless, the fiscal impact
upon DSH funding, the main source of safety net hospital operating receipts, is projected to be
curtailed sharply from current levels after 2014 if the PPACA is fully implemented (Kulkarni,
2011). LSU-run Charity Hospital system facilities already face the loss of DSH funds from DHH
reallocation and from the “DSH Audit Rule” that came effective at the close of 2010 – the latter
limited the amount of allowable healthcare services that can be federally reimbursed (CMS 2009;
Moller 2010a; National Association of Public Hospitals / NAPH 2011; Shuler 2011a).
Business conditions for public and non-profit safety net hospitals, many with aging
facilities and out-of-date diagnostic equipment, are driving many to merge with for-profit
providers, redesign their healthcare delivery for the consumer marketplace, or face bankruptcy
and closure (Landsberg 2004; Harrison and Sexton 2004; Darcé and Pope 2006; Stone 2006).
Yet these healthcare marketplace adjustments may also conflict with their charitable missions,
leading to their demise as charity safety net providers (Landsberg 2004; Stone 2006).

80

Baton Rouge’s Earl K. Long is slated to close and merge with Our Lady of the Lake in 2013: (Shuler 2010b). See
Maginnis (2010); Hasten (2008) (Huey P. Long/Pineville); and Roberts (2010) (Lallie Kemp/Independence).
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Once threatened with the potential loss of a half-billion dollars in DSH funds, DHH
officials and Senator Mary Landrieu scrambled successfully to defend Louisiana’s adjusted
“Federal Medical Assistance Percentage” (FMAP) to reflect the influx of storm relief funds as
well as the displacement of thousands of Medicaid recipients to places outside of Louisiana
(Shields 2011). Nationally known (derisively) as “the Louisiana Purchase” – Landrieu’s 2010
rider was reportedly added in exchange for her support of the PPACA. This political carve out
supposedly safeguards LSU Charity hospitals and Louisiana Medicaid until 2014 (Alpert 2011).
But this experience yet again urges LSU to move beyond its DSH-reliant “old Charity model.”
LSU Health Sciences Center Chancellor Dr. Larry Hollier said that he is “absolutely
committed to keeping us away from the charity model” (Moller 2006e). He noted that while
Charity for decades “drew young physicians for training and helped keep them in Louisiana to
practice” LSU’s ability to continue to train seventy percent of physicians that remain in the state
must have a “magnet” academic medical center “that is financially sustainable” (Griggs 2010). 81
In this regard, LSU post-Katrina planning is solidly in a continuous line with pre-storm plans to
diversify its patient base with a greater concentration of insured, healthier patients.
Hollier said that shifting from “a Charity model” to “an academic medical center
model” bypasses the limitations of relying on DSH funding. By attracting more Medicaid
patients through the PPACA expansion, Hollier said “more matching federal funds (can) come in
because there’s not a cap on Medicaid eligibility and matching,” unlike DSH funds that are
capped. Hollier said this will also expand education opportunities since the subject patient base
will become more varied with its expanded payer mix (Hollier Deposition 2009, pp. 71, 94).
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For lists of research breakthroughs made while New Orleans’ Charity Hospital was in operation, see Yakubik,
Brown, Greer and Lee (2011, pp. 4, 11-13) and LSUHSC (2011): http://lsuhscimportantwork.com/importantfacts.
More UMC superlatives: Moller (2007d): The UMC would mean “a new emphasis on teaching and research”;
Barrow (2011b): The new UMC will be “an elite facility that would draw patients from across the Gulf Coast.”
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While reaffirming LSU’s public academic medical center status, Hollier elaborated that
LSU is “changing the entire way the uninsured receive care.” He contrasted the current tenhospital state-owned Charity safety net system with LSU’s “public/private partnership” model:
The state legislature … approved a public/private partnership between
(LSU/Earl K. Long and Our Lady of the Lake medical centers). The
result is a fully funded infrastructure, because 98% of the patients will
be insured. This will dramatically reduce our dependence on state
health care dollars, and produce a major change in care for the
uninsured … A similar project replicating that public/private
enterprise model is underway in New Orleans, where we are building
a new academic health center which will serve both uninsured and
insured patients … The private institutions with whom we are
partnering have service goals that match well with ours. … By
reducing the hospital funding needs, we can ensure that state dollars
are available to be redirected to advance education, infrastructure, and
the development of new treatments (Hollier 2010, p. 17).
Legnini and Waldman (1999) investigated tensions within academic medical centers
(AMCs) forced to contend with the private healthcare market environment while upholding their
once unquestioned mutual provision of medical training and safety net healthcare:
AMCs play another important function in the medical system – as
safety net providers. Since the establishment of the first hospitals in
this country that served the poor exclusively and also trained
physicians, academic medical centers have provided large amounts of
free care and have been an important source of access to highly
specialized services without regard to ability to pay. AMCs have the
largest pool of physician labor available to care for the poor – namely
physicians in training (both often located in inner cities…) (p. 1).
Even LSU’s private healthcare critics suggest that the key for revitalizing LSU’s
teaching hospital enterprise is to escape the “stigma” of a “Charity Hospital” (Deslatte 2007). 82
Yet Dr. George Thibault, a professor at Harvard Medical School, said “local history, local
culture and local relationships” impact desired changes. Thibault said LSU’s challenge will be:
“Can you create that de novo if you do not have that 100- or 200- year tradition?” (Eggler 2007).
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For viewpoints on charity and its association with the stigma of poverty and need: see Fothergill (2003): “The
Stigma of Charity: Gender, Class and Disaster Assistance” and Frey (2005): “Big Charity in New Orleans.”
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In proposing before Hurricane Katrina the consolidation of Charity with University
Hospitals through the construction of an entirely new medical campus, Adams Management
consultants heavily predicated their assumptions on discarding the Charity heritage. Yet their
report reflected both divided sentiments amongst LSU-HCSD and LSUHSC professionals (e.g.,
divided for / against having the new academic medical center in the midst of LSUHSC between
Charity and University hospitals due to their proximity to Charity, with those in favor desiring
continuing Charity heritage; those opposed suggesting “the charity stigma may be too strongly a
part of this neighborhood”) but most decidedly in favor for the Charity Hospital mission and
clinical research traditions, especially with Tulane clinicians, to remain in place as an ethic. 83
Though LSU has largely remain consistent with its plans with regards to the project
intent as proposed by their consultants, its post-Katrina size has taken a decidedly suburban
scope and look (moderate-story buildings of five to six floors versus 16 to 17 floors on a smaller
land footprint before the storm. This is in stark contrast with pre-Katrina plans when the
preferred option amongst both LSU-HCSD and LSUHSC was the South option. Likewise the
needs for community consultation in the pre-storm planning was seen as crucial; whereas postKatrina, the effective decisions have already been made before public input was even sought.
Grimly, the 2005 Adams pre-storm report noted about the possibility of the closure of
the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO) combined Charity and University
hospitals campus if steps were not taken to supplant the hospitals with a new combined facility:
Other than replacement, the only option would be to ultimately close
MCLNO and redistribute medical education and patients throughout
the private hospitals in the region. This would have a negative impact
on the medical education component due to the absence of sufficient
clinical mass at any one site, present access challenges for patients,
and shift the uncompensated care burden to private hospitals and
physicians (ADAMS 2005, p. 3)
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See ADAMS (2005, pp. 95-97). Post-storm LSU UMC comparisons made via http://www.newhospital.org.
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Administratively since Hurricane Katrina LSU has made its decision to do away with
even the institutional memory of Charity. Indeed, LSU has been in a process of ‘rebranding.’ In
addition to exorcizing all references to “Charity hospitals” LSU has also moved away from
“LSU Hospitals,” first in favor of “LSU Health System;” and the latest name: “LSU Health.” 84
Mapped out as part of a “complete logo hierarchy” in order to ensure “consistency” in LSU
Health brand “(presentation, usage, messages)… strengthening the overall impression of quality
and professionalism for LSU Health as a whole.” It answers the question: “Why a new identity?”
Regardless of what we know (about our health system), it’s what
others know about us that defines our brand. Because a brand is not
what we say it is. It’s what those who perceive us say it is. That’s why
it is essential for us to seek relevance and to connect with the public…
As we update our brand to better reflect who we are and how we are
perceived in today’s world, it is imperative that we develop a strong
visual identity to underscore our commitment to the future. Our new
logo and its various versions, is designed to make a simpler, yet more
powerful, statement about who we are – one that is both easy to grasp
and relevant … The new logo serves as the springboard for all of our
brand identity efforts, the cornerstone around which we will build a
more relevant and more focused message about who we are at LSU
Health (LSU Health Graphic Standards 2010, p. 2).
Changing cultural perceptions however are likely to be a tall order. According to
national surveys, healthcare consumers prefer “hospital,” associating hospitals with better and
more comprehensive healthcare than “medical centers,” contradicting rebranding efforts by
hundreds of hospitals across the nation (Mueller 2011; Jacobson 2011; FierceHealthcare 2011).
While LSU has clearly been attempting “a change in culture,” its institutional response
has taken dramatic shifts since Hurricane Katrina; and in response to Governor Jindal’s DHH
wholesale privatization of Louisiana Medicaid. Particularly with regards to LSU / Charity’s
predominately African American patient base “a change in culture” has taken on a decided tone,
one that may yet result in a rupture that could be greater than the closure of Charity itself.
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See http://www.lsuhospitals.org/Media-Relations/Newsletter.htm newsletters and releases (2008, 2010-2011).
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As previously noted in this case study, Charity Hospital during both Jim Crow
segregation and following the Civil Rights movement has often been the only comprehensive
acute facilities in Louisiana to admit African Americans as patients, albeit with varying degrees
of actual dignity and personal treatment. And given Charity’s history, substantial numbers of
poor whites as well as blacks have been Charity system patients. 85 Both Salvaggio (1992) and
especially Roberts and Durant (2010) extensively document the rise of African American health
professionals and hospital administrators since the advent of Medicare and Medicaid. Yet
indications of a shift based on race would arise soon after Charity’s late September 2005
permanent closure. For comparison, the pre-storm Adams Management report noted:
Further, MCLNO will expand the volume of insured patients through
focused programmatic development efforts and a marketing strategy
centered on building market share of Medicare and Medicaid
populations within the African American community in the core
market [of Uptown and Mid-City New Orleans] and New Orleans
East (ADAMS 2005, p. 2)
Likewise as noted by McDonald (2002) and reaffirmed in the 2005 Adams report and
other venues, LSU Shreveport became the professed model before Hurricane Katrina of culture
change away from New Orleans “two-tier system” of predominately African American poor and
uninsured going to Charity Hospital and predominately white with health insurance receiving
care from non-state private and parish hospital district facilities. Beyond the profound rupture
caused by Charity Hospital’s post-Katrina closing, LSU leadership lodged their contention for
abandoning Charity Hospital and charity care in racial-code class terms:
I have a deep feeling that a lot of this is just a way of putting the least
enfranchised people in a dilapidated, damaged, obsolete structure that
will allow the upper-class citizens of New Orleans not to be bothered
by the likes of them. Not in my backyard. Going into Charity Hospital
is inappropriate, even temporarily, by any reasonable standards. (LSU
Chief Medical Officer Dr. Michael Butler quoted by Webster 2007).
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See Table 2 on p. 106 and Table 3 on p. 107 for Charity Hospital system and New Orleans data by race.
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LSU System President John Lombardi wrote to The Shreveport Times proposing “the
time has come (to modify the newspaper’s) official style regarding hospitals run by LSU.” He
said their “Charity’ system references are “anachronistic and simply inaccurate”:
Those who advocate an alternative to the old “charity hospital” model
have become fond of the buzz word “health care redesign” even
though they don’t know exactly what the term means or how much
more redesign will cost. LSU has been quietly “redesigning” health
care for many years and improving outcomes while living within its
legislatively approved budget. LSU believes that phrases like “charity
hospital” and “charity hospital system” is a part of the state’s proud
heritage and a testament to the compassion conveyed by the Great
Seal of the State of Louisiana, but they no longer describe the modern
approach to medical care being pursued by LSU. In fact, no hospital
among the 10 LSU public hospitals is legally known as a “charity
hospital.” University Hospital in New Orleans that used to be a part of
the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans is now legally
known as the Interim LSU Public Hospital (Lombardi 2007). 86
Lombardi also asserted LSU thinks “the term ‘charity hospital’ has become racially
charged and is tinged with a pejorative undertone that not only negatively skews public debate
over health care reform, but also feeds perceptions that unfairly challenge the quality of medical
care delivered by our medical staffs…” (Lombardi, 2007).
Yet LSU officials apparently had no problem subjecting returning patients of any race
to tents and other makeshift accommodations. The closure of Charity Hospital, charged historian
Dr. Lance Hill, was “the single greatest obstacle to return of the black community…” Hill,
executive director of the Southern Institute for Education and Research, called LSU and the
state’s decision to close Charity the cause of “barbarous suffering and pain for people” especially
in light of the loss of many black middle class jobs with insurance since the storm. Hill also
suggested Charity’s post-Katrina closure merited more media exposure, suggesting that
“(closing) the only hospital for the uninsured” elsewhere would not be tolerated (Hill 2008).
86

Actual legal name: HB 1 (2011, p. 242): “Charity Hospital and the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans.”
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Lovell (2011b) concurs with Hill and others that “for poor and African American
residents who had struggled to return and rebuild broken lives, Charity Hospital’s closure
reinforced their sense that the city was being redesigned for white, middle class residents and
tourists.” Unlike many scholars, Lovell details the attempt by Charity’s workers and the U.S.
military to reopen the hospital in the weeks following Hurricane Katrina – as well as highlighting
the “broad social movement to reopen Charity Hospital, intensified by LSU’s announcement” of
the planned razing of the predominately African American working class neighborhood of Lower
Mid-City for the future complexes replacing Charity and the original VA Medical Center. 87
Though this author found no evidence of a pre-planned conspiracy to capitalize on the
Hurricane Katrina disaster, the catastrophe nevertheless provided a clear opportunity to speed up
LSU’s pre-storm plans to replace Charity Hospital with a “market-ready” facility. LSU and the
state could have acted to reopen the hospital in the weeks after the storm. Indeed not to do so
seemed to belie a “First do no harm” medical principle for its health system and its patients. 88
And the closure of Charity Hospital set into motion consequences that invariably have had a
disproportionately negative impact on New Orleans’ African American populace and Diaspora.
Skepticism that the new LSU University Medical Center will be different from what
“white New Orleanians and Louisianans that view Charity as ‘a black hospital’” runs deep, even
as LSU UMC supporters extol it as the next “destination hospital” for everyone, including those
with insurance (Barrow 2011d). More disturbingly, by closing Charity Hospital and dispersing
its core indigent patient base before building its new academic medical center, LSU risked the
loss of meeting both its safety net healthcare and graduate medical educational missions.

87

The razing of Lower Mid-City is nearly complete. See Vogel (2011): http://insidethefootprint.blogspot.com/.
88

Primum Non Nocere: “Latin for ‘first do no harm.’ A guiding principle for physicians that, whatever the
intervention or procedure, the patient’s well-being is the primary consideration.” http://medicaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/First+Do+No+Harm.; See also Krause (1997) and Lakhani (2011).
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Findings: New Orleans’ Charity Hospital was closed as the result of disaster capitalism to
supplant its original mission in favor of LSU’s neoliberal academic medical enterprise
Through the rigorous review of multiple sources of literature and data, this case study
finds that New Orleans’ Reverend Avery C. Alexander Charity Hospital was closed as the result
of disaster capitalism in order to supplant Charity’s original safety net mission in favor of
Louisiana State University’s neoliberal University Medical Center academic medical enterprise.
The genesis of LSU’s closure of Charity Hospital began years before LSU assumed
administrative oversight of Charity and its inspired network of public safety net hospitals. Sorely
neglected following the 1965 advent of the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs, Charity’s
previous administrator, the Louisiana Health Care Authority (LHCA), also attempted to abandon
the Big Charity Hospital campus and the Charity name fifteen years prior to Hurricane Katrina.
Under the LHCA’s administration Louisiana’s Charity Hospital system became the
recipient of special Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) federal match payments
designed to support safety net hospitals that treated a disproportionate share of the uninsured.
Had the funds been distributed as they were intended, the Charity public hospital system could
have completely modernized and fully integrated with other medical providers statewide to
address Louisiana’s challenging health indicators long marked by poverty and racial inequality.
Rather than transforming the state hospital system, DSH “Medicaid golden goose egg”
funds became an opportunity for outright avarice and corruption. Charity system hospitals were
forced to ‘donate’ DSH-eligible funds to the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals
(DHH). The resulting federal fund matches created up to three times the cost of Charity Hospital
care to benefit not Charity, but private healthcare enterprises, many of them owned and operated
by politically-favored allies of the Edwards gubernatorial administration. Charity system
hospitals subsequently lost out on a total of approximately two billion dollars.
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Even after U.S. Congressional curbs were instituted and Charity Hospital system
administration was transferred to LSU, hundreds of millions of DSH dollars meant for Charity
hospitals continued to enrich private providers during Governor Foster’s administration. Indeed,
upon LSU’s assumption of Charity hospitals in 1997, Foster had left LSU without operating
funds, as $86 million of Charity DSH-generated funds instead went to balance the state budget.
Despite Louisiana state legislative attempts to afford LSU a greater ability to command
its administration of the Charity Hospital system, almost uninterrupted budgetary shortfalls,
coupled with continuing deferred facility maintenance issues, led LSU to seek the replacement of
Charity’s flagship hospital in New Orleans in advance of Hurricane Katrina. Initially LSU tread
a wholly different path than its LHCA administrative predecessor. LSU had attempted to build
public, state legislative, then gubernatorial support under the Blanco administration to transform
the state hospital system on the chassis of the highly-regarded and beloved Charity into a greater
integration with LSU’s graduate medical education enterprise. Yet its commitment to upholding
Charity’s safety net mission under Louisiana’s tradition of “Open Access” without regard to
one’s income had already eroded thanks to LSU institutional means-testing of Charity’s
medically indigent patients a full two years before Hurricane Katrina struck.
The evidence on which this thesis bases its finding of the use of the disaster capitalism
paradigm in Charity Hospital’s closure begins with LSU’s failure to uphold its responsibilities
for hospitals statewide under Louisiana’s emergency operations plan in advance and following
Hurricane Katrina. LSU did erect and staff what was then the nation’s largest field hospital on its
flagship LSU academic campus in Baton Rouge. 89 Nevertheless both of its hospitals in New
Orleans as well as all other area hospitals literally fended for themselves to deal with the loss of
power and sanitation as well as evacuation from a flood-ravaged New Orleans.
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See LSU-HCSD (2006e, pp. 5-6)
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Following the evacuation of Charity’s patients, staff and their families five days after
the storm, LSU essentially abandoned its two New Orleans hospital campuses. Charity doctors
and U.S. military personnel indeed found the hospital’s entrance doors wide open. Following an
assessment authorized under federal disaster plan guidelines, Charity’s workers, medical
residents and U.S. military personnel proceeded to ready the facility for reopening.
Virtually uninterrupted for weeks in their attempt to revive this critical disaster medical
infrastructure, the U.S. military was blocked by LSU officials in seeking installation of back-up
electrical generators to support Charity Hospital’s permanent reopening. LSU officials also
forced the deactivation of temporary generators which had successfully powered-up key areas of
the hospital, including its emergency department; and informed U.S. military personnel that
Charity would not be reopening, so their disaster recovery efforts would have to end.
LSU then threatened its workers who were otherwise authorized to restore Charity
Hospital operations for future medical use with criminal trespass had they remained on the
premises. This ended the attempt to reopen Charity Hospital and ended its use as a centerpiece in
the U.S. Army’s Taskforce Katrina’s disaster recovery operation of New Orleans.
The State of Louisiana, through its Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) and
Office of Emergency Preparedness, blocked FEMA grant expenditures to fully repair Charity
Hospital. The state returned $340 million in emergency public assistance – the same amount
LSU-HCSD’s Chief Administrative Officer said it would cost to repair Charity. LSU’s choice to
use its emergency FEMA funds on the much smaller University Hospital led to the loss of
healthcare that Charity once provided because of University Hospital’s shortage of clinical
space. LSU and the State of Louisiana also opted for the use of tents and other makeshift
facilities, even as the still JCAHO-accredited Charity Hospital was left shuttered.
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The resulting loss of Medicare, Medicaid and private insurance reimbursement because
of LSU’s use of makeshift facilities contributed to the mass firing of over 2,600 medical workers
and the displacement of hundreds of medical residents, inflaming a public health crisis because
of their absence. The closure of Charity Hospital and its 160-pre Katrina LSU clinics resulted in
the loss of medical care, such that many New Orleans residents would remain displaced away
from the city for a prolonged period of time; and for those who managed to return home, a
critical shortage of adult acute hospital beds lasted many months.
The closure of Charity Hospital meant the loss of the only Level One trauma center on
the Gulf Coast for more than seven months. This specialized unit also did not return back to the
city from suburban Jefferson Parish until more than a year after the storm. Charity’s closure,
particularly of its 128-bed psychiatric Crisis Intervention Unit (CIU), was said to be “the number
one cause for the mental health crisis” afflicting New Orleans having amongst the nation’s
highest rates of untreated Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and preventable suicide.
Because of Charity Hospital’s closure, healthcare access for all patients in the
metropolitan area as well as Baton Rouge and statewide was negatively impacted, leading to
delayed care and medical complications as a direct result of delayed healthcare. Charity’s closure
also led to millions of dollars in unanticipated expenditures by the remaining reopened facilities;
with them collectively still unable to replace the medical care that Charity once provided.
LSU’s closure of Charity Hospital was also found by international and national human
rights organizations and bodies as having violated the human rights of internally displaced
persons. These same human rights organizations found that the demolition of the Lower MidCity New Orleans neighborhood, slated for LSU’s new University Medical Center, would cause
further internal displacement, hardship and human rights violations.
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Additional benchmarks of LSU’s disaster capitalized closure of Charity Hospital
involved the timing of its execution (when the city was virtually emptied of its populace), and
the lack of meaningful participation in charting New Orleans’ healthcare recovery.
Other parties, including the Bring New Orleans Back Commission (BNOB), the
Louisiana Health Care Redesign Collaborative, the Bush administration, as well as several
former and current local, state and federal officials also contributed to ensuring Charity’s
permanent closure. This supplanted Charity’s historic safety net mission with the attempted
medical neoliberal transformation of its physical, financial, institutional and cultural assets to
favor private health insurance and corporate medicine. Healthcare became a commodity, rather
than an inalienable human right, abridging what should have been free following a disaster.
The closure of Charity Hospital came at a time when New Orleans was effectively
emptied and much of its populace was internally displaced, unable to return to the city. Charity’s
closure disproportionately impacted African Americans through the displacement of its
predominately African American patient base, house staff and nursing corps, as well as
significant numbers of hospital physicians, administrators and contract medical vendors.
Many healthcare professionals, foundation representatives and medical lobbyists failed
to acknowledge the attempted reopening of Charity Hospital by its workers and the U.S. military.
Resulting disaster recovery decisions were made in desired expectation of Charity’s continued
closure, with the attempted re-allocation of Charity Hospital’s main operating Medicaid DSH
funds; first towards the purchase of private insurance vouchers, then toward the development of
a private non-profit clinic network. Planners of these healthcare redesign efforts following
Charity’s closure also knew in advance that most stakeholders, especially patients, were unable
to participate in decision-making due to their internal displacement.
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Epilogue:
Conflict between LSU and the Jindal administration over LSU-HCSD state budget
appropriations recalls how broken our healthcare system is without Charity Hospital
Finding its own Fiscal Year 2011-2012 budget in a mid-year shortfall of $251 million
due to reduced tax revenues, Governor Jindal’s administration took $50 million in federal DSH
match dollars generated from the LSU Charity Hospital system and gave the funds to the
Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) (Shuler 2012). As a result, LSU-HCSD ordered $34
million in budget cuts, with $15 million of them imposed on New Orleans’ LSU Interim Hospital
(Barrow 2012a). LSU-HCSD closed its dedicated stroke unit, the chemical detox unit, and
nineteen psychiatric beds, including one-fourth of its beds at the former DePaul Hospital and ten
of twenty beds in LSU Interim’s Mental Health Emergency Room Extension (MHERE). The
budget cuts have resulted in total reductions of 225 positions, including the actual layoff of 110
workers at LSU Interim (LSU-HCSD 2012b). Hundreds more health professional layoffs and
significant service cuts have occurred at six other LSU-HCSD hospitals in Baton Rouge,
Bogalusa, Houma, Independence, Lake Charles and Lafayette (LSU-HCSD 2012a). 90
This reallocation of LSU-HCSD system DSH funding again recalls earlier diversions
where Charity Hospital system funds earned their enhanced federal match, then were shifted to
benefit private Medicaid providers. Facing a firestorm of criticism for executing these budget
reductions, DHH secretary Bruce Greenstein as well as Governor Jindal blamed LSU for wanting
to overspend its appropriated state budget (Barrow 2012b; Wilson 2012). Greenstein in particular
charged that LSU’s cuts to vital programs were “meant to mobilize communities and supporters”
for LSU. Yet billings from non-state hospitals and private Medicaid providers were on pace to
overspend DHH’s FY 2011-12 budget by nearly $500 million (Barrow 2012d).
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Three hospitals under LSUHSC Shreveport also face budget reductions and the loss DSH match funding; but did
not face major cuts in vital programs or employee layoffs (LSU System Board of Supervisors 2012).
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The Jindal Administration has moved swiftly to privatize Louisiana Medicaid delivery
through its Bayou Health scheme. Medicaid recipients are being forced to choose or be directly
assigned to five private HMO providers in order to access primary and acute medicine. Enacted
in the final hours of the 2010 Louisiana State Legislative Session, Bayou Health is scheduled to
reallocate an additional $2.2 billion of the state’s $6.7 billion in annual Medicaid expenditures to
private insurance providers. Critics have charged the program will not save the state money, will
disrupt doctor-patient relationships, and was passed into law through a series of last minute
obscure state budget amendments that bypassed the full scrutiny of state legislative budget and
health and welfare committees (Barrow 2011g; Maginnis 2012). Indeed, state Medicaid
overwhelmingly has become a private enterprise, as private providers are commanding close to
$5 billion or almost three-quarters of Louisiana’s Medicaid program (DHH 2011, p. A1).
Under current cost projections, the only way DHH will be able to balance its corporate
Medicaid largess within the current fiscal year is through its continued receipt of enhanced
federal DSH funds generated out of currently budgeted LSU public hospitals (DHH 2012). Yet
LSU’s response has been curiously muted for an entity which critics and supporters alike have
long ascribed it “a fourth branch of government” status. 91 Indeed, in response to the Jindal
administration lambasts of LSU’s poor budget performance, LSU President John Lombardi
issued a memo requesting LSU system administrators not to complain about the austere
dimensions of the state budget. As a result, virtually no one publicly commented to the Jindal
administration’s recent release of its Fiscal Year 2012-13 state budget (Barrow 2012c). Likewise,
aside from non-judgmental responses to DHH’s obvious re-appropriation of LSU-HCSD’s 201112 budget, LSU officials remain tight lipped (Farris 2012, Barrow 2012d).
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See http://louisiana.gov/Government/Executive_Branch/#boardsandcommissions. The LSU Board of Supervisors
is the largest of Louisiana’s more than 500 appointed boards and commissions.
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While DHH Secretary Greenstein smarts from public criticism in response to LSUHCSD’s draconian budget cuts, both Greenstein and LSU officials seem all too eager to
outsource to private providers vital healthcare functions, and indeed graduate medical education
programs that were once the primary domain of the state-run Charity Hospital system. Though
Governor Jindal charged that LSU hadn’t made significant budget reductions from the beginning
of the current fiscal year, LSU’s Executive Budget cuts of key hospital and medical school
programs leave critics and supporters alike to wonder whether LSU might be more aligned with
Jindal’s private enterprise-paradise. LSU-HCSD within the 2011-12 Fiscal Year is proceeding to
complete the elimination of obstetrics, pediatrics, hyperbarics and hospital dentistry programs.
Documents detail that FY 2011-12 expenditure reductions will reduce LSU-HCSD’s budget by
$63 million (LSU System 2011, p. 1146). LSU also appears to be on track to meet its 2013
deadline to shutdown its Baton Rouge Charity Hospital, the Earl K. Long Medical Center.
LSU public hospital system workers, patients and the communities in which they are
located increasingly are becoming bewildered over how state officials could mete out such
damaging budgetary reductions – and how LSU officials have been largely silent in the face of
them. Indeed, so many key hospital services are being discontinued that their raison d’être is now
in question. Most endangered is Louisiana’s once acclaimed Charity Hospital network. 92
More than one hundred health and public safety professionals along with current and
former LSU and Charity Hospital patients demanded the reversal of planned cuts during a special
meeting of the New Orleans City Council. Councilmember Susan Guidry posed what she called
“the $64 question … the elephant in the room kind of thing” which had to send a chill onto LSU:
“How is it that the state is going to be able to run this mega hospital if
they can’t even run our little Interim Hospital now?” (New Orleans
City Council 2012).
92
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Questions as to whether LSU still has the ability to uphold its 1997 commitment to
provide safety net hospital and clinical healthcare to the poor and uninsured of Louisiana, much
less be able to fulfill their graduate medical education transformation with its new University
Medical Center project cannot be overstated. For possibly the first time in the state’s almost 200
year history, state general funds are proposed not to be appropriated to support the historic
Charity Hospital system. Instead, true to the model of governance Governor Jindal has long
espoused, proposed funding for the LSU Health public hospital system is slated to come from
non-state government sources. Indeed, the “means of financing” of the proposed Fiscal Year
2012-13 Louisiana Executive Budget relies heavily on the sale of state assets, including the sale
of the former New Orleans Adolescent Hospital (NOAH)! And the balance of what would
normally be constituted with state general fund appropriations for the LSU/Charity system
proposes to utilize unspent budget balances of close to fifty local and state agencies and support
funds – including unspent Hurricane Katrina disaster recovery funds under the Gulf Opportunity
Zone Act of 2005 that were meant for currently unmet needs in New Orleans. 93
To add insult to injury, the collected funds purportedly meant to cover the loss of state
general fund allocations for LSU/Charity public hospital operations are being directed not to
LSU-HCSD directly, but to a Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH)-controlled
“Medical Assistance Trust Fund.” This aspect alone suggests that LSU-HCSD again will face a
raid on their Fiscal Year 2012-13 budget as they experienced during the middle of the Fiscal
Year 2011-12! Indeed, LSU Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs Dr. Fred Cerise said that LSU is
anticipating that DHH will take about $50 million in LSU DSH-eligible funds to gain enhanced
millions of federal matching dollars to benefit DHH’s private medical vendor program. 94
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Drawing from both known medical literature and personal experience, Orleans Parish
Criminal Court Judge Arthur Hunter, who presides over New Orleans special mental health court
said “everyone suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, whether their house flooded or not”
(Hudson 2009). As confirmed by the public testimony of New Orleans top public safety and
medical professionals, the current state of New Orleans healthcare is precarious in the wake of
recent state budget cuts to the LSU Interim Hospital. Several leaders said that a mental health
system that was just emerging from the closure of Charity Hospital following Hurricane Katrina
now is threatened with undoing the progress since the storm (New Orleans City Council 2012).
On top of severe Fiscal Year 2011-12 budget cuts to LSU/Charity public hospitals,
their impact, along with the projected loss of state general fund support for the coming fiscal
year are also anticipated to wallop LSU Health Sciences Center New Orleans graduate medical
education and allied health programs. Chancellor Dr. Larry Hollier, in a presentation to the
Louisiana House Appropriations Committee March 27, 2012, said the continued drop in state
general fund appropriations since 2007 no longer can be mitigated with either federal stimulus
funding (due to end with the FY 2011-12 budget year) and rising tuition costs on students – and
not suffer the loss of the same students and LSUHSC health clinical access for patients, both
levels of which have doubled since Hurricane Katrina. Indeed, unlike its Charity Hospital system
counterpart, LSUHSC New Orleans said Hollier is facing from about $25 million to almost $37
million in budget cuts for Fiscal Year 2012-13, based on anticipated reductions in state college
and university formula funding from the State Board of Regents, and the expected reduction in
health services at LSU Interim and other LSU/Charity system hospitals, curtailing needed
graduate medical education residency training opportunities for LSUHSC New Orleans students
(LSUHSC 2012; Louisiana House Appropriations Committee 2012).
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Whatever the level of severity of LSU/Charity public hospital and LSUHSC New
Orleans cuts have on local and state healthcare, the manner and timing of their occurrence has
created an unprecedented reversal in “Louisiana’s way” of state healthcare and social insurance.
Indeed, unless the Louisiana State Legislature fully asserts its constitutional and budget
authority, Governor Bobby Jindal will likely make good on his most ideologically neoliberal /
neoconservative pledge made when he first became Louisiana’s health secretary sixteen years
ago, to slay sacred cows and transform Louisiana’s”focus from being a [public] health care
provider to a wise purchaser of [privatized healthcare]” (Shuler 1996b).
Salvaggio’s (1992) characterization that New Orleans’ Charity Hospital during the
early and mid-1980s was in its “death rattles,” unfortunately has become far worse today. Mother
Charity then was at least open. And the former University Hospital, now known as LSU Interim,
is but at a quarter of its pre-storm capacity, and is likely to face further drastic service cuts.
Charity’s now-shuttered downtown New Orleans hospital, the emblematic anchor of
iconic populist Huey P. Long’s Share Our Wealth commitment to the poor and dispossessed has
literally become a shadow of its former self, even at its austere status of the time of Hurricane
Katrina, to gravely portend to New Orleans a profound lack of an intact healthcare safety net.
Charity and its inspired network of Louisiana public hospitals – a holdover remnant of
Keynesian New Deal-era policies – have endured through decades of institutional neglect and
cannibalization of their assets for private medical interests. They now face perhaps their own
death rattles – by authorities taking advantage of the epic catastrophe sparked by Hurricane
Katrina through the paradigm of disaster capitalism – to permanently supplant Charity
Hospital’s historic mission in favor of medical neoliberalism.

142

References
Abercrombie, Nicholas, Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner. 1994. The Penguin DICTIONARY OF
SOCIOLOGY. Third Edition. London: Penguin Books.
Adams, Chris. 1995a, August 13. “Medicaid Madness.” The Times-Picayune.
Adams, Chris. 1995b, August 13. “Private Operations benefit from state’s rule change: Charity system is
the big loser.” The Times-Picayune.
Adams Project Management (ADAMS). 2005a. “Site and Facility Master Plan Consolidation of Charity
and University Hospitals, Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans. 19-610-03B-13 Part 01 Site
Code: 1-36-036.” For LSU Health Care Services Division.
Adams Project Management (ADAMS). 2005b, November. “Executive Summary excerpted from
EMERGENCY FACILITIES ASSESSMENT University and Charity Hospitals, New Orleans, Louisiana
for LSU Health Care Services Division.
Adams Project Management (ADAMS). 2007, May. “MCLNO Strategic and Campus Master Plan Update
Pre-Design Study.” No. 19-610-03B-13 Part 2 Site Code 1-36-049.
Advisory Group on Forced Evictions (AGFE). 2010, November. “Mission Report to New Orleans, United
States.” An Advisory Group to UN-Habitat. United Nations.
Advocates for Environmental Human Rights (AEHR). 2011. “Protecting the Human Right to Return with
Dignity & Justice After Hurricane Katrina (paper series).” Accessed December 16, 2011 via
http://www.ehumanrights.org/ourwork_residents_HRAAGCR.html.
Airline Ambassadors International (AAI). 2008. “National Emergency Relief: Hurricane Katrina Relief.”
PowerPoint Presentation. Accessed October 20, 2011 via http://www.airlineamb.org.
Alexander, Kelly King. 1993, December 28. “Was it the year of…Health Care?” The Greater Baton
Rouge Business Report.
Alfred, Dana. 2007, August 7. “Where Did They Go and Are They Coming Back?” An analysis of
displaced Louisianans living in other states. For the Louisiana Family Recovery Corps.
Alpert, Bruce. 2011, November 23. “Louisiana won’t lose $560+ million in federal Medicaid
reimbursements.” The Times-Picayune.
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP). 2008, September 25. “Health Reform in Louisiana:
Options and Open Questions.” Keith Hearle, President, Verité Healthcare Consulting, LLC.
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 2006, August 9. Abandoned & Abused: Orleans Parish
Prisoners in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina.
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 2007, August. “BROKEN PROMISES: 2 Years after Katrina.”

143

American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) 2006, August. “Emergency Medicine One Year
After Katrina.” American College of Emergency Physicians.
American Press. 2012a, February 8. “City Council may join effort to ask state to spare Moss Regional.”
American Press. 2012b, February 18. “Memorial to take over Moss Regional’s pediatric clinic.”
Amnesty International (AI). 2010, April. “Un-Natural Disaster: Human Rights in the Gulf Coast.”
Demand Dignity Campaign.
Anderson, Ed. 1999, May 4. “Sprinkler deadline extended by House.” The Times-Picayune.
Anderson, Ron J. MD., Paul J. Boumbulian, DPA, MPH and S. Sue Pickens, MEd. 2004, December.
“The Role of U.S. Public Hospitals in Urban Health.” Academic Medicine. Vol. 79. No. 12: 1162-1168.
Andonie, Dr. Jack. 2011, May 5. “In Defense of the Big Charity Plan.” The Hayride.com. Downloaded
November 18, 2011 via http://www.thehayride.com/2011/05/in-defense-of-the-big-charity-plan/.
Andrews, Travis. 2011, March 21. “Post-Katrina mental illness may lead to crime, goes untreated.” The
Louisiana Weekly.
The Associated Press (AP). 2003, December 5. “Feds question La.’s use of hospital bailout dollars.” via
The Advocate.
The Associated Press (AP). 2005a, September 1. “New Orleans hospitals desperate as food runs low.” via
USA Today.
The Associated Press (AP).2005b, October 5. “LSU calls New Orleans’ charity hospitals unsalvageable.”
via The Advocate.
The Associated Press (AP).2005c, October 6. “Navy hospital in N.O. reports few patients, expected to
leave soon.” via The Advocate.
The Associated Press (AP).2005d, October 12. “Harsh urban renewal in New Orleans.” via MSNBC.
Downloaded November 12, 2011 via http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9678167/ns/us_news-life/t/harshurban-renewal-new-orleans/.
The Associated Press (AP). 2005e, December 10. “Report slams medical response to Katrina.” via USA
Today. Downloaded October 15, 2011 via http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-12-10-medicalresponse_x.htm.
Bahamonde, Marty J. 2005, October 20. “Testimony of Marty J. Bahamonde Office of Public Affairs,
Federal Emergency Management Agency before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs.” United States Senate, Washington, DC.
Baldwin, Steve, MD., Andria Robinson, MBA, Pam Barloe, BS, Crayton A. Fargason, Jr, MD, MM,
FAAP. 2006, May. “Interstate Transfer of Pediatrics Patients During Hurricane Katrina.” Pediatrics. Vol.
117. No. 5. via University of New Orleans. September 13, 2009.

144

Barkemeyer, Brian M., MD, FAAP. 2006, May 1. “Practicing Neonatology in a Blackout: The University
Hospital NICU in the Midst of Hurricane Katrina: Caring for Children Without Power or Water.”
Pediatrics. Accessed September 13, 2009 via
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/117/5/S2/S369.
Barringer, Felicity. 2006, January 23. “Long After the Storm, Shortages Overwhelm New Orleans’s Few
Hospitals.” The New York Times.
Barrouquere, Brett. 2003, June 23. “Senate approves plan to give LSU more control of hospitals.” The
Advocate.
Barrow, Bill. 2009, April 18. “Citizens hoping to sway FEMA’s hospital payout.” The Times-Picayune.
Barrow, Bill. 2011a, January 31. “University Medical Center now forecast to open in lower Mid-City in
2015.” The Times-Picayune.
Barrow, Bill. 2011b, May 2. “LSU officials tell skeptical legislators University Medical Center can be
elite regional hospital.” The Times-Picayune.
Barrow, Bill. 2011c, September 8. “Debt-free University Medical Center plan weighed.” The TimesPicayune.
Barrow, Bill. 2011d, September 12. “University Medical Center’s success hinges on web of financial
unknowns.” The Times-Picayune.
Barrow, Bill. 2011e, September 16. “Louisiana to debate yearly payout for University Medical Center.”
The Times-Picayune.
Barrow, Bill. 2011f, September 16. “Legislative panel approves new teaching hospital construction.” The
Times-Picayune.
Barrow, Bill. 2011g, November 3. “Medicaid transition to private networks to begin Dec. 15, state health
chief says.” The Times-Picayune.
Barrow, Bill. 2012a, February 3. “LSU making $15 million in cuts to Interim LSU Public Hospital.” The
Times-Picayune.
Barrow, Bill. 2012b, February 6. “Louisiana health secretary pledges to help New Orleans maintain
mental health services amid cuts.” The Times-Picayune.
Barrow, Bill. 2012c, February 9. “LSU president: Jindal ‘would appreciate’ no complaints on budget.”
The Times-Picayune.
Barrow, Bill. 2012d, February 14. “Legislative panel approves new teaching hospital construction.” The
Times-Picayune.
Bello, Walden. 2006, May 26. “The Rise of the Relief and Reconstruction Complex.” Focus on the
Global South. Transnational Institute.

145

Berggren, Ruth E. M.D. and Tyler J. Curiel, M.D., M.P.H. 2006, April 13. “After the Storm – Health
Care Infrastructure in Post-Katrina New Orleans.” The New England Journal of Medicine. 354;15: 15491551.
Blanco, Kathleen Babineaux. 2006, January 19. “Emergency Procedures for Repairing, Renovating, or
Replacing State Owned Buildings Damaged by Hurricane Katrina or Rita.” State of Louisiana Governor
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco Executive Order No. KBB 2006-1.
BlitchKnevel Architects (BKA). 2007a, July 18. “Reopen Charity Psychiatric ward.” State Project #01107-05B-13 – Part G4.
BlitchKnevel Architects (BKA). 2007a, August 13. “Reoccupy Charity Psychiatric ward.” BlitchKnevel
Architects. State Project #01-107-05B-13 – Part G4.
Blueprint Louisiana. 2007, July 30. Position Paper on Health Care Reform Proposals. Accessed via
http://www.blueprintlouisiana.org/assets/docs/healthcarepositionpaper.pdf.
Blueprint Louisiana. 2010, March 19. “Blueprint Supports LSU/OLOL Health Care Partnership.” News
Release.
Blueprint Louisiana. 2011, February. “Goal #4: Transition Louisiana’s Charity Hospitals to PublicPrivate Partnerships.” In “Blueprint for Louisiana’s “Financial Cliff” Year.”
Bodenheimer, Thomas. 2005, November/December. “The Political Divide in Health Care: A Liberal
Perspective. Health Affairs. Vol. 24, No. 6: 1426-1435.
Bolar, Luke. 2009, June 1. “Congressmen Scalise, Cao and Mica Push to Free Up FEMA Funding
Backlog.” News Release. Steve Scalise, United States House of Representatives, Louisiana.
Borocz, Jozsef. 1997, June. “Social change with sticky features and the failures of
modernization.”Innovations: The European Journal of Social Sciences. Vol. 10. No. 2: 161-169.
Bowman, Steve, Lawrence Kapp and Amy Belasco. 2005, September 19. “Hurricane Katrina: DOD
Disaster Response.” CRS Report for Congress. Order Code RL 33095. Congressional Research Service.
The Library of Congress. Washington, DC.
Brevard, Sidney B., MD, MPH, Sharon L. Weintraub, MD, MPH, James B. Aiken, MD, MHA, Edward
B. Halton, MD, Juan C. Duchesne, MD, Norman E. McSwain, Jr., MD, John P. Hunt, MD, MPH and
Alan B. Marr, MD. 2008, November. “Analysis of Disaster Response Plans and the Aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned From a Level 1 Trauma Center.” The Journal of TRAUMA Injury,
Infection, and Critical Care.
Bring New Orleans Back Commission Urban Planning Committee (BNOB) 2006, January 11. “Action
Plan for New Orleans: The New American City.” Wallace Roberts & Todd, LLC – Master Planner.
Bring New Orleans Back Commission Health and Social Services Committee (BNOB Health). 2006,
January 18. “Report and Recommendations to the Commission.”

146

Bring New Orleans Back Commission Health and Social Services Committee (BNOB Health). 2006,
January 18. ”Members and Meeting Participants.” Attached to “Report and Recommendations to the
Commission.”
Broderick, Matthew. 2006, February 10. Statement of Brigadier General Matthew Broderick Director for
Operations Coordination United States Department of Homeland Security. Before the United States
Senate, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Washington, DC.
Brookings Institution. 2008, January 14. “A Human Rights Perspective for Major Natural Disasters.”
Walter Kalin. Brookings Institution. Downloaded March 25, 2010 via
http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/0114_disasters_kalin.aspx?p=1.
Brown, Andrew J. 1981. Community Health: An Introduction for the Health Professional. Minneapolis.
Burgess Publishing Company.
Brown, Phil. 1989. Perspectives in Medical Sociology. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.
Brydon-Miller, Mary, Davydd Greenwood and Patricia Maguire. 2003. “Why Action Research?” Action
Research. 1; 9. Downloaded. October 24, 2009 via http://arj.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/1/1/9/.
Burdeau, Cain. 2009, July 14. “Honore: Ex-La. Governor halted hospital reopening.” The Associated
Press.
Butler, Elisabeth. 2003, December 22. “Financially strapped Louisiana state hospital system concerned
about federal windfall funding.” New Orleans City Business.
Butler, Michael K. MD, MHA, CPE. 2005, October 5. Letter to Robert E. Suter, DO, MHA, FACEP,
President American College of Emergency Physicians. From Michael K. Butler, Chief Medical Officer,
LSU Health Care Services Division.
Calderon-Abbo, Jose, M.D. 2008, March. “The Long Road Home: Rebuilding Public Inpatient
Psychiatric Services in Post-Katrina New Orleans.” Psychiatric Services. Vol. 59, No. 3. 304-309.
Callimachi, Rukmini. 2006, February 23. “New Orleans’ Uninsured Get Makeshift Care.” The Associated
Press.
Cao, Anh “Joseph.” 2009, April 23. Letter to The Honorable Barack Obama President of the United
States of America. Congress of the United States. House of Representatives Honorable Anh “Joseph”
Cao.
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP). 2007, April 17. “Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
says federal health care redesign model provides little help to Louisiana.” Accessed April 27, 2008 via
http://stayhealthyla.org/home/alerts/view/126/.
Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR). 2009, July 26-31. “International Human Rights Obligations and
Post-Katrina Housing Policies.” Briefing Paper to the Technical Experts for the Advisory Group on
Forced Evictions United States Mission. Center for Constitutional Rights and the Loyola New Orleans
College of Law.

147

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). 2010. “Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital
(DSH) Reports Overview.” Downloaded March 22, 2010 via
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidDSHReports/.
Cerise, Dr. Frederick P. 2004a, December 16. “Louisiana’s Report on the Uninsured.” Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals. Presented to the Governor’s Health Care Reform Panel.
Cerise, Dr. Frederick P. 2004b, June 24. Letter: “To Governor Blanco and Members of the Governor’s
Health Care Reform Panel.” State of Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals.
Cerise, Dr. Frederick P. 2005, June. “Governor’s Health Care Reform Panel: A Report on the State of the
Mental Health Delivery System in Louisiana.” Presented to the Governor’s Health Care Reform Panel by
Frederick P. Cerise, MD, MPH. Secretary, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals.
Cerise, Dr. Frederick P. 2009, July 2. Electronic mail communication to “hospital administrators, medical
directors, and HCSD central office employees” (Dr. Mike Butler reassignment announcement). LSU
Hospitals. Baton Rouge, LA.
Cerise, Dr. Frederick P. 2012a, March 29. Electronic mail communication to Brad Ott. “Re: House
Appropriations: question about your graph/DSH.”
Cerise, Dr. Frederick P. 2012b, March 30. Electronic mail communication to Brad Ott. “Re: House
Appropriations: question about your graph/DSH.” With PowerPoint slide attached. “DSH payments
earned by state hospitals and returned to DHH.” Slide N.d.
Clark, Mary A. 2010a. “Access to Care versus Access to Coverage: What Can We Learn from the
Louisiana State Hospital Model?” World Medical & Health Policy: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 10. Downloaded
May 27, 2010 via http://www.psocommons.org/wmhp/vol2/iss1/art10/.
Clark, Mary A. 2010b, October. “Rebuilding the Past: Health Care Reform in Post-Katrina Louisiana.”
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law. Vol. 35, No. 5.
Coates, Guy. 1994, August 8. “Should state get out of hospital business?” The Advocate.
Coburn, Tom M.D. United States Senator, Oklahoma. 2006, January 27. Letter to Dr. Donald Smithburg,
CEO, LSU Health Care Services Division. United States Senate. Washington, DC.
Cohen, Deborah and Sanae Inagami. 2005b, October. “Neighborhood Effects and the Role of
Communities in Restructuring.” RAND Health Research. WR-310.
Comments from Collaborative Members. 2006, October. LSU draft comments. Louisiana Health Care
Redesign Collaborative.
Connolly, Ceci. 2005, November 25. “New Orleans Health Care Another Katrina Casualty; Loss of
Hospitals and Professionals Slows Rebuilding.” The Washington Post.
Consumers Union. 1992. How to Resolve the Health Care Crisis. Editors of Consumer Reports. Yonkers,
NY: Consumers Union.

148

Cooper, Christopher. 2005, September 8. “Old-Line Families Escape Worst of Flood and Plot the Future.”
The Wall Street Journal. Accessed via Common Dreams.org July 31, 2010 via
http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/headlines05/0908-09.htm.
Coughlin, Teresa A., M.P.H., Leighton Ku, Ph.D. and Johnny Kim. 2000, Winter. “Reforming the
Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Program.” Health Care Financing Review. Vol. 22, No. 2.
Council for A Better Louisiana (CABL). 2006a. “CABL Position on Health Care
Reform/PricewaterhouseCoopers Recommendations.”
Council for A Better Louisiana (CABL). 2006b, May 22. “Who Will be the Champions of Real Health
Care Reform?” Council for A Better Louisiana.
Council for A Better Louisiana (CABL). 2006c, July 24. “On the Cusp of Real Health Care Reform, or
Not? (CABL Briefing).” Council for A Better Louisiana.
Council for A Better Louisiana (CABL). 2006d, September. “CABL’s Framework for Identifying A
Trustworthy Plan for Rebuilding Louisiana and New Orleans.” Council for A Better Louisiana.
Council for A Better Louisiana (CABL). 2007, September. “Quantum Change Agenda: Health Care
Reform.” Council for A Better Louisiana.
Council for A Better Louisiana (CABL). 2008, November 20. “A New Direction for Health Care
Reform.” CABL Wire. Council for A Better Louisiana.
Council for A Better Louisiana (CABL). 2010, February 16. “OLOL/LSU Items of Interest: Quantum
Change for Health Care.” Council for A Better Louisiana.
Cowen, Michael A. 2006, January 4. “Everyman for Himself or Crescent City Resurrection?” Chair,
Human Relations Commission, City of New Orleans. Accessed December 10, 2009 via
http://homepages.moeller.org/pastmin/missiontrips/2006/hurricanerelief/NewOrleansProject.htm.
Creswell, John W. 2007. Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches.
Second Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Creswell, John W. 2009. RESEARCH DESIGN: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods
Approaches. Third Edition. Los Angeles: Sage Publications, Inc.
Croghan, Thomas, Yee-Wei Lim and Lauren Honess-Morreale. 2005d, October. “The Public Hospital
System in Louisiana.” RAND Health Research. WR-314.
Danos, Todd. 2005, September 26. “Charity’s workers waiting for answers.” Letter to the Editor. The
Times-Picayune.
Dao, James. 2006, January 27. “Study Says 80% of New Orleans Blacks May Not Return.” The New York
Times.
Darcé, Keith. 2006, January 26. “N.O. hospital given a new lease on life.” The Times-Picayune.

149

Darcé, Keith and John Pope. 2006, January 9. “FORCED TO CHANGE: Charity Hospital, an icon in
trauma treatment and teaching, will never be the same after Katrina.” The Times-Picayune.
Davis, Matt. 2010, August 28. “Five years later, a richer, whiter New Orleans.” Salon.com. via
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2010/08/28/new_orleans_katrina_demographics.
Davis, Mike. 2006, March 26. “Who Is Killing New Orleans?” Z-Net / Z Magazine.
Davis, Tom. 2005, October 27. “Opening Statement of Chairman Tom Davis, Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina Hearing on the
Military’s Role.” United States House of Representatives. Washington, DC.
deBoisblanc, Ben, MD. 2006, November. “Humanism: The Legacy of Hurricane Katrina.” The American
Journal of the Medical Sciences. Vol. 332. No. 5: 298-300.
Degette, 2007, March 13. Testimony of Hon. Diana Degette, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Colorado on “Post Katrina Health Care: Continuing Concerns and Immediate Needs in the New
Orleans Region.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce. United States House of Representatives. Serial No. 110-17.
de la Houssaye, J.P. 1993, March 31. “Letter to the Editor: Let’s not ‘gamble’ at Charity.” The TimesPicayune.
Decker, Bill. 2012, February 4. “UMC still has strong links to Acadiana.” Editorial. The Advertiser.
DeSalvo, Karen B., Amanda D. Hyre, Danielle C. Ompad, Andy Menke, L. Lee Tynes and Paul Muntner.
2007. “Symptoms of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in a New Orleans Workforce Following Hurricane
Katrina.” Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine. Vol. 84, No. 2: 142152.
DeSalvo, Karen B. and Eliot Sorel. 2009. “Post-Katrina New Orleans Sustaining Multi-Disciplinary
Approaches to Primary Care through Policy Reform.” Advances in Psychiatry. Vol. 3: 237-247.
Deslatte, Melinda. 2007, March 3. “Shreveport public hospital considered a model for charity system.”
The Associated Press via Nola.com.
Deslatte, Melinda. 2011, September 20. “Analysis: Debate won’t end about public hospital.” The
Associated Press.
Dethloff, Henry C., Ed.1976. HUEY P. LONG: Southern Demagogue or American Democrat? Lafayette:
University of Southwestern Louisiana.
DeWulf, Anne-Cecile, Lisa Mills, Rachel Levitan, Marlow Macht, Natasha Afonso, Jennifer Avegno and
Trevor J. Mills. 2007, April 28. “Prevalence of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Following Hurricane
Katrina.” Academic Emergency Medicine. 14(5-Sup1): 134.
Dick, Andrew and Soeren Mattke. 2005a, October. “The Level of State Involvement in the
Reconstruction of the Municipal Health System.” RAND Health Research. WR-308.

150

Donze, Frank and James Varney. 2005, October 1. “Nagin introduces his own rebuilding team for city.”
The Times-Picayune.
Donze, Frank and Gordon Russell. 2006, January 11. “4 MONTHS TO DECIDE.” The Times-Picayune.
Dussé, Barry. 2005, September 21. Electronic communication between Barry Dusse and Charles Castille.
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals via Louisiana Public Records Act request of the Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals, Secretary Fred Cerise’s office. By K. Brad Ott. August 17, 2006.
Dyer, Scott. 2003, August 1. “Kyle says charity hospitals failing.” The Advocate.
EP&P Consulting, Inc. 2004, April 23. “Low-Income Uninsured Focus Groups Final Report.” Health
Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) Waiver. EP&P Consulting, Inc. for the Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals.
Eaton, Leslie. 2007, July 24. “New Orleans Recovery is Slowed by Closed Hospitals.” The New York
Times.
Eggler, Bruce. 2007, August 11. “Ochsner chief disputes need for new hospital.” The Times-Picayune.
Eggler, Bruce. 2008, March 15. “LSU unit opens 20 psychiatric beds.” The Times-Picayune.
Eggler, Bruce. 2011, June 2. “New Orleans City Council votes to close streets in hospital footprint.” The
Times-Picayune.
Elie, Lolis Eric. 2006, March 24. “City needs Charity to return.” The Times-Picayune.
Emergency Support Function #8 (ESF #8). 2003, January. “ESF #8 – Health and Medical Services
Annex.” United States Department of Health and Human Services.
Emergency Support Function #8 (ESF #8). 2008, January. “ESF #8 – Health and Medical Services
Annex.” United States Department of Health and Human Services.
Evans, Desiree. 2009, July 17. “New Orleans: A city without Charity.” Facing South. Institute for
Southern Studies. Accessed July 30, 2010 via http://www.southernstudies.org/2009/07/post-46.html.
44 CFR Part 206. 2009, August 31. “Arbitration for Public Assistance Determinations Related to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Disasters DR-1603, DR-1604, DR-1605, DR-1606, and DR-1607).” United
States Department of Homeland Security. Federal Emergency Management Agency. [Docket ID FEMA2009-0006]. In Federal Register. Vol. 74. No. 167. Rules and Regulations. 44761-44769.
504 Healthnet.org. 2010. “ABOUT US: The New Orleans Health Care Network.” Accessed March 28,
2010 via http://504healthnet.org/about.html.
Farris, Meg. 2012, February 7. “City leaders worried that mental health services may run out of cash.”
WWL-TV New Orleans.

151

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 2005, September 16. “More Than $760 Million In
Federal Dollars To Help Louisiana.” Downloaded March 25, 2010 via
http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=18922.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 2009, October 30. “Response of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency to Arbitration Request of the Louisiana Facility Planning and Control,
State of Louisiana. Repair/Replacement of Charity Hospital, PW #2175, FEMA-1603-DR-LA. DOCKET
# CBCA-1741-FEMA. Received by the United States Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (U.S. CBCA).
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 2011. “Louisiana Post-Katrina Recovery: Six Years
of Upward Momentum – Health Care: Katrina and Rital Recovery 2005-2011.” Downloaded October 25,
2011 via http://www/fema.gov/hazard/hurricane/2005katrina/6year/healthcare/healthcare.shtm.
Ferdinand, Keith C. MD, FACC. 2006, February. “Public Health and Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned
and What We Can Do Now.” Journal of the National Medical Association. Vol. 98, No. 2: 271-274.
FierceHealthcare. 2011, June 21. “Hospital vs. medical center: Consumers favor ‘hospital’ title.”
Downloaded November 18, 2011 via http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/print/node/58929.
Fisher, Jill A., PhD. 2007, Spring. “Coming Soon to a Physician Near You: Medical Neoliberalism and
Pharmaceutical Clinical Trials.” Harvard Health Policy Review. Vol. 8, No. 1, 61-70.
Fishman, Linda E. and James D. Bentley. 1997, July / August. “The Evolution of Support for Safety-Net
Hospitals.” Health Affairs. Vol. 16, No. 4: 30-47.
Flynn, George. 2006, September. “’Charity’ Suffers Long: Emergency Medicine Revives The Spirit of
Centuries-Old New Orleans Institution.” Annals of Emergency Medicine. Vol. 48, No. 3: 309-311.
Fothergill, Alice. 2003, Autumn. “The Stigma of Charity: Gender, Class, and Disaster Assistance.” The
Sociological Quarterly. Vol. 44. No. 4: 659-680.
Franco, Crystal, Eric Toner, Richard Waldhorn, Beth Maldin, Tara O’Toole and Thomas V. Inglesby.
2006. “Systemic Collapse: Medicare Care in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.” Biosecurity and
Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science. Vol. 4, No. 2.
Freemantle, Tony. 2005, September 18. “Trapped hospital workers kept most patients alive.” The
Houston Chronicle.
Freund, Peter E. S., and Meredith B. McGuire. 1995. Health, Illness, and the Social Body: A Critical
Sociology. Second Edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Frey, John. 2005, November. “Big Charity in New Orleans.” British Journal of General Practice.
Frink, Chris. 2003, October 15. “Ieyoub backs Blanco, cites Jindal’s inexperience.” The Advocate.
Frink, Chris and Scott Dyer. 2003, November 11. “Political consultant disputes “negative ad”
characterization.” The Advocate.

152

From the Lake to the River: The New Orleans Coalition for Legal Aid & Disaster Relief. 2005. “Report to
Mayor Nagin’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission: An Alternative Vision for Rebuilding,
Redevelopment & Reconstruction.”
Gallegos, Chris. 2009, August 6. “Homeland Security Dept. to Establish Arbitration Panels to Resolve
Disputes Over Hurricane Recovery Projects: Cochran & Wicker Welcome Move as New tool for
Communities to Overcome Storm Woes.” News Release. United States Senator Thad Cochran,
Mississippi. Downloaded October 22, 2011 via http://www.cochran.senate.gov/press/pr080609a.html.
Gill, James. 1995, August 16. “Dickens, Meet Louisiana Medicaid.” Op-Ed Columnist. The TimesPicayune.
Gill, James. 2011, February 9. “Hurricane Katrina changes becoming permanent.” Op-Ed Columnist. The
Times-Picayune.
Gratz, Roberta Brandes. 2011, April 27. “Why Was New Orleans’s Charity Hospital Allowed to Die?”
The Nation.
Gray, Bradford H. PhD and Kathy Hebert, MD, MMM, MPH. 2007. “Hospitals in Hurricane Katrina:
Challenges Facing Custodial Institutions in a Disaster.” Journal of Health Care for the Poor and
Underserved. 18: 283-298.
Greater New Orleans Community Health Connection (GNOCHC). 2010, September 30. “GNOCHC??
What’s that?” Powerpoint presentation.
Griggs, Ted. 2010, March. “Charity-FEMA Award has Broad Implications.” Louisiana Medical News.
Guin, Cecile C., Linda C. Robinson, Ezra C. Boyd and Marc L. Levitan. 2009. “Health Care and Disaster
Planning: Understanding the Impact of Disasters on the Medical Community.” Louisiana State Medical
Society Educational Research Foundation. www.healthcaredisasterplanning.org.
Gusman, Marlin N. 2008, January 16. Exhibit 10: Sworn Affidavit. Sheriff Orleans Parish. In Leblanc et.
al v. Thomas et al. 2008. LeBlanc, Melvin, Naomi Faulkin, Lucille Moore, Ronald Newman, Delilah
Hall, Marlene Dumas, and Betty Washington, Plaintiffs Versus Dwayne Thomas, Chief Executive
Officer, Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans, Larry Hollier, Chancellor, LSU Health Sciences
Center – New Orleans, LSU Health Sciences Center – New Orleans, and Dr. Michael K. Butler, Acting
Chief Executive Officer, LSU Health Care Services Division, Defendants. Civil District Court for the
Parish of Orleans. State of Louisiana. Number 08-548. Division N-8. January 17, 2008.
Gyan, Joe Jr. 1996, April 27. “Livingston, Jindal tout resolution for La. Medicaid.” The Advocate.
Haber, Bill. 2006, March 26. “Dozens fight New Orleans hospital closure.” USA Today/The Associated
Press.
Hammer, David. 2009, June 2. “Meeting in tattered Charity aims to cut FEMA red tape.” The TimesPicayune.
Harrison, Jeffrey P. and Christopher Sexton. 2004, July-September. “The paradox of the not-for-profit
hospital.” Health Care Management. 23(3): 192-204.

153

Hartley, Smith W. 2012, January-February. “One on One: Roxane A. Townsend, MD.” Healthcare
Journal of New Orleans.
Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of NEOLIBERALISM. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hasten, Mike. 2008, December 5. “State plan would close Huey P. Long as in-patient hospital.” The
Town Talk. Alexandria, LA.
Head, Stacy. 2008, November 19. Electronic mail stream from Arnie Fielkow to Stacy Head. New
Orleans City Council.
Henderson, Nancy. 2009, January. “Bringing New Orleans Back: Kim Boyle defends her clients – and her
hometown.” Louisiana Super Lawyers 2009.
Hill, Lance. 2008, January 26. “Interview of Lance Hill on Hurricane Katrina and Racial and Class Equity
Issues.” Transcript. WTUL-FM Radio. Tulane University.
Hilsen, Anne Inga. 2006. “And they shall be known by their deeds: Ethics and politics in action research.”
Action Research. 4; 23. Downloaded. October 24, 2009 via
http://arj.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/4/1/23.
Holden, Melvin L. “Kip”. 2005, September 28. “Recoverying from Hurricane Katrina: Responding to the
Immediate Needs of Its Victims.” Testimony of Mayor-President Melvin L. “Kip” Holden. City of Baton
Rouge, Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana. United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Government Affairs. Washington, DC.
Hollier Deposition. 2009, June 15. “Deposition of Larry Hollier.” In Melvin Leblanc et al Versus Dwayne
Thomas et al. at the office of Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips. Baton Rouge, LA.
Hollier, Larry, MD, FACS, FACC, FRCS. 2010. “Partnership.” In Creating Value: 2010 Annual Report.
Association of Academic Health Centers.
Hong, Seung. 2007, May 17. “City Council Addresses the New Orleans Healthcare Crisis.” The Council,
City of New Orleans. Shelley Midura, Councilmember District A. Press Release.
Honoré, Lt. Gen. Russel L. 2008, November. “Health Disparities: Barriers to a Culture of Preparedness.”
Journal of Public Health Management Practice.
Honoré, Lt. Gen. Russel L., Dr. James Moises, Monique Harden, Nathalie Walker, Tracie L. Washington
and K. Brad Ott. 2009, June 10. Letter to The Honorable Barack Obama President of the United States of
America. Louisiana United for Healthcare Delivery.
Honoré, Lt. Gen. Russel L. 2010. “Curriculum Vitae: Russel L. Honoré Lieutenant General United States
Army (Retired)”. Accessed October 18, 2011 via:

http://www.generalhonore.com/Documents/Russel_L%20_Honore_Curriculum_Vitae_2010.pdf.
Horton, Eleanor. 2007. “Neoliberalism and the Australian Healthcare System (Factory).” Conference
Presentation, 2007 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia.

154

Horwitz, Jill R. 2005, May/June. “Making Profits And Providing Care: Comparing Nonprofit, For-Profit,
and Government Hospitals.” Health Affairs. Vol. 24, No. 3, 790-801.
Houma Today.com. 2012a, January 21. “Cheers and Jeers: Jeers – No Room to Spare.” The Houma
Courier via http://www.houmatoday.com/article/20120121/OPINION/120129960.
Houma Today.com. 2012b, February 4. “Explore all the options.” Editorial. The Houma Courier via
http://www.houmatoday.com/article/20120204/OPINION/120209810?template=printpicart.
Howard, Captain Jason. 2006, April 15. Transcribed statement. Doctors Without Hospitals.
Hudson, Audrey. 2009, August 4. “Mental illness tidal wave swamps New Orleans.” The Washington
Times.
Institute for Southern Studies. (ISS). 2008, January. “Hurricane Katrina and the Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement: A Global Human Rights Perspective on a Natural Disaster.” Chris Kromm and
Sue Sturgis.
Intervention. 2009, April 16. Appeal of FEMA Project Worksheet Number 2175V3 by Facility Planning
and Control, State of Louisiana, Intervention by Parties with a Fundamental Interest in the outcome of the
FEMA Appeal.
Jacobson, Matt. 2011, June 29. “What’s in a Name? “Hospital” or “Medical Center”?” Signature
MD.com. http://www.signaturemd.com/what%E2%80%99s-in-a-name%E2%80%9Chospital%E2%80%9D-or-%E2%80%9Cmedical-center%E2%80%9D-2/.
Johnson, Allen M. Jr. 2008, December 18. “State rejects FEMA offer on N.O. hospital.” The Advocate.
Johnson, Allen M. Jr. 2009, April 16. “New La. FEMA chief vows teamwork.” The Advocate.
Johnson, Staff Sergeant John A. 2009, April 28. Sworn Affidavit, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.
Jones, Mike. 2005. “Iwo Jima’s Damage Control Team Making an Impact in New Orleans.” Navy.Mil.
September 14, 2005.
Kalin, Walter. 2008, January 14. “A Human Rights Perspective for Major Natural Disasters.” Brookings
Institution. Downloaded March 25, 2010 via
http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/0114_disasters_kalin.aspx?p=1.
Kazel, Robert. 1991, February 26. “Faith, Hope and Charity.” Health Care Annual Report 1991.
Supplement to New Orleans City Business.
Keating, Admiral Timothy J., USN. 2005, October 27. Statement before the House Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. United States House of
Representatives. Washington, DC.
Kline, David G., M.D. 2007, January. “Inside and somewhat outside Charity.” Journal of Neurosurgery.
Vol. 106: 180-188.

155

Klein, Naomi. 2007. THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York.
Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC.
Konieczko, Jill. 2008, May 22. “10 Things You Didn’t Know About Bobby Jindal.” US News and World
Report.
Krause, Mark. 1997, December. “First, Do No Harm: An Analysis of the Nonprofit Sale Acts.” UCLA
Law Review. University of California Los Angeles. 45 UCLA L. Rev. 503.
Kromm, Chris and Sue Sturgis. 2008, January. “Hurricane Katrina and the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement: A Global Human Rights Perspective on a Natural Disaster.” Institute for Southern Studies.
(ISS).
Krupa, Michelle. 2011, June 8. “Pockets of City Grow Farther Apart on Race.” The Times-Picayune.
Ku, Leighton. 2003, June 4. “State Fiscal Relief Provides an Opportunity to Safeguard Medicaid
Budgets.” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Kulkarni, Shefali. 2011, July 7. “NY Health and Hospital Corp.’s President Welcomes The Health Law’s
Promise, But Sees ‘A Very Clear Downside’ For Public Hospitals.” The KHN Interview. Kaiser Health
Network.
Kurtz, Michael L. and Morgan D. Peoples. 1990. Earl K. Long: The Saga of Uncle Earl and Louisiana
Politics. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
Laborde, Karen. 1993, May 31. “A Year of Change and Turmoil.” Health Care Special Report.
Supplement to New Orleans City Business.
Lakhani, Nina. 2011, May 8. “Fury erupts over plan to close heart hospitals for children.” The
Independent. London, UK. Accessed December 17, 2011 via http://www.independent.co.uk/lifestyle/health-and-families/health-news/fury-erupts-over-plan-to-close-heart-hospitals-for-children2280810.html.
Landreneau, Major General Bennett C. 2005, October 24. Statement of the House Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. The Adjutant General,
State of Louisiana. United States House of Representatives. Washington, DC.
Landrieu, Mitch. 2011, June 16. “Now’s the time to invest in New Orleans’ new hospital.” The TimesPicayune. Op-Ed Columnist.
Landsberg, Bill E. 2004, January. “The Nonprofit Paradox: For-Profit Business Models in the Third
Sector.” The International Journal of Not-For-Profit Law. Vol. 6, Iss. 2.
Laplante, John. 2006 February 24. “Hospital complex proposed for veterans, poor patients.” The
Advocate.
Larkin, Howard. 2007, February. “Louisiana’s Second Chance.” Hospitals & Health Networks. 54-60.

156

Leavitt, Mike. 2006, July 26. “Hardship enables opportunity’ that’s our history, our heritage.” The
Hill.com.
Leblanc et. al v. Thomas et al. 2008, January 17. LeBlanc, Melvin, Naomi Faulkin, Lucille Moore,
Ronald Newman, Delilah Hall, Marlene Dumas, and Betty Washington, Plaintiffs Versus Dwayne
Thomas, Chief Executive Officer, Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans, Larry Hollier,
Chancellor, LSU Health Sciences Center – New Orleans, LSU Health Sciences Center – New Orleans,
and Dr. Michael K. Butler, Acting Chief Executive Officer, LSU Health Care Services Division,
Defendants. Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. State of Louisiana. Number 08-548. Division
N-8.
Legislative Fiscal Office. 1997, April 16. “Transfer of Charity Hospitals from LHCA to LSU Medical
Center.” Fiscal Note Summary. Louisiana State Legislature. Baton Rouge, LA.
Legnini, Mark W. and Emily K. Waldman. 1999, August. “Academic Medical Centers and the Culture of
Local Markets.” Economic and Social Research Institute.
Leighninger, Robert D. Jr. 2007. BUILDING LOUISIANA: The Legacy of the Public Works
Administration. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi.
Levin, Aaron. 2010, May 21. “New Orleans’ MH System Still Struggling to Recover.” Psychiatric News.
Vol. 45. No. 10: 1-34.
Lipton, Eric. 2008, September 1. “FEMA is Eager to Show It Learned From Katrina.” The New York
Times.
Lipton, Eric. 2011, August 28. “With Katrina In Mind, Obama Administration Says It’s Ready for Irene.”
The New York Times.
Lister, Sarah A. 2005, September 21. “Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response.”
CRS Report for Congress. Congressional Research Service. The Library of Congress. Washington, DC.
Loewenberg, Samuel. 2005 September 10. “Louisiana looks back on a week of disaster.” The Lancet.
Vol. 366: 881-882.
Logan, John R. 2006, January. “The Impact of Katrina: Race and Class in Storm-Damaged
Neighborhoods.” Department of Sociology, Brown University.
Lombardi, John V. 2007, October 31. “’Charity Hospital’ is an inaccurate description.” The Shreveport
Times.
Long, Huey P. 1933. EVERY MAN A KING: The Autobiography of Huey P. Long. 1996 De Capo Press.
Long, Huey P. 1935. “To Members and Well-Wishers of the Share Our Wealth Society.” In Dethloff,
Henry C., Ed.1976. HUEY P. LONG: Southern Demagogue or American Democrat? Lafayette:
University of Southwestern Louisiana.
Long Legacy Project. 2010. “Huey Long’s Programs – Healthcare.” Accessed March 9, 2010 via
http://www.hueylong.com/programs/healthcare.php.

157

Louisiana Constitution. 1998, November 5. Constitutional Amendment Division 8, Section 16: Public
Hospitals. Downloaded March 15, 2011 via http://www.legis.state.la.us/lss/newWin.asp?doc=206572.
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH). 2005a, April. “Plan for Coverage, Access, and
Restructuring for Excellence (DRAFT – For Discussion Only).”
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH). 2005b, September 28. “News Release: DHH
Clarifies Refunding FEMA-Funding.”
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH). 2010, September 22. “Governor Jindal, Mayor
Landrieu Announce that Community Clinic Network will be Preserved.” News Release.
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH). 2011, October 3. “State Fiscal Year 2010/11 Year
End Financial Report & State Fiscal Year 2011/12 Program Distribution with Sub-Program Initial
Estimates.” Louisiana Medicaid Program. Division of Health Economics.
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH). 2012, February 1. “Louisiana Medicaid
Expenditure Forecast Report State Fiscal Year 2011/12.” Louisiana Medicaid Program. Division of
Health Economics.
Louisiana Family Recovery Corps. (LFRC). 2007, August 7. “Where Did They Go and Are They Coming
Back?” An analysis of displaced Louisianans living in other states. By Dana Alfred.
Louisiana Health Care Authority (LHCA). 1991, March 15. “Strategic Plan: Report to the Louisiana
Legislature.” Louisiana Health Care Authority.
Louisiana Healthcare Redesign Collaborative. 2006a. Not dated (but presumably after May 1, 2006.).
Membership List.
Louisiana Healthcare Redesign Collaborative. 2006b, May 15. “Communications Plan: Short-Term.”
Louisiana Healthcare Redesign Collaborative. 2006c, June 13. “Summary of the Immediate Issues
Discussion.”
Louisiana Healthcare Redesign Collaborative. 2006d, July 21. Meeting minutes.
Louisiana Healthcare Redesign Collaborative. 2006e, August 3. Meeting minutes.
Louisiana Healthcare Redesign Collaborative. 2006f, August 17. Meeting minutes.
Louisiana Healthcare Redesign Collaborative. 2006g, August 31. Meeting minutes.
Louisiana Hospital Association. 2003, February 19. “Recommendations to the LSU Board of Supervisors
Task Force on Indigent Care and Medical Education.”
Louisiana Hospital Association. 2006 January 6. “Policy Framework: Ensuring Access to Healthcare
Services while Redesigning Louisiana’s Healthcare Delivery System.”

158

Louisiana House Appropriations Committee 2012, March 27. “Overview and discussion regarding the
appropriations proposed on House Bill No. 1 of the 2012 Regular Session for the Department of Health
and Hospitals and the LSU Health Care Services Division.” Regular Session 2012. Louisiana Legislature.
Louisiana House Bill No. 1 (HB 1). 2011, July 1. “APPROPRIATIONS: Provide for the ordinary
operating expenses of state government for Fiscal Year 2011-2012.” Regular Session 2011. Louisiana
Legislature.
Louisiana House Bill No. 2 (HB 2). 2002. “CAPITAL OUTLAY: Provides for the comprehensive capital
outlay budget: Louisiana Health Sciences Center – Health Care Services Division (Fire alarm and
sprinkler system replacement, Charity Campus). Regular Legislative Session. 2002. p. 50.
Louisiana House Bill No. 131 (HB 131). 2005. “FEES/LICENSES/PERMITS: Provides relative to the
effective date of the Healthcare Affordability Act (Item #18).” First Extraordinary Session (FES)
Louisiana Legislature. Representative Joe Salter and Senator Joe McPherson, authors.
Louisiana House Bill No. 822 (HB 822). 2012. “FUNDS/FUNDING: Provides for the transfer and
deposit of monies among state funds (OR-$198,467,867 GF RV See Note). Legislative Digest. Regular
Legislative Session Louisiana Legislature. Representative Jim Fannin, author.
Louisiana House Concurrent Resolution No. 8 (HCR 8) 2005, November 17. Commendation of Naval
Mobile Construction Battalion 40. First Extraordinary Session (FES) Louisiana Legislature.
Louisiana House Concurrent Resolution No. 89 (HCR 89). 2006, April 19. “ADMINISTRATION
DIVISION: Urges the governor and the office of facility planning and control of the division of
administration to work with LSU to develop a plan to use a portion of the Medical Center of New Orleans
on an interim basis.” Regular Session. Louisiana State Legislature. Representative Ken Odinet, author.
Louisiana House Concurrent Resolution No. 127 (HCR 127). 2006, June 21. “HEALTH CARE: Creates
the Louisiana Health Care Redesign Collaborative.” Regular Session. Louisiana State Legislature.
Representative Sydnie Mae Durand, author.
Louisiana House Fiscal Division (LHFD). 2003, July 28. “Fiscal Year 2003-2004: Fast Facts and Talking
Points.” Louisiana House of Representatives. House Fiscal Division.
Louisiana House Fiscal Division (LHFD). 2004, July 30. “Fiscal Year 2004-2005: Fast Facts and Talking
Points.” Louisiana House of Representatives. House Fiscal Division.
Louisiana House Fiscal Division (LHFD). 2005, August 1. “Fiscal Year 2005-2006: Fast Facts and
Talking Points.” Louisiana House of Representatives.
Louisiana House Fiscal Division (LHFD). 2012, March 27. “House Committee on Appropriations FY
12-13 Executive Budget Review. LSU Health Care Services Division/Health Sciences Centers.”
Louisiana House of Representatives. Mark Antoon, presenter.
Louisiana Public Health Institute (LPHI). 2005, November 10. “Framework for a Healthier Greater New
Orleans.” Greater New Orleans Health Planning Group.

159

Louisiana Public Records Act request. 2006, March 3. To Donald Smithburg, Chief Executive Officer,
LSU Health Care Services Division. Extract of Lease/Option/Amendment (E-MED tents purchase,
Elmwood Medical Center, Lord & Taylor Department Store leases).
Louisiana Senate Bill No. 246. 2006. “MEDICAID: Provides for a common payment methodology for
Medicaid reimbursement for hospitals.” Regular Legislative Session. Louisiana State Senate. Senator Joe
McPherson, author.
Louisiana Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 (SCR 27) Report. 2003, February 14. “Report of SCR 27 of
the Regular Session Study Committee.” Submitted to Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget, House
Committee on Health and Welfare, Senate Committee on Health and Welfare. Louisiana State
Legislature.
Louisiana Senate Concurrent Resolution 95 (SCR95) 2004, October 19. “HEALTH/HOSPITALS DEPT:
Establishes a framework for permanent regional health care consortiums designed to continue the work
begun by the regional health care summits called by the governor in 2004.” Senator Joe McPherson,
author. Louisiana State Senate.
Louisiana Senate Concurrent Resolution 99 (SCR 99). 2006, June 19. “HEALTH: Acknowledges,
encourages and supports the Memorandum of Understanding between the VA and LSU which explores
the opportunity of jointly constructing a medical facility in the city of New Orleans.” Senator Diana
Bajoie, author. Louisiana State Senate.
Louisiana Senate Concurrent Resolution 76 (SCR 76). 2007 June 28. “FUNDS/FUNDING: Approves the
business plan submitted by the office of facility planning and control within the division of administration
for the new Medical Center of Louisiana in New Orleans.” Senator Donald Hines, author. Louisiana State
Senate.
Louisiana State Medical Society (LSMS). 2006. “Health Access Louisiana: A plan for healthcare
coverage reform.”
Louisiana State Office of Facility Planning and Control (FPC). 2009, September 30. Request for
Arbitration. ATTN: FEMA Arbitration Administrator. U.S. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals.
Washington, DC. In Re: FEMA PW No. 2175 (Versions 0-3) and Related Matters. State of Louisiana.
FIPS#:000UXL4N-00. FEMA Disaster #: 1603. Jerry W. Jones, Assistant Commissioner.
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2003. “Navigating the
Transformation: The Five R’s of a Healthier Louisiana.” 2003 LSU Health Care Services Division
Annual Report. Baton Rouge, LA.
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2004. “A Commitment to Serve:
Facing and Overcoming Challenges.” 2004 LSU Health Care Services Division Annual Report. Baton
Rouge, LA.
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2005. “LSU Hospitals & Clinics
ON the MOVE.” 2005 LSU Health Care Services Division Annual Report. Baton Rouge, LA.
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2006a. “PriceWaterhouse
Coopers Report – Response.”

160

Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2006b. “Comments on the
Medical Home Model As a Core Concept in Health Care Reform Legislation.”
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2006c. “Comments on Leavitt
Proposal.”
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2006d, March 25. “LSU Health
Care Services Division statement concerning the Rally to Save Charity Hospital.”
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2006e. “REBIRTH.” 2006 LSU
Health Care Services Division Annual Report. Baton Rouge, LA.
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2007a, May. “LSU Comments
on PAR Report.”
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2007b, July 30. “Comments on
Blueprint Louisiana’s Health Care Recommendations.”
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2007c, August 1. “Forty-Five
Years of Studies: Construction of a New Public Hospital in New Orleans.”
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2007d, August 8. “The Closure
of the Charity Hospital Building.”
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2007e, November 9. “LSU
Interim Hospital Behavioral Health.”
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2007f. “THE MEDICAL
HOME: A Place of Healing, A Place of Hope.” 2007 LSU Health Care Services Division Annual Report.
Baton Rouge, LA.
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2008. “THE VALUE OF A
SYSTEM: a Priceless Asset of Louisiana.” 2008 LSU Health Care Services Division Annual Report.
Baton Rouge, LA.
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2010. “LSU Health 2010
Annual Report .” Baton Rouge, LA.
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2011a. “Charity Hospital
System Timeline.” Accessed July 23, 2011 via http://www.lsuhospitals.org/About_LSUHCSD/history.htm.
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2011b. “LSU-HCSD Finance
Division Medically Indigent Eligibility Table.” Accessed December 16, 2011 via
http://www.lsuhospitals.org/finance/PFSFreeCare.asp.
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2012a, February 1. “HCSD FY
12 Budget.”

161

Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division (LSU-HCSD). 2012b, February 15. “Interim
LSU Public Hospital Response to Budget Reduction.”
Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center (LSUHSC). 2011. “Important Facts.” Downloaded
June 3, 2011 via http://lsuhscimportantwork.com/importantfacts/.
Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center (LSUHSC). 2012, March 27. “LSUHSC-New Orleans
House Appropriations Committee FY 2013 LSUHSC-N.O. Budget Overview. Chancellor Larry Hollier.”
Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center Shreveport. (LSUHSC-S). 2011. “A Chronological
History.” Downloaded November 21, 2011 via http://www.lsuhscshistory.org/.
LSU Health. 2011. “2010 Graphics Standards Manual.” Louisiana State University Health System. Baton
Rouge, LA. Downloaded via http://www.lsuhospitals.org/media-relations/graphicsstandards/index.htm.
LSU Health. 2012, March 27. “LSU Health: LSU-HCSD FY 13 Major Budget Issues.” Power Point
slides. Presentation before the Louisiana State Legislature House Appropriations Committee.
LSU Hospitals. 2008. July 9. “Revised Logo and Graphics Standards Replace “Hospitals” with “Health
System”.” Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division.
LSU-Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) Presentation. 2006 November 1. “LSU-VA Joint Medical
Center – New Orleans Briefing Paper to the Louisiana Recovery Authority.”
Louisiana State University System Board of Supervisors. 2011, July 29. “Louisiana State University
Health Care Services Division Operating Budget for Fiscal Year 2011-2012.” Downloaded February 3,
2012 via http://www.lsusystem.edu/docs/agenda/2012/agenda02032012.pdf.
Louisiana State University System Board of Supervisors. 2012a, February 3. “FY 2011-2012 Mid-Year
Reduction General Fund Budget Pro-Rata. Attachment A.
http://www.lsusystem.edu/docs/agenda/2012/agenda02032012.pdf.
Louisiana State University System Board of Supervisors. 2012b, February 3. “FY 2011-2012 Mid-Year
Reduction General Fund Budget Pro-Rata. Attachment C.
http://www.lsusystem.edu/docs/agenda/2012/agenda02032012.pdf.
Lovell, Anne M. 2011a. “Debating Life After Disaster: Charity Hospital Babies and Bioscientific Futures
in Post-Katrina New Orleans.” Medical Anthropology Quarterly. Vol. 25. Iss. 2: 254-277.
Lovell, Anne M. 2011b, June 8, 2011. “Who cares about care? Health care rationalization and the demise
of a public hospital after Katrina.” Metro politiques.eu. Downloaded June 14, 2011 via
http://www.metropolitiques.eu/spip.php?page=print&id_article=166.
Luft, Rachel E. 2009, September. “Beyond Disaster Exceptionalism: Social Movement Developments in
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.” American Quarterly. Vol. 61, No. 3: 499-527.
Lynch, Robert E., MD. 2007, March 13. “Statement of Robert E. Lynch, MD Director, Veteran
Intergrated Service Network 16 Department of Veterans Affairs Before the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.”

162

M-07-237. 2007, May 17. New Orleans City Council resolution requesting “the Governor’s Division of
Administration immediately commission an independent study into the feasibility and cost of reopening
the mental health unit of Charity Hospital”; “requests an official opinion from the state Attorney General
on the appropriateness of the closure of Charity Hospital without legislative approval.” Passed
unanimously by Carter, Fielkow, Head, Hedge-Morrell, Midura, Thomas, Willard-Lewis.
Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO). 2006. “FY 2005—Medical Center of Louisiana
at New Orleans, The Rev. Alexander Charity Hospital / University Hospital.” LSU Health Care Services
Division. Downloaded August 8, 2006 via http://www.lsuhospitals.org/Hospitals/MCLNO-Profile.htm.
Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO). 2008. “Clinic Information Sheet.” University
Hospital and Trauma Services. Downloaded March 30, 2008 via
http://www.mclno.org/Emergency%20Notices/ClnInfoSheet.htm.
Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO). 2011a. Urgent Care Clinic notice. (“Open 24
hours a day, 7 days a week”). Downloaded Spring 2011 via http://www.mclno.org/mclno/menu/, p. 3
Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO). 2011b. Urgent Care Clinic notice (“MondayFriday 7am-11pm; Saturday, Sunday & holidays 7am-7pm”). Downloaded Fall 2011 via
http://www.mclno.org/mclno/menu/, p. 3
MCS 22944. 2007, December 20. “An Ordinance to establish a temporary moratorium … Regional
Medical District Redevelopment Moratorium, on the issuance of any building permits for construction,
renovations, repairs, or for demolition of buildings (in Lower Mid-City New Orleans).” Mayor Council
Series 22944. New Orleans City Council. Passed unanimously by Carter, Clarkson, Fielkow, Head,
Hedge-Morrell, Midura, Willard-Lewis.
Madigan, Eric. 2004, April 23. “States recycling Medicaid funds face federal scrutiny.” Stateline.org.
Downloaded August 1, 2010 via http://www.stateline.org/live/printable/story?contentId=15628.
Maggi, Laura. 2005, September 27. “La. Agency gives back much of FEMA money.” The TimesPicayune.
Maginnis, John. 2010, February 3. “The end of charity hospitals.” The Times-Picayune.
Maginnis, John. 2011a, April 27. “Louisiana state government is being put up for sale.” The TimesPicayune.
Maginnis, John. 2011b, August 17. “Louisiana Legislature left out of change.” The Times-Picayune.
Maginnis, John. 2012, February 8. “Bobby Jindal’s health care vision put to the test.” The TimesPicayune.
Martel, Brett. 2006, March 26. “Doctors, patients protest state refusal to reopen major hospital.” The
Associated Press.
Matcha, Duane A. 2000. MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY. A Comparative Perspective. Needham Heights, MA:
Allyn and Bacon.

163

McCarthy, Kevin, D.J. Peterson, Narayan Sastry and Michael Pollard. 2006, January. “The Repopulation
of New Orleans After Hurricane Katrina.” RAND Gulf States Policy Institute Technical Report.
McCauley, Byron. 2002 December 29. “LSUHSC brings frontier care to everybody.” The Shreveport
Times. Accessed November 18, 2002 via http://www.johnmcdonald.org/pop-html/article0029.html.
McDonald, Dr. John C. 1984, January. “Louisiana’s place in American surgery.” Journal of the Louisiana
State Medical Society.
McDonald, Dr. John. 2002, November. “The Shreveport Model.” Lecture given to the Taskforce to
Improve Healthcare in Louisiana, Louisiana Legislature. Downloaded November 18, 2011 via
http://www.johnmcdonald.org/assets/pdf046.pdf.
McGraw, Marvin. 2010, July 21. “Interim LSU Public Hospital Will Close Labor and Delivery Services.”
News Release. LSU Health Care Services Division.
McKinney, Joan and Marsha Shuler. 1996. “Budget bails out Medicaid.” The Advocate. Baton Rouge,
LA. April 26, 1996.
McKiven, Henry M. Jr. 2007, December. “The Political Construction of a Natural Disaster: The Yellow
Fever Epidemic of 1853.” The Journal of American History. 734-742.
McMahon, Bill. 1995, May 19. “House OKs $11 billion budget; LSU takeover key to Medicaid plan.”
The Advocate.
McMahon, Bill. 1996a, May 1. “Lawmaker warns of dependence on “cavalry” rescues.” The Advocate.
McMahon, Bill. 1996b, May 10. “DHH plans to eliminate program for the needy.” The Advocate.
McMahon, Bill and Marsha Shuler. 1995, June 28. “La. Starts cutting Medicaid.” The Advocate.
Mechanic, David. 1978. MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY: A Comprehensive Text. Second Edition. New York:
The Free Press.
Mechanic, Robert E. 2004 September 14. “Medicaid’s Disproportionate Share Hospital Program;
Complex Structure, Critical Payments.” NHPF Background Paper. National Health Policy Forum. The
George Washington University. Washington, DC.
Mildenberg, David. 2011, February 4. “Census Finds Post-Katrina New Orleans Richer, Whiter,
Emptier.” Bloomberg.
Missouri Foundation for Health (MFH). 2005, Summer. “Issue Overview: Hospital Charity Care in the
United States.” Health Policy Committee. 3-21.
Moises, James P. M.D. 2009a, January 9. Sworn Affidavit. Exhibit B2. Appeal of FEMA Project
Worksheet Number 2175V3 by Facility Planning and Control, State of Louisiana, Intervention by Parties
with a Fundamental Interest in the outcome of the FEMA Appeal. April 16, 2009.

164

Moises, James P. M.D. 2009b, February 6 and 16. Deposition Transcript. Exhibit B1. Appeal of FEMA
Project Worksheet Number 2175V3 by Facility Planning and Control, State of Louisiana, Intervention by
Parties with a Fundamental Interest in the outcome of the FEMA Appeal. April 16, 2009.
Moller, Jan. 2003, August 22. “Charity hospital budget cuts approved; System to lose about 291 jobs; 59
are in N.O.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2005a, June 3. “Senator blasts care at charity hospitals” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2005b, June 20. “Senate passes state budget.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2005c, September 15. “New Charity may rise in Katrina’s wake.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2005d October 7. “Evacuation keeps hospital patients at bay” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2005e, November 9. “Charity plan calls for shift in services.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2006a, February 3. “Building repairs ranked by urgency.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2006b, February 23. “LSU and VA collaborate to rebuild N.O. health care.” The TimesPicayune.
Moller, Jan. 2006c, September 22. “Staff to reopen hospital scarce.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2006d, October 3. “Deal to revamp health care in N.O. stalls but panel chief looks for a
breakthrough.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2006e, December 15. “LRA agrees to $74 million down payment on hospital.” The TimesPicayune.
Moller, Jan. 2007a, January 19. “Legislature, LRA argue over money for hospital.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2007b, January 20. “$300 million OK’d for new Charity.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2007c, January 30. “Feds try to convince state to rework health care system.” The TimesPicayune.
Moller, Jan. 2007d, February 21. “Blanco, Vitter agree on initial funding for LSU hospital.” The TimesPicayune.
Moller, Jan. 2007e, March 3. “Panel OKs teaching hospital funds.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2007f, June 26. “Senate OKs spending on Charity, Road Home.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2008a, August 28. “State, feds still at odds on funds.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2008b, October 29. “Time runs short on hospital, Levine says.” The Times-Picayune.

165

Moller, Jan. 2008c, December 12. “Financing is in doubt for new New Orleans teaching hospital.” The
Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2008d, December 13. “FEMA approves more for Charity Hospital.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2009a, March 17. “Louisiana claims FEMA violated its own rules in settling Charity
Hospital reimbursement.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2009b, October 3. “Judges to hear Charity dispute.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2009c, November 4. “FEMA says Charity consultants erred.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2009d, December 10. “State can present case in Charity money arbitration.” The TimesPicayune.
Moller, Jan. 2010a, January 21. “Louisiana public hospitals anticipate financial hit from federal rule
change.” The Times-Picayune.
Moller, Jan. 2010b, January 23. “LSU denies neglecting Charity: FEMA says it refused help to open
hospital.” The Times-Picayune.
Moran, Donald W. 2005, November/December. “Whence And Whither Health Insurance? A Revisionist
History.” Health Affairs. Vol. 24. No. 6: 1415-1425.
Moran, Kate. 2006, November 17. “Scaled back hospital reopens.” The Times-Picayune.
Moran, Kate. 2008, June 27. “Residents decry lack of transparency in hospital planning.” The TimesPicayune.
Mueller, Ann Tracy. 2011, June 23. “It’s all in the name. Hospital beats out medical center.” Health Care
Communication News.
Murray, John E. 2006, Winter. “The Persistence of the Health Insurance Dilemma: An Introduction.”
Social Science History. 30:4. 465-477.
Myers, Doug. 1995, June 4. “Board opposes plan to give LSU control of state hospitals.” The Advocate.
Nagin, C. Ray. 2007, May 14. Letter to The Honorable Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor State of
Louisiana. City of New Orleans. C. Ray Nagin, Mayor
National Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems. (NAPH). 2011, March. “Revise the
Medicaid DSH Auditing and Reporting Rule.” Our View.
National Economic & Social Rights Initiative (NESRI). 2008. “Betraying an American tradition: The
Killing of Charity Hospital.” NESRI’s Human Rights of Hurricane Survivors series.
National Trust for Historic Preservation (NTHP). 2009. “National Trust Files Suit Against Veterans
Affairs and FEMA to Protect New Orleans’ Mid-City Historic District.” National Trust Legal Defense
Fund May 2009 Update.

166

Nead, Arthur. 2008, June 23. “State Commits to New Academic Medical Center.” New Wave. Tulane
University.
Nelson, Marla, Renia Ehrenfeucht and Shirley Laska. 2007. “Planning, Plans, and People: Professional
Expertise, Local Knowledge, and Governmental Action in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans.”
Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research. Vol. 9, No. 3: 23-52.
New Orleans City Business (CB). 1994, March 7. “Hospital Roundup, 1993.” Health Care Review
supplement.
New Orleans City Council. 2012, February 15. Criminal Justice Committee Discussion of proposed cuts
by the State of Louisiana to mental health and substance abuse services and resources at LSU Interim
Hospital, including identification of any potential alternative and/or mitigating measures.”
The New York Times 2008, November 24. “Fixing FEMA.” Editorial. .
Nolan, Bruce. 2006a, January 5. “Support builds for rebuild plan.” The Times-Picayune.
Nolan, Bruce. 2006b, February 12. “Change is mantra of citizen group.” The Times-Picayune.
Nossiter, Adam. 2003a, November 3. “Hopefuls subtly tack with political winds.” The Advocate.
Nossiter, Adam. 2003b, December 30. “Charity hospitals get little sympathy: State officials keep cutting
needed funds.” The Advocate.
Nossiter, Adam. 2005, December 17. “Dispute Over Historic Hospital for the Poor Pits Doctors Against
the State.” The New York Times.
Nossiter, Adam. 2006, January 6. “Fight Grows in New Orleans on Demolition and Rebuilding.” The
New York Times.
Oberlander, Jonathan B. 1997, April. “Managed Care and Medicare Reform.” Journal of Health Politics,
Policy and Law. Vol. 22, No. 2: 595-631.
Online Etymology Dictionary. 2011. “charity.” Downloaded June 17, 2011 via
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=charity&searchmode=term.
Ouroussoff, Nicolai. 2006, November 19. “All Fall Down.” The New York Times.
Partnership for Access To Healthcare. (PATH). 2003, October. “Number of encounters by zip code Clinic
Affiliation within low income areas.” Map by Denice Warren and Joy Bonaguro. Greater New Orleans
Community Data Center.
Patel, Kavita, Susan Marquis, Sai Ma and Ben Springgate. 2005c, October. “Expanding Coverage to the
Uninsured of Louisiana.” RAND Health Research. WR-311.
Pence, Gregory E. 2004. Classic Cases in MEDICAL ETHICS: Accounts of Cases that Have Shaped
Medical Ethics, with Philosophical, Legal, and Historical Backgrounds. Fourth Edition. Boston: McGraw
Hill.

167

Penner, D’Ann and Keith C. Ferdinand. 2009, February. OVERCOMING KATRINA: African American
Voices from the Crescent City and Beyond. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Perry, Andre and Michael Schwam-Baird. 2010. “School by School: The Transformation of New Orleans
Public Education.” In The New Orleans Index at Five: Reviewing Key Reforms After Hurricane Katrina.
Washington: Metropolitan Policy Program, Brookings Institution and the Greater New Orleans
Community Data Center.
Plyer, Allison. 2010, April 15. “Hurricane Katrina Impact.” News release. Chief Demographer, Greater
New Orleans Community Data Center.
Plyer, Allison. 2011, February 3. “What Census 2010 Reveals about Population and Housing in New
Orleans and the Metro Area.” Greater New Orleans Community Data Center.
Pope, John. 1993a February 5. “New hospitals planned for medical center area.” The Times-Picayune.
Pope, John. 1993b, March 25. “Charity avoids repairs.” The Times-Picayune.
Pope, John. 1997, May 18. “Charity will see big changes as LSU prepares to take over; Mission still to
serve poor.” The Times-Picayune.
Pope, John. 1998, July 5. “LSU brings stability back to Charity.” The Times-Picayune.
Pope, John. 2000a, May 13. “Changes at clinic hurt HIV patients; Tougher policies make drugs harder to
get.” The Times-Picayune.
Pope, John. 2000b, June 27. “Charity system escapes budget cut; La. Health department faces layoffs.”
The Times-Picayune.
Potash, Mordecai N., MD and Daniel K. Winstead, MD. 2008, February. “A Review of Mental Health
Issues as a Result of Hurricane Katrina.” Psychiatric Annals. Vol. 38, Iss. 2.
Powell, Lawrence N. 2007, December. “What Does American History Tell Us about Katrina and Vice
Versa?” Journal of American History, 94. 863-876.
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC). 2006, April 27. “Report on Louisiana Healthcare Delivery and
Financing System.” Report for the Louisiana Recovery Authority Support Foundation.
Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc. (PAR). 2006a, April. “Hurricanes and Health Care
Reform: Can Louisiana turn a disaster into an opportunity?” Publication 309.
Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc. (PAR). 2006b, October 23. “Action Steps for Access
to Care.” Health Care Policy Brief. Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc. Commentaries.
Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc. (PAR). 2006c, April. “Health Care Collaborative: Go
Statewide, Consider Charity Hospitals.” Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc. Publication
309.

168

Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc. (PAR). 2007, May. “Realigning Charity Health Care
and Medical Education in Louisiana.” Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc. Publication 312.

Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc. (PAR). 2008, December. “Assessing the Louisiana
Health First Plan” Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc. Research Brief.
Quigley, William P. 2008. “What Katrina Revealed.” Harvard Law & Policy Review. Vol. 2: 361-384.
R-06-143. 2006, April 6. Resolution to reopen Charity Hospital. New Orleans City Council. Passed
unanimously by Batt, Clarkson, Gill-Pratt, Hedge-Morrell, Sapir, Thomas, Willard-Lewis.
Rainier, Phil. 2012, February 3. “Thousands of patients left to find new medical care after budget cuts.”
WAFB-TV Channel 9.
RAND. 2010. “How Fare the Displaced and Returned Residents of New Orleans?” Research Brief and
Pilot Survey. RAND Gulf States Policy Institute. RB-9500.
RAND Health Research. 2005a, October. “The Level of State Involvement in the Reconstruction of the
Municipal Health System.” Andrew Dick and Soeren Mattke. WR-308.
RAND Health Research. 2005b, October. “Neighborhood Effects and the Role of Communities in
Restructuring.” Deborah Cohen and Sanae Inagami. WR-310.
RAND Health Research. 2005c, October. “Expanding Coverage to the Uninsured of Louisiana.” Kavita
Patel, Susan Marquis, Sai Ma and Ben Springgate. WR-311.
RAND Health Research. 2005d, October. “The Public Hospital System in Louisiana.” Thomas Croghan,
Yee-Wei Lim and Lauren Honess-Morreale. WR-314.
RMJM Hillier. 2008, August 20. “Medical Center of New Orleans Charity Hospital Feasibility Study
Foundation for Historical Louisiana.”
RMJM Hillier. 2008, August 20. “Medical Center of New Orleans Charity Hospital Feasibility Study
Foundation for Historical Louisiana Executive Summary.”
Rainey, Joanie, Krista Scardina and Rebecca Updike. 2005, Fall. “Hurricane Katrina: Review and
Analysis of the Public Health and Medical Response.” In Hurricane Katrina: Dimensions of a Major
Disaster. EMSE 334: Environmental Hazards Management. Dr. Paul Bourget, Professor. Institute for
Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management. The George Washington University. Washington, DC.
Reckdahl, Katy. 2004, October 5. “Losing Patients.” Gambit Weekly.
Redfearn, Suz. 1996, December 24. “Concerns linger over LSU/Charity proposal.” Greater Baton Rouge
Business Report.
Redman, Carl. 1998, December 16. “Charity hospital change creates deficit on books.” The Advocate.

169

Redman, Carl. 1999a, January 20. “AG rules against charity hospitals, places $86 million in general
fund.” The Advocate.
Redman, Carl. 1999b, April 6. “LSU Medical Center officials warn of budget problems.” The Advocate.
Reed, Adolph, Jr. 2005, September 15. “Classifying the Hurricane.” The Nation.
Reynolds, Jeff. 2005, September 22. Electronic communication between Jeff Reynolds and Charles
Castille. Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. Accessed via Louisiana Public Records Act
request of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals Secretary Fred Cerise’s office, made by K.
Brad Ott. August 17, 2006.
Ritea, Steve. 2000, January 19. “Health department faces millions in cuts to close shortfall; Charity
Hospitals to get less reimbursement.” The Times-Picayune.
Rivlin, Gary. 2005, September 29. “A Mogul Who Would Rebuild New Orleans.” The New York Times.
Rivlin, Gary. 2006, January 12. “Anger Meets New Orleans Renewal Plan.” The New York Times.
Roberts, Deon and Richard A. Webster. 2010, January 27. “Arbitration panel sets Charity replacement at
$475M.” New Orleans City Business.
Roberts, Jonathan and Thomas J. Durant. 2010. A HISTORY OF THE CHARITY HOSPITALS OF
LOUISIANA: A Study of Poverty, Politics, Public Health, and the Public Interest. Lewiston, NY: The
Edward Mellen Press.
Roberts, Faimon A. 2010, November 6. “Officials fight to save Tangipahoa hospital.” The Advocate.
Robertson, Campbell. 2010, August 27. “On Anniversary of Katrina, Signs of Healing.” The New York
Times.
Robertson, Campbell. 2011, February 3. “Smaller New Orleans After Katrina, Census Shows.” The New
York Times.
Rose, Kalima and Laura Tuggle. 2010. “Community Action: Bringing People Home to Stronger
Neighborhoods.” In The New Orleans Index at Five: Reviewing Key Reforms After Hurricane Katrina.
Washington: Metropolitan Policy Program, Brookings Institution and the Greater New Orleans
Community Data Center.
Rowland, Diane. 2007, March 13. Testimony of Diane Rowland, Executive Vice President, The Henry J.
Kaiser Family Foundation, Executive Director, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured,
Washington, DC on “Post Katrina Health Care: Continuing Concerns and Immediate Needs in the New
Orleans Region.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce. United States House of Representatives. Washington, DC. Serial No. 110-17.
Russell, Gordon and Frank Donze. 2006, January 8. “Officials tiptoe around footprint issue.” The TimesPicayune.

170

Sachs, Benjamin. 2008c, November. “MCLNO & VA Hospitals and Healthcare Reform in Louisiana: An
Update.” Tulane University School of Medicine.
Sack, Kevin. 2010, January 28. “Louisiana Wins Fight for Hospital.” The New York Times.
Salvaggio, John, M.D. 1992. NEW ORLEANS CHARITY HOSPITAL: A Story of Physicians, Politics, and
Poverty. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
Scallan, Matt. 1999, January 26. “Deadlines are here; Sprinklers still aren’t.” The Times-Picayune.
Scott, Robert Travis. 2005, September 18. “Turf wars, political strife threaten plans to rebuild.” The
Times-Picayune.
Shields, Gerard. 2007, May 12. “Mental-health aid in N.O. criticized.” The Advocate.
Shields, Gerard. 2011, September 29. “Feds, La. Disagree over funding.” The Advocate.
Shinkle, Peter. 1994, April 3. “Charity hospitals a money machine for state; State uses funds for
Medicaid.” The Advocate.
Shinkle, Peter. 1996, February 15. “Most patients oppose Medicaid co-payments.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1994a, February 11. “Breaux suggests La. Delay hospital work.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1994b, March 14. “LHCA faces health care roadblock.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1994c, March 24. “LHCA OKs $120,000-a-year post.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1994d, April 6. “Administrator hired to oversee charity hospital merger.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1994e, December 16. “Plan changes La. Hospital system.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1994f, December 17. “Hospital, physician groups eyeing health-care changes.” The
Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1995a, January 12. “LHCA includes charity hospitals in revamp plan.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1995b, February 1. “Charity system under scrutiny.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1995c, March 3. “Data uncertain on Edwards’ health care fix.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1995d, March 9. “Brown sees rocky road for Edwards’ health-care fix.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1995e, March 15. “State officials see profit in new plan to run Medicaid.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1995f, April 7. “House budget panel critical of delay in health care plan.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1995g, April 28. “Assault continues on proposed health-care plan.” The Advocate.

171

Shuler, Marsha. 1995h, April 30. “Health care overhaul faces hurdles in Louisiana House.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1995i, May 11. “Edwards ready to drop health plan.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1995j, May 17. “Edwards abandons health plan; Governor will offer partial-year budget.”
The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1995k, June 6. “U.S. officials nix latest plan for Medicaid.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1995L, June 20. “LHCA survives reconstructive surgery; House-passed bill dies on
Senate floor.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1995m, July 21. “Where are those $1 billion in cuts?” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1996a, January 6. “DHH pick “Bobby” Jindal young but “a genius”.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1996b, January 20. “DHH to see major changes, new health secretary says.” The
Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1996c, January 31. “DHH chief vows to recoup overpayments to hospitals.” The
Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1996d. February 14. “Officials target nursing home Medicaid funds”.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1996e, March 6. “State health agency to lay of 185.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1996f, April 8. “Care bailout comes with strings, cap.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1996g, April 28. “DHH secretary says he’ll soften health care cuts; No facilities planned
for closure.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1996h, May 4. “La. Lands $80 million federal windfall for Medicaid.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1997, April 24. “Senate OKs LSU-charity takeover bill.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 1998, January 7. “La. DHH program has recouped $35.4 million in overpayments.” The
Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2000a, February 26. “Pain of some Medicaid cuts eased.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2000b, May 27. “Official lays out outcome of cuts to charity system.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2000c, November 8. “DHH cut to eliminate hospital nurse coordinators.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2002a, February 20. “Health care feeling brunt of job cuts.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2002b, July 26. “Prisoners vs. The Poor: Charity system forced to juggle inmate care
with regular patients.” The Advocate.

172

Shuler, Marsha. 2002c, October 17. “Medicaid to take another financial hit.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2003a, April 20, 2003. “Charity hospital system at center of debate over serving
uninsured.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2003b, May 15. “Charity hospitals’ patients would have to pay under bill.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2003c, August 19. “Hospital cuts “dramatic”.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2003d, August 28. “Charity hospital cuts everybody’s concern.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2003e, September 7. “Candidates disagree on role of state hospitals.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2003f, October 15. “Study: Hospitals in bad condition; $300 million cost estimated just
to keep facilities functional.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2003g, December 5. “Feds question state’s use of hospital bailout funding.” The
Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2004a, January 6. “Voters overwhelmingly back charity hospital system, poll finds.” The
Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2004b, January 29. “Doctors’ group lobbies Blanco to keep Hood as chief of DHH.” The
Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2004c, January 31. “EKL chief takes over state DHH; Blanco also fills DEQ, DNR
posts.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2004d, March 16. “La. Waits on OK for health funds.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2005a, January 12. “Majority favor keeping state charity hospitals.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2005b, April 26. “83% of voters want to keep La. Public hospital system.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2005c, July 28. “LSU board turns more attention to hospital duties.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2009, October 3. “State opts for arbitration.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2010a, January 28. “Judges panel: Feds owe La. For hospital.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2010b, March 20. “Panel OKs plan closing EKL.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2011a, January 6. “State told to repay $239 million to feds.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2011b, November 15. “Medicaid contract awaits OK from Jindal.” The Advocate.
Shuler, Marsha. 2011c, November 16. “LSU signs Medicaid health providers.” The Advocate.

173

Shuler, Marsha. 2012, January 4. “Hospital system faces $29 million in cuts.” The Advocate.
Simon, Fran, 2007, Winter. “Resuscitation.” Tulanian. Tulane University. Downloaded February 5, 2009
via http://www.2.tulane.edu/article_news_details.cfm?ArticleID=7218.
Smithburg, Don. 2005, October 6. “Message from Don Smithburg, CEO Health Care Services Division
(10/6/05).” Declaration of Charity and University hospitals as being “unsalvageable.” Exhibit FC-10,
August 21, 2008. Attached to the transcript of “Article 1442 Video Deposition of LOUISIANA
HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER – NEW ORLEANS, taken through its designee FRED CERISE, M.D.,”
taken in the offices of Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips, LLP. Baton Rouge, LA. August 21, 2008.
Smithburg, Donald R. 2006, February 21. Letter to The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D., United States
Senate.
Smithburg, Donald R. 2007, March 13. Testimony of Donald R. Smithburg, Chief Executive Officer,
LSU Health Care Services Division on “Post Katrina Health Care: Continuing Concerns and Immediate
Needs in the New Orleans Region.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of
the Committee on Energy and Commerce. United States House of Representatives. Washington, DC.
Serial No. 110-17.
Solomon, Judith. 2007a, April 3. “President’s “Affordable Choices” Initiative Provides Little Support for
State Efforts to Expand Health Coverage.” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Solomon, Judith. 2007b, May. “The Louisiana Health Care Redesign Collaborative.” In “Rebuilding A
Healthy New Orleans: Final Conference Report of the New Orleans Health Disparities Initiative.”
Spiegel, Alix. 2007, August 29. “New Orleans Suffers Crisis in Mental Health Care.” National Public
Radio. Downloaded November 23, 2011 via
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14031894&sc=emaf.
Spivey, Michael, J.D. and Arthur L. Kellermann, M.D., M.P.H. 2009, June 18. “Rescuing the Safety
Net.” New England Journal of Medicine. 360; 25: 2598-2601.
Srinivas, Nidhi. 2010, April. “Disaster capitalism and disaster managerialism: What recent earthquakes
tell us about management.” Submission for the 3rd LAEMOS: Civic Society, Cooperation and
Development in Latin American and Europe. Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Starr, Paul. 1982. The Social Transformation of American Medicine. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
Stephens, Kevin U. Sr. MD, JD. 2005, March 17. “Governor’s Health Care Reform: Region 1 Consortium
Update.” Louisiana Regional Health Care Consortium Region One.
Stephens, Kevin U. Sr. MD, JD. 2007, October 31. “Post-Catastrophe Crisis: Addressing the Dramatic
Need and Scant Availability of Mental Health Care in the Gulf Coast.” Testimony of Kevin U. Stephens,
Sr., M.D., J.D. Director, New Orleans Health Department before the United States Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery.
Washington, DC.

174

Stephens, Kevin U. Sr. MD, JD., David Grew, MSPH, Karen Chin, MSPH, Paul Kadetz, MSN, MPH, P.
Gregg Greenough, MD, MPH, and Frederick M. Burkle Jr., MD, MPH, DTM. 2007, May 10. “Excess
Mortality in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina: A Preliminary Report.” Disaster Medicine and Public
Health Preparedness.
Sternberg, Steve. 2005, September 1. “For city’s historic hospital, help is needed ‘in a hurry’.” USA
Today.
Sternberg, Steve. 2007, July 31. “Report: N.O. hospitals bleeding money.” USA Today.
Stoeckle, John D. 1995. “The Citadel Cannot Hold: Technologies Go Outside the Hospital, Patients and
Doctors Too.” The Milbank Quarterly. Vol. 73, No. 1: 3-17.
Stolberg, Sheryl Gay. 2008, October 10. “In Final Months in Office, Bush is Burdened But Still
Confident.” The New York Times.
Stolzenberg, Edward A. FACHE. 2000, September/October. “Governance Change for Public Hospitals.”
Journal of Healthcare Management. 45:5: 347-350.
Stone, Christal. 2006, August. “Corporate Finance and Consolidation in Health Care.” Changes in Health
Care Financing & Organization findings brief. Vol. IX, No. 4.
Suter, Robert E. DO, MHA, FACEP. 2005, September 14. Letter to Donald Smithburg, HCSD-CEO
Charity Hospitals System.” President, American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP).
Swann, Christopher. 2005, October 4. “Katrina leaves charity hospitals ailing.” The Financial Times via
MSNBC. Via http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9590592/from/ET/.
Tebo, Cecile. 2007, June 19. “Ticking Time Bombs.” Gambit.
Tebo, Cecile. 2010, October 8. “Broken mental health system is costing lives.” Guest column. The TimesPicayune.
Tebo, Cecile. 2011, November 10. “Work for the mentally ill in New Orleans is far from finished.” The
Times-Picayune. Op-Ed Columnist.
The Advocate. 1994a, March 8. “Hospital given preliminary OK to borrow funds.” Staff report.
The Advocate. 1994b, April 2. “Health care job increase explained.” Staff report
The Advocate. 1994c, October 28. “OUR VIEWS: Health plan talk should be public.” Editorial.
The Advocate. 1996, April 29. “OUR VIEWS: La. Gets off easy with Medicaid.” Editorial.
The Advocate. 1997, May 15. “OUR VIEWS: Promise, pitfalls of charity switch.” Editorial.
The Advocate. 1998, January 31. “OUR VIEWS: Jindal leaves DHH leaner and cleaner.” Editorial.
The Advocate. 2003, October 6. “A wild finish in the primary.” Staff report.

175

The Advocate. 2004, February 26. “BR doctor: Poor patients neglected.” Staff report.
The Heritage Foundation. 2008, August 29. “State Health Care Reform: Retargeting Medicaid Hospital
Payments to Expand Health Insurance Coverage.” Christopher J. Meyer. Executive Summary
Backgrounder No. 2177. The Heritage Foundation.
The Times-Picayune. 1998, November 19. “Foster: Tobacco money needed; Health care best use of
settlement.”
The Times-Picayune. 2009a, January 30. “Poll backs Charity rehab.” Briefing Book.
The Times-Picayune. 2009b. August 9. “Deaths at Orleans Parish Prison raise concerns: An editorial.”
This Week at MCL. 2003, July 7-13. “New Medical Center of Louisiana: A Major Step Toward Reality.”
Thurman et al. Versus Nagin. 2009, July 14. Thurman, Wallace, Sheila Joseph, Veda M. Manuel and K.
Brad Ott Versus C. Ray Nagin, in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of New Orleans and The City
of New Orleans. Div. N, Section 8. No. 09-7244. Orleans Parish Civil District Court.
Tilove, Jonathan. 2009a, May 14. “Gen. Russell Honore says Louisiana should drop appeal and pay for
new hospital itself.” The Times-Picayune.
Tilove, Jonathan. 2009b, May 26. “Officials press for Charity Hospital decision.” The Times-Picayune.
Tilove, Jonathan. 2009c, August 24. “FEMA dispute over Charity Hospital on my plate, Homeland
Security secretary says.” The Times-Picayune.
Tulane University. 2006a, August. “Building a Healthier New Orleans.” Tulane University Prevention
Research Center.
Tulane University. 2006b, November 16. “Redesigning New Orleans Area Health Care.” Madeline Vann.
Downloaded December 18, 2009 via http://www.sph.tulane.edu/PRC/pages/newwavehealthcare.htm.
Tulane University. 2007, Winter. “Resuscitation.” Fran Simon. Tulanian. Downloaded February 5, 2009
via http://www.2.tulane.edu/article_news_details.cfm?ArticleID=7218.
Tulane University. 2008a, February 14. “Tulane University’s Plan to Advance the Development of
Community-Based Health Centers in New Orleans. Tulane University School of Medicine.
Tulane University. 2008b, June 23. “State Commits to New Academic Medical Center.” Arthur Nead.
New Wave.
Tulane University. 2008c, November. “MCLNO & VA Hospitals and Healthcare Reform in Louisiana:
An Update. Dean Benjamin Sachs. Tulane University School of Medicine.
Tulane University/Democracy Corps. 2009, April. New Orleans Frequency Questionnaire. Greenberg
Quinlan Rosner Research.

176

University of Maryland Libraries. 2011. “Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Sources.” Downloaded April
26, 2011 via http://www.lib.umd.edu/guides/primary-sources.html.
UNITY for the Homeless of Greater New Orleans (UNITY). 2010, August. “Search and Rescue Five
Years Later: Saving People Still Trapped in Katrina’s Ruins.” A report of the Abandoned Buildings
Outreach Team.
United States Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (U.S. CBCA). 2009, December 9. Memorandum of
Conference/Order. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. Judge Stephen M. Daniels. 1741-FEMA – In the
matter of State of Louisiana, Facility Planning and Control [re: FEMA-1603-DR-LA] (Charity Hospital).
Washington, DC.
United States Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (U.S. CBCA). 2010a, January 11-15. Transcript.
Volume 1 of 5. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency In the
matter of State of Louisiana Facility Planning and Control, Repair/Replacement of Charity Hospital, PW
#2175. Case No. FEMA-1603-DR-LA; CBCA-1741-FEMA. Washington, DC.
United States Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (U.S. CBCA). 2010b, January 11-15. Transcript.
Volume 5 of 5. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency In the
matter of State of Louisiana Facility Planning and Control, Repair/Replacement of Charity Hospital, PW
#2175. Case No. FEMA-1603-DR-LA; CBCA-1741-FEMA. Washington, DC.
United States Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (U.S. CBCA). 2010c, January 27. Board Decision.
Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. Judge Stephen M. Daniels. 1741-FEMA – In the matter of State of
Louisiana, Facility Planning and Control [re: FEMA-1603-DR-LA] (Charity Hospital). Washington, DC.
United States Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (U.S. CBCA). 2011. “Hearing Procedures: Contract
Appeals Cases.” Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. (f) Refusal to be sworn. Downloaded October 31,
2011 via
http://www.cbca.gsaa.gov/RULES%20OF%20PROCEDURE/RULES%20OF%20PROCEDURE%20201
1.htm.
United States Department of Health and Human Services. (U.S. DHHS). 2006, July 17. “Louisiana Health
Care System Focus of Redesign.” News Release. Washington, DC. Accessed April 27, 2008 via
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/20060717.html.
United States Department of Homeland Security (U.S. DHS). 2009a, March 31. “Secretary Napolitano
Appoints Janet Woodka as Gulf Coast Rebuilding Coordinator.” News Release.
United States Department of Homeland Security (U.S. DHS). 2009b, August 6, 2009. “Secretary
Napolitano Announces Public Assistance Arbitration Process for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.” News
Release. Accessed October 22, 2011 via http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1249573246141.shtm.
United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA City MOU). 2007, November 19. “MEMORANDUM
OF UNDERSTANDING Between The United States Department of Veterans Affairs and The City of
New Orleans, Louisiana Regarding A Potential Acquisition and Transfer of Certain New Orleans Land by
the City of New Orleans to VA For the Construction and Operation of a New VA Medical Center and A
Potential VA Enhanced-Use Lease of the Southeast Louisiana Veterans Healthcare System VA Medical
Center in New Orleans, Louisiana to the City of New Orleans.” K07-659.

177

United States Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO). 2006a, March 8. “Testimony before the
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental affairs Committee: HURRICANE KATRINA – GAO’s
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response, and Recovery.” Statement of David M.
Walker, Comptroller General of the United States. GAO-06-442T.
United States Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO). 2006b, March 28. “Report to
Congressional Committees: HURRICANE KATRINA – Status of the Health Care System in New
Orleans and Difficult Decisions Related to Efforts to Rebuild It Approximately 6 Months After Hurricane
Katrina.” GAO-06-576R.
United States Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO). 2006c, September. “Report to
Congressional Committees: HURRICANE KATRINA – Status of Hospital Inpatient and Emergency
Departments in the Greater New Orleans Area.” GAO-06-1003.
United States House of Representatives. 2006, February 15. “A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of
the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina.”
United States Congress. Washington, DC.
United States Senate. 2006. “Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared.” Special Report of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. United States Congress.Washington, DC.
The Urban Land Institute (ULI). 2005. December 10, 2005. “A Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans,
Louisiana November 12-18, 2005.” Draft Report. Washington, DC.
Urbaszewski, Katie. 2011, March 7. “Uncle kills two children, himself.” The Times-Picayune.
VanLandingham, Mark J. PhD. 2007, September. “Murder Rates in New Orleans, La, 2004-2006.”
American Journal of Public Health. Vol. 97, No. 9.1614-1616.
Van Meter, Keith, MD. 2006, November. “Katrina at Charity Hospital: Much Ado About Something.”
The American Journal of the Medical Sciences. Vol. 332. No. 5: 251-254.
Vann, Madeline. 2006, November 16. “Redesigning New Orleans Area Health Care.” Tulane University.
Downloaded December 18, 2009 via http://www.sph.tulane.edu/PRC/pages/newwavehealthcare.htm.
Verité. 2010, April. “Business Plan Analysis University Medical Center, New Orleans.” Prepared for
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. Prepared by Verité Healthcare Consulting, LLC.
Verité. 2011, September 6. “Business Plan for University Medical Center.” Prepared for the University
Medical Center Management Corporation Board. Prepared by Verité Healthcare Consulting, LLC.
Vogel, Brad 2011. Inside the Footprint blog site. http://insidethefootprint.blogspot.com.
Wall, Bennett H., Light Townsend Cummins, Judith Kelleher Schafer, Edward F. Haas, Michael L. Kurtz.
2002. LOUISIANA: A History. Fourth Edition. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc.
Walsh, Bill. 1996a, February 26. “Firms eager for piece of Charity: LSU may lead hospital system.” The
Times-Picayune.

178

Walsh, Bill. 1996b, June 20. “Needy’s medical expenses covered.” The Times-Picayune.
Walsh, Bill. 1997a, March 12. “Charity hospitals won’t run for profit, LSU vows; Dean promises to
preserve safety-net system for state poor.” The Times-Picayune.
Walsh, Bill. 1997b “LSU will administer La. Charity hospitals.” The Times-Picayune. New Orleans, LA.
May 3, 1997.
Walsh, Bill. 1997c, May 7. “LSU plunges in to changes for Charity system.” The Times-Picayune.
Walsh, Bill and Jan Moller. 2006, September 5. “When needed most, psych services gone.” The TimesPicayune.
Ward, Martha C. 1986. POOR WOMEN POWERFUL MEN: America's Great Experiment in Family
Planning. Boulder: Westview Press.
Warren, Denice and Joy Bonaguro. 2003, October. “Number of encounters by zip code Clinic Affiliation
within low income areas.” Map. Partnership for Access To Healthcare (PATH) and the Greater New
Orleans Community Data Center.
Webster, Richard A. 2006, January 23. “Panel wants to end health care disparity in New Orleans.” New
Orleans City Business.
Webster, Richard A. 2007, July 23. “SPECIAL TREATMENT: Reopening Charity Hospital’s first three
floors possible.” New Orleans City Business.
Weiss, Joanna. 1996, May 30. “Health unit: $30 million found; But DHH says money is already
earmarked.” The Times-Picayune.
Weitz, Rose. 2001. The Sociology of Health, Illness, and Health Care: A Critical Approach. Second
Edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.
West, Jonathan J., M.E. Alcina, Kristina J. Peterson and Shirley Laska. 2008, November. “Principles of
participatory action research (PAR), Issues of entrée, and internal review board (IRB) challenges in
community/agency/university collaborations.” Manifestation: Journal of Community Engaged Research
and Learning Partnerships. Vol. 1, No. 1.
Williams, T. Harry. 1966. Romance and Realism in Southern Politics. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press.
Williams, T. Harry. 1969. Huey Long. 1981 First Vintage Books Edition. New York: Random House.
Williams, Clayton and K. Brad Ott. 2005, January 31. “Care of the Uninsured Committee Report to
Consortium.” Louisiana Regional Health Care Consortium Region 1.
Wilson, Sabrina. 2012, February 7. “Jindal says LSU was irresponsible in handling spending.” WVUETV Fox 8.

179

Wombwell, James A. 2009. “Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster.” The Long War
Series Occasional Paper 29.
Yacoe, Donald. 1991, July 5. “Louisiana Lawmakers Vote for Authority to Run State’s Charity Hospital
System.” The Bond Buyer.
Yakubik, Jill-Karen, Dan Brown, Donna K. Greer and Dayna B. Lee. 2011, September. “Historical
Documentation of the Charity Hospital at New Orleans, Orleans Parish, Louisiana.” Final report, Earth
Search, Inc. for Louisiana Office of Facility Planning & Control.
Yin, Robert K. 2009. CASE STUDY RESEARCH: Design and Methods. Fourth Edition. Applied Social
Research Methods Series Volume 5. Los Angeles: Sage Publications, Inc.
Young, Tara. 2005, October 15. “Amid destruction, the doctors are in.” The Times-Picayune.
Zganjar, Leslie. 1995, January 23. “State keeps trying for Medicaid break.” The Advocate.
Zigmond, Jessica. 2006, October 8. “New Orleans charity care soars.” Modern Healthcare.
Zigmond, Jessica. 2007, August 31. “LSU settles with Smithburg; former division chief heading to
consultancy.” Modern Healthcare.
Zwolak, Judith. 1997, January 1. “Tulane Supports Governor’s Charity Hospital Plan.” Tulane
University. Page accessed July 8, 2010 via
http://tulane.edu/news/releases/archive/1997/tulane_supports_governors_charity_hospital_plan.

180

Left to right: German engineers pump floodwaters from Charity Hospital’s basement; Charity Hospital’s
Emergency Department, September 21, 2005; Charity Hospital’s Emergency Department, June 1, 2009.

Appendix A:
Photographs of attempted reopening of Charity by its workers and the U.S. military
Note: Appendix A provides an internet address to photos taken in 2005 by Charity Hospital
doctors, workers and members of the U.S. military both in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, during the three weeks following the storm while Charity was being cleaned out by its
Emergency Department staff, medical residents, U.S military personnel and other volunteers; as
well as some follow-up photos taken in 2006 to certify Charity’s condition. Several of these
photos made up “Exhibit C” of the attempted legal intervention by citizens with an interest in the
outcome of the FEMA Arbitration; others made up photo booklets distributed to journalists, and
state legislators to back workers’ demands to reopen Charity Hospital (Moises 2009b, p. 243).
Save Charity Hospital (dot) com (2011):
http://www.savecharityhospital.com/content/breaking-news-hospital-appears-clean-after-storm.
Link to the Foundation for Historical Louisiana / RMJM Hillier‘s “Medical Center of Louisiana
at New Orleans / Charity Hospital – New Life for a Cultural Icon” film:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_P9RiqkvrIE.
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Left to right: Stairwell to flooded Charity Hospital basement, early September 2005; floodwaters in
Charity Hospital basement, undated photo; E-MED tents on floor of Morial Convention Center, fall 2005.

Appendix B:
Photographs taken by LSU of Charity Hospital damage; surviving Hurricane Katrina
Note: Appendix B provides internet addresses to photos taken in 2005 on behalf of LSU Media
Relations and Communications, including ones that made up reports prepared by Adams
Management (LSU’s lead consultant evaluator of Charity before and after Katrina); and ones
posted on LSU System websites outlining both the heroism of its medical personnel and what
they termed the “unsalvageable” damage to Charity and University hospitals following the
storm. Subsequently University Hospital was reopened in November 2006; while Charity
Hospital’s main building remains closed (even as its laundry, workshop, powerhouse and chiller
facility also reopened by November 2006.
“LSU Health: Five Years After Katrina and Rita”
http://www.lsuhospitals.org/hurricanes/mclno.shtml;
http://www.lsuhospitals.org/hurricanes/ourStory.shtml (slideshow of photos);
“The Loss of Charity” LSU video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8v81bNsMjDc.
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Appendix C: The movement to Reopen Charity Hospital and Save Lower Mid-City
Note: In part due to my extensive involvement in the launch of the movement to reopen Charity
Hospital, this thesis was not drafted as a social movement analysis; and is only referenced within
the context of the stated research propositions of this case study. However, this work would be
incomplete without noting the organized groupings of this movement – as on several significant
levels it challenged the closure of Charity Hospital and the demolition of the Lower Mid-City
neighborhood for the proposed LSU/VA Medical Center. What follows is a chronological listing
and brief description of the primary organizational actors in efforts to Reopen Charity Hospital
and Save Lower Mid-City:
Doctors for Charity. March 2006-Present. Founded out of the efforts of Charity Hospital doctors,
workers and medical residents who had attempted to reopen Charity Hospital within three weeks of
Hurricane Katrina, September 2005. http://www.doctorsforcharity.com/about.html.
The Committee to Reopen Charity Hospital. Circa Spring 2007-Present. Founded as an offshoot of the
Health Committee of the People’s Hurricane Relief Fund and Oversight Committee (circa Fall 2005) –
and with remnant activists from the pre-Katrina Advocates for Louisiana Public Healthcare (ALPH).
Alternately known as the New Orleans Committee to Reopen Charity. http://www.charityhospital.net.
Advocates for Environmental Human Rights (AEHR). Charity Hospital involvement began in 2006
(e.g., brought attention of its closure directly to international human rights organizations and to the United
Nations); Provided legal counsel and lawsuit support (e.g., led the attempted intervention of citizens with
an interest in the outcome of the FEMA Arbitration, April 2009) as well as community activism.
http://www.ehumanrights.org/ourwork.html.
Foundation for Historical Louisiana (FHL). Spring 2006-Present. Charity Hospital involvement began
following passage of HCR 89 during the 2006 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature (naming FHL
to coordinate the architectural evaluation of Charity Hospital for possible renovation into a 21st century
medical center) Responsible for alerting the national historic preservation community, leading Charity
and the Lower Mid-City neighborhood to be nominated on the list of the Eleven most endangered places.
http://www.fhl.org/fhl/news/presvalerts/charityhospitalsyn.shtm.
ACORN / A Community Voice. Spring 2006-Present. A pre-Katrina ally of Advocates for Louisiana
Public Healthcare, ACORN and its successor A Community Voice’s Charity Hospital involvement
continues. http://acommunityvoice.com/index.php?p=1_4_About.
Health Law Advocates (HLA). Reopen Charity Hospital movement involvement began in 2007.
Provided legal counsel and lawsuit support (e.g., organized and enlisted law firms to file the first lawsuit
contesting Charity Hospital’s closure, January 2008). http://www.healthlawadvocates.org/;
http://www.hlalouisiana.org/.
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Louisiana Justice Institute (LJI). Reopen Charity Hospital movement involvement began in 2007.
Provided legal counsel and lawsuit support (e.g., hosted filing of the first lawsuit contesting Charity
Hospital’s closure, January 2008) as well as community activism.
http://www.louisianajusticeinstitute.org/programs/health+care.
C3/Hands Off Iberville. This group of public housing former / current residents and supporters in 2007
helped revive active organizing to reopen Charity Hospital with sponsored forums of 2006 Reopen
Charity organizers, leading to the formal designation of the Committee to Reopen Charity Hospital
(following the dissolution of the People’s Hurricane Relief Fund and Oversight Committee); and remains
active in partnership (most recently with the Occupy NOLA). http://c3handsoffiberville.blogspot.com/
United Teachers of New Orleans. Charity Hospital involvement began in 2007. Was the first union to
formally endorse and continue in solidarity Reopen Charity Hospital efforts. http://la.aft.org/utno/.
National Trust for Historic Preservation (NTHP). Circa 2008-Present. The main national organization
that has supported through recognition, resources (including staff and funding support) and litigation
(e.g., NTHP vs. VA and FEMA) the Reopen Charity Hospital / Save Lower Mid-City movement.
http://www.preservationnation.org/travel-and-sites/sites/southern-region/charity-hospital/;
http://www.preservationnation.org/resources/legal-resources/additional-resources/ldf-updates/2009-5LDF-Update.pdf.
Lower Mid-City Residents and Business Owners Affected by the LSU/VA. Circa Spring 2008-2010.

http://www.squanderedheritage.com/2008/06/25/open-letter-to-mayor-nagin-and-city-council/.
Save Charity Hospital (dot) Com. Circa 2008-Present. Website and campaign launched to escalate
reopen Charity Hospital organizing and saving Lower Mid-City from demolition. Created by Eli
Ackerman and Jonah Evans with support from the Foundation for Historical Louisiana and Mid-City
residents and businesspeople. http://www.savecharityhospital.com.
Smart Growth for Louisiana. Charity Hospital involvement began circa 2008 with their push for
community participation in the development / expansion of the New Orleans Medical District.

http://www.smartgrowthla.org/; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cAuw8Ny0eQk.
Inside the Footprint Blog. September 2009 to September 2011. Founded by Brad Vogel, Fellow of the
National Trust for Historic Preservation (NTHP). Nearly-complete chronicle of the struggle to save /
demolition of the Lower Mid-City New Orleans neighborhood in advance of the LSU/VA Medical
Center. http://www.insidethefootprint.blogspot.com/.
New Orleans Bio District Watch. Launched in 2011 as an outgrowth of organizing to save Lower MidCity; the Mid-City, Gert Town, Zion City and Xavier neighborhoods now face impacts including possible
demolition due to the designated Greater New Orleans Biosciences Economic Development District (now
known as Bio District New Orleans. http://nolabiodistrictwatch.wordpress.com.
And many others. Efforts by Charity’s workers to reopen Charity Hospital led the recovery of New
Orleans from Hurricane Katrina. Displaced members of the Katrina Diaspora began organizing for the
Right to Return to the city. Reopening Charity Hospital was one of the main landmark goals of recovery
for those supporting the Right of Return of all pre-Katrina residents. This listing is an incomplete list of
efforts in 2009 to broaden the movement: http://savecharityhospital.com/content/41-organizations-callgovernor-and-city-leaders-open-process-decision-making-major-hospitals.
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Photo of K. Brad Ott in front of Charity: Frank Ayami / New Orleans City Business

Vita
Kenneth Brad Ott (K. Brad Ott), an Erie, Pennsylvania native, graduated from New Orleans’ Warren
Easton High School in 1979. A long-time New Orleans progressive community social justice activist, Ott
suffered a DVT/Stroke in October 2003 from sitting too long on a trip. Paralysis that occurred was
substantially reversed (as well as discovery of a congenital heart defect!) thanks to the quick action of the
Rev. Avery C. Alexander Charity Hospital Emergency Department. Ott served as Legislative Chair of
Advocates for Louisiana Public Healthcare (ALPH) (2004-2005). He was the appointed Consumer
Representative for the Region 1 Health Care Consortium (representing the Louisiana parishes of
Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines and St. Bernard), as well as co-chairing its “Care for the Uninsured”
subcommittee (2004-2008). Ott was also the co-founder of the Committee to Reopen Charity Hospital;
and served as its co-chair (2007-2010). Returning to the University of New Orleans (UNO) under a partial
Louisiana Rehabilitation Services grant, Ott completed his Bachelor of Arts in Sociology in 2007. Ott was
a Student Research Assistant (2006-2010) for the UNO Center for Hazards Assessment, Response and
Technology (CHART), an applied research center supporting Louisiana communities’ resilience and
recovery from disasters under the Participatory Action Research (PAR) paradigm. Ott remained at
CHART as a scholar-in-residence throughout 2011 and 2012 to complete this Master of Arts thesis.
Contact Ott at kott@uno.edu; bradott@bellsouth.net or P.O. Box 71221, New Orleans, LA 70172.
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